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Abstract
Judgements of recency (JORs) are decisions about how long ago a repeated item was 
initially presented. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were acquired in three 
experiments, alongside behavioural measures, in order to determine the number and 
nature of memory processes contributing to JORs. In a series of continuous verbal 
memory tasks (adapted from Yntema & Trask, 1963), participants were presented 
with a long list of words and for each item participants were required to make an 
old/new recognition judgement, followed by a numerical JOR. The repetition intervals 
and JOR response options varied across experiments from between 5 to 35 
intervening words. The mid-frontal old/new effect and the left parietal old/new effect 
were two ERP modulations which varied in a strength-based manner across time and 
JOR. These bore resemblances to effects reported in previous studies where they were 
associated with familiarity and recollection memory processes respectively. Late 
frontal ERP activity was also identified in the experiments and this is discussed in 
relation to previous theory. A series of behavioural experiments was employed in 
addition to the ERP studies, which also involved continuous memory tasks. These 
studies all had 6 different repetition lags and JOR response options which were 
between 5 and 30 with increments of 5 (adapted from Hintzman, 2003). This research 
was conducted in order to address further questions about how recollection and 
familiarity might support JORs under different circumstances. Additional support for 
the notion that memory processes underpin JORs in a strength-based manner was 
identified in this behavioural series. The findings in this thesis therefore suggest that 
JORs are based in part on an assessment of memory strength, and that two memory 
processes are likely to support memory for recency under some circumstances.
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CHAPTER 1: MEMORY FOR RECENCY
Introduction
Time perception, including the ability to make judgements about the age of retrieved 
memories, is hugely important for survival even in the modem world of clocks, 
calendars and diaries. Being able to recall how long ago one injected oneself with 
insulin, or how long ago you tested your smoke detector, are examples of memory 
time judgements which need to be reasonably accurate for well-being. How precise is 
one likely to be in making these judgements? Furthermore, how is it that the human 
brain comes to make these judgements of time in the first place? The topic of time and 
memory, and more specifically, judgements of recency (JOR), is the area of research 
with which this thesis is concerned. For the purposes of this research, judgements 
about how long ago a repeated event or item was initially encountered are referred to 
as judgements of recency.
Memory for time includes both memory for recency, as described above, and memory 
for duration. It is memory for recency that this thesis is concerned with, which is 
distinguished conceptually from memory for duration (Block & Zakay, 2001), 
although exactly how these two areas of research relate to one another functionally is 
still to be determined. Duration judgements differ from recency judgments in that the 
former can be both retrospective (e.g. how long did that last?) and prospective (e.g. 
how long do you think this will last?), whereas recency memory is by nature entirely 
retrospective (how long ago did that occur?). One cannot make a recency judgement 
about the future, but one can make a duration judgment about the future, albeit 
sometimes based on retrospective experience (e.g. I think this movie is likely to last 
two hours).
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Perhaps a sensible starting point when considering memory for recency is to view the 
ways in which judgments about when events occurred differ from other kinds of 
judgments about episodic memory details. Tulving’s widely cited characterisation of 
episodic memory (e.g. Tulving, 1983) is that it involves the recovery of ‘what, when 
and where’ information about an event. What is absent from this characterisation is 
any indication about how the bases for making recency memory judgments (‘when’ 
judgments) differ from those supporting ‘what’ and ‘where’ judgments. Clearly 
however, there is a fundamental difference between the sources of information that 
might be employed to make what, when, and where judgments. The difference stems 
from the fact that the strengths of memories diminish with time, and this feature 
provides a source of information that is relevant to ‘when’ judgments in a way that is 
less relevant for ‘where’ and ‘what’ judgments. In the latter two cases, a weak 
memory will simply reduce the likelihood of making an accurate memory judgment 
about, for example, the place an event occurred, or who did what. For ‘when’ 
judgments however, the ‘strength’ of a memory can in principle be a guide, in so far 
as memory strength can be employed as diagnostic for how recently an event 
occurred: strong memories are likely to signal that an event occurred more recently 
than are weak memories (Hinrichs, 1970).
The focus in this thesis is on questions about how the strengths of memories (and 
what kinds of ‘strengths’) might support judgments about when events occurred. This 
line of argument is developed by considering how two processes that support long­
term memory judgments (recollection and familiarity) can support judgments about
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when events occurred, with the particular emphasis being on the question of whether 
either or both of these processes contribute to accurate recency judgments when 
memory ‘strength’ is, by virtue of experiment designs, the principal source of 
information that is available to people. In the following sections, broad conceptual 
considerations about memory for recency are described. Much of the current chapter 
will be based on work by Friedman (1993), who in a detailed and comprehensive 
review characterised the kinds of information that could support recency memory. 
Furthermore in this chapter, considerations about memory strength as a basis for 
recency judgments will be linked to the processes of recollection and familiarity. A 
review of the evidence that supports the distinction between recollection and 
familiarity is provided. This is necessary, because there remains controversy about the 
separation between these processes, as well as how these processes might be 
instantiated neurally.
The second chapter also includes the justification for employing event-related 
potentials (ERPs) as indices of memory processes. Critically, Chapter 2 provides the 
argument that the strength of familiarity and recollection may support ‘when’ 
judgments, and that an assessment of this account can be obtained through an analysis 
of how neural activity varies in tasks where people make JORs.
Memory for Recency
Several theories that offer to explain memory for recency have been proposed. These 
include: Time Tagging Theory, Strength theory, Perturbation Theory, Associative 
Chaining Theory and the Scale Invariant Memory, Perception and Learning Model. 
Each of these is outlined below in rough chronological order. After this historical
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review, work by Friedman (1993) will be discussed, which is considered most 
relevant to the current work, and which provides a strong theoretical basis upon which 
judgements about time can be made. This work is then used as a framework for the 
discussion of much relevant empirical research, and has informed and supported the 
research carried out in this thesis.
The name ‘time tag’ refers to hypothetical information about time that is bound to a 
memory trace at the time of encoding (Friedman, 1990). Time tags were considered to 
be part of a memory organization system that was not exclusive for coding temporal 
information (Yntema & Trask, 1963). For example, Yntema and Trask (1963) noted 
that memories might be associated with a number of tags that provide categorical 
information, linguistic information, temporal information and so on. Hasher and 
Zacks (1979) also advocated a theory of memory consistent with the notion of time 
tags, claiming that information about time is automatically bound into a memory trace 
through a temporal coding system.
There is much evidence that opposes time tag models, for example in one early study 
of memory for recency, JORs were compared for abstract and concrete words in a 
continuous recognition paradigm (Yntema & Trask, 1963). The researchers were 
interested in whether time tags were used to determine the age of an item in memory. 
Yntema and Trask (1963) showed that people were more variable when making JORs 
for abstract than concrete words, which doesn’t fit with a time tag theory, since there 
is no logical reason for concrete items to be associated with a more recent time tag 
during encoding. Time tag models are also challenged by the findings of Wagenaar
10
(1986) who, in a diary study, found that date of encoding information is of little 
benefit when attempting to recall an episode.
Finally, more recent findings show that when comparing the relative recency of two 
items in memory, participants stop searching memory for temporal information when 
they recover time associated with the most recent item (e.g. Muter, 1979). This 
reaction time data (RT) is inconsistent with the notion that each event is associated 
with its own separate time tag, because this cannot explain why accessing one tag 
might allow you to make a relative order judgement (since both tags would surely 
have to be accessed by the participant). Thus, time tag theories cannot account for 
many recency memory research findings (in addition see Friedman, 2001). A more 
promising line of thought is a strength theory of recency.
Strength-based accounts of memory for recency are an alternative to time-tagging 
theories. An early strength-based account of JORs was put forward by Hinrichs 
(1970) who provided evidence in support of the idea that the estimation of memory 
age is based on the amount of memory-related activity produced when a trace is 
reactivated. This strength level is postulated to decline with increasing memory age. 
Thus an estimate of the age of a memory could be based on the level of strength 
gauged at retrieval. Memory strength is assumed to decline with increasing age 
through interference of other more recently encountered items and through less 
efficient trace activation (Hinrichs, 1970).
Hinrichs also noted that a decision process would be required before attributing an 
item with a JOR, where a criterion would be set about what level of strength
11
corresponds to each degree of time (1970). Setting the strength criteria could be based 
on: (i) comparison with other items in time; (ii) comparison with strength at encoding; 
or (iii) comparison to a fixed and pre-determined global strength. Therefore, to 
determine the recency of a memory one would require some means of assessing 
strength levels, along with a decision process based upon criteria for attributing 
strength to a point in time (Hinrichs, 1970). Strength theory was not widely advocated 
at this time and was thought by some to be a poor account of recency memory. 
Hintzman and Block (1971) for example, had shown that items presented near the 
beginning of a list are better discriminated than items at the end of a list. This would 
be unexpected according to a strength theory of recency, since more recently 
experienced items would be expected to have greater memory strength (Hintzman,
2000). However data such as this can be accounted for by strength theory -  since 
items at the beginning of a list may be rehearsed more than items at the end of a list, 
making them even stronger in memory than the most recently encountered items. The 
possibility that memory strength may provide a basis for recency judgements is a key 
concept that is returned to throughout this thesis.
In the late seventies, researchers began developing ideas about how memory for serial 
order is established. An account of recency was put forward by Lee and Estes in 1981. 
In their model, the temporal properties of an item (A) are encoded at the time of 
presentation. As more items are experienced (B, C), the temporal properties of the 
item (A) are updated through a process of reactivation. According to this notion, to 
retrieve the temporal properties of an item, one would need to move through a list of 
items backwards in time according to order of presentation. The relations between the 
items in the list serve as temporal context, and rehearsal of the order needs to occur in
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order to preserve the temporal context in memory (Lee & Estes, 1981). During 
rehearsal, some re-activations may cause items to be placed out of order mistakenly 
(‘perturbed’), having a knock-on effect for the order of related items.
Friedman (1993) noted that there is much support for perturbation models of memory 
for time, for example, the fact that memory for recency is often associated with 
temporal landmarks, such as the beginning of a list. It also accounts for scale effects - 
accuracy on a fine time scale, but less accuracy on a wider time scale (e.g. Friedman 
& Wilkins, 1985). However, it is unlikely that perturbation theory accurately 
describes the mechanics of recency memory under all situations. Perturbation theory 
is likely to be applicable for short sequences of items for example, and not when there 
is a long list of items in which there are few temporal landmarks (e.g. Hintzman,
2001). In several circumstances there would be limited scope for item order rehearsal 
(Friedman, 1993). In very long lists, many of the items are likely to be forgotten and 
therefore cannot provide information about the recency of other items from the list -  
yet under these circumstances, people are still able to make recency judgements (e.g. 
Hintzman, 2003). Thus perturbation theory is promising but is unlikely to provide a 
complete account of memory for recency.
Associative chaining models emerged in the late 1980s, and these models are similar 
to the perturbation theory of memory for recency, in that they were formed to describe 
temporal memory for fairly short sequences of items. Lewandowsky and Murdock 
(1989) developed a model linked to the Theory of Distributed Associative Memory 
(TODAM), a single process view of recognition memory. Murdock (1982) proposed 
that items in memory are seen as lists of random features, and presentation of a test
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cue results in a comparison process with information stored in memory. Mismatches 
result in new judgements (i.e. a judgement that the item has been presented for the 
first time in the list), whereas a particular degree of matching of test item and stored 
information in the long-term memory store will result in old judgments (i.e. a 
judgement that the item is a repetition in the list).
In the Lewandowsky and Murdock (1989) model, memory for temporal order is 
stored in the associations between pairs of items in a sequence. These may be 
associations between single items such as words, or between groups of items on a 
larger scale (chunks). For example, if there are three items in a list (A, B, C), one 
must store the association between the first two (A, B) and the second two (B, C) 
items on the list to enable one to retain order information (Lewandowsky & Murdock, 
1989). In practical terms, this might mean that we would date an event only by 
associating it with other events.
The main problem with the associative chaining model is that it does not make clear 
the scale at which temporal associations are stored, and that (as is also the case for 
perturbation theory) the theory does not allow for the fact that episodic memory 
usually gives rise to limited rehearsal (Friedman, 1993). If temporal memory is 
mediated by associative chaining, it is unclear how this could work over very long 
lists of items, or over long time scales. A more recent account of recency memory has 
since been put forward that views this class of memory as being based on 
chronological order of occurrence, rather than on the associations between events, and 
this is described below.
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Brown, Neath and Chater (2007) have proposed a Scale Invariant Memory and 
Perceptual Learning (SIMPLE) model that envisions memory as being organised in a 
form directly reflecting the organization of actual time. More recently presented items 
are represented by more easily accessible memory traces than are less recently 
presented items, explained by SIMPLE through the notion that memories are 
chronologically organised. Traces for items presented far back in the past are viewed 
as occupying a congested part of memory, and are thus more confusable and less 
easily accessed than recently encountered items (Brown & Chater, 2001). Brown et al. 
(2007) suggest that ease in accessing a memory trace will be dictated by this temporal 
expanse, and that this will be proportional to the number of items sharing the same 
region of psychological space. The SIMPLE model is scale invariant, in that it applies 
equally over different time-scales across prospective and retrospective memories, and 
this element of the theory is supported by the finding that forgetting curves have the 
same shape over a range of different time-scales (Maylor, Chater & Brown 2001).
Brown and Chater (2001) suggest that since more recently experienced items or 
events may be recovered more easily than less recently occurring items (due to 
forgetting over time), memory must be temporally organised. Furthermore, Brown 
and Chater (2001) cite evidence in support of their model that the temporal position of 
some items in a list can be confused with that of other items -  and that this is more 
likely to happen when those items occur closely together in actual time (Healy, 1974). 
Other support for a SIMPLE model of memory is data showing that the need for 
information about an event declines with an increase in the amount of time since the 
event occurred -  in line with memory accessibility (Anderson, 1998). Additionally, 
Brown and Chater (2001) suggest that evolutionary foraging behaviour was the likely
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precursor to memory developing in this way -  in that to save energy an animal must 
know both how long it will take to travel a certain distance for food. The authors of 
the model perceive temporal landmarks in memory (such as the start or end of a list) 
to be reminiscent of spatial cues in foraging behaviour (2001).
Though SIMPLE theory can account for some serial order phenomena (e.g. long term 
recency effects: Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Talmi & Goshen-Gottstein, 2006), the model 
fails to account for one of the principal findings in serial order experiments 
(Friedman, 2001), known as the primacy effect (Murdock, 1962), where items at the 
beginning of a list are remembered well, relative to mid-list items. According to the 
SIMPLE account this should not be the case, since items at the start of a list are 
chronologically further back in time than mid-list items, and must be more 
confusable. In addition, this theory fails to account for scale effects (Friedman, 2001).
Though this theory has much relevance for an account of serial ordering performance 
and was developed based on empirical evidence from serial ordering tasks (Chater & 
Brown, 2008), a SIMPLE view of memory is less able to account for data obtained in 
long continuous recency tasks that are free of contextual landmarks (such as the 
beginning and end of a list). These are the kinds of tasks that are employed in this 
thesis. The important distinction here is between judgements of recency and 
judgements of serial order (Hintzman, 2003), where primacy and recency effects may 
only in the latter case reflect associations with these contextual landmarks (at least to 
an extent). Thus, despite the fact a SIMPLE view of memory has been put forward as 
an account of memory for recency, it is not relevant for the tasks presented within this 
thesis, nor is it able to fully explain tasks of serial ordering.
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In this historical review of theories relevant to memory for recency, each can account 
for some empirical data (perhaps with the exception of time tagging theories), but not 
all. Friedman (1993) categorised these theories into location, relative and distance 
accounts of memory for recency and as will be illustrated later in this chapter, the 
theories may not need to compete as different accounts of recency. It will be argued 
that different forms of recency information may be available under different 
circumstances. Before moving onto Friedman’s framework of memory for time 
however, a potentially important theory of time perception shall be described.
Wearden ’s Model o f Time Perception
In addition to the above theories and viewpoints about memory for time, there is 
another interesting branch of theory that is related, which concerns perceptions of 
time duration. Evidence suggests that people often have only a loose sense of time 
perception, for example when asked to judge the amount of time that has elapsed (i.e. 
to assess duration), adults tend to make underestimations (Block & Zakay, 1997). 
Older adults make greater verbal estimates of duration regardless of the time period 
presented (Block, Zakay, & Hancock, 1998), and young children show greater 
variability in their time duration judgements than adults, as well as overestimating 
time periods that have passed (Block, Zakay, & Hancock, 1999). An influential view 
of time perception is that of Wearden (2003) who has argued in support of a Scalar 
Expectancy (or Timing) Theory (SET), which provides a description of internal 
timing mechanisms.
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Wearden (2001) described how one might come to make a judgement about the 
duration of a time interval by using an internal clock that may store the length of time 
between stimulus presentation and stimulus repetition, which is measured via ‘ticks’.
It is proposed that the presentation of a stimulus switches a connection between a 
pace-maker and an accumulator into ‘on’ mode, which is switched ‘off again at 
stimulus repetition. The switch is thought as of being variable in the time it takes to 
initiate, thereby causing inconsistency in duration judgements, which Wearden refers 
to as ‘scalar variance’. This internal clock is one part of the SET model initially 
developed by Gibbon, Church and Meek (1984), and according to the model 
accumulated temporal information can be transferred into short- or long-term 
memory. Decision processes are also incorporated in the model, which are necessary 
for the stored information to be employed for time judgments. Evidence for the 
presence of an accumulator has been obtained in animal studies, where pace-makers 
are employed to produce a certain number of ‘ticks’ per second and this can guide 
behaviours that are rewarded only after a certain number of clicks have been 
encountered (for a review, see Lejeune & Wearden, 2006).
However, while this view of time perception is intriguing, there are difficulties 
reconciling it with work that seeks to find an understanding of temporal 
representations in memory. For example, Hoerl and McCormack (2001) have stated 
that despite the well explicated representations in Wearden’s theory, such timers may 
not be able to provide an animal with enough information to distinguish between 
events happening at different times (and/or placing episodic events in temporal order), 
in particular when such disparate events may correspond to the same representations 
or internal state or clock (Hoerl & McCormack, 2001). In addition, it is not
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straightforward to envision how one or even a few clocks might accurately represent 
the passage of time between multiple similar memory episodes in a way that would 
permit accurate time judgments when several competing episodes intervene between 
presentation and re-presentation.
It may be that subjective time in memory may be linked to actual passage of time, 
amongst other factors (Lam & Buehler, 2009). Despite this, JORs are quite different 
from time as measured by clocks (Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock & von Hecker, 2008; 
Ross & Wilson, 2002), and thus it is likely that they are based on something other 
than an internal mirror of actual time passage. Furthermore, in a criticism related to 
that made by Hoerl and McCormack (2001), while Wearden’s model appears to 
propose logical mechanisms that can represent some aspects of internal time 
perception, the fact that the model relates to conceptual representations of processes 
at a holistic level rather than to hypothesise about how these processes could 
cognitively or physiologically function, means that it is not easy to investigate, and 
may require greater refinement (a problem recognised by Wearden himself, 2001). As 
Staddon noted, no such physiological evidence of an internal clock or pacemaker has 
yet been found in the 20 years since SET theory was formally described (2005). 
Wearden’s work looks promising, however it requires more development and is of 
less significance to the current research than more empirically grounded theory such 
as the work of Friedman (1993) and Hintzman (2001; 2003; 2004).
In summary, a roughly chronological summary of existing models of memory for time 
highlights that each has various advantages and disadvantages. What follows is a
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description of a framework of memory for recency by Friedman (1993) which 
incorporates as well as integrates many of the positive aspects of the above models.
Understanding Memory for Recency: Friedman’s Framework 
Friedman (1993) has suggested that a person could make use of three types of 
information when making recency memory judgements. Relative information involves 
making judgements about where (in time) an event fits in to a series of events. The 
associations between items are thus assumed to provide a form of recency 
information. For example, a person might determine that their neuroscience meeting 
took place in June by relating it to a cognitive meeting which took place in May, and 
to an interview they had in July. Hence, the use of relative information would be 
useful when one wishes to make chronological re-ordering judgements.
Location information is a second form of information which is likely to be available 
to people when making judgements about recency in memory (Friedman, 1993). 
Location-based information is said to be intrinsic and fixed within the memory for the 
study episode (Friedman, 1993). To date an item’s initial occurrence, one must assess 
the trace for this contextual information, or reconstruct it (Curran & Friedman, 2003). 
For example, a person might judge that their holiday in Greece occurred eight years 
ago, because they remember that the Sept 11th terrorist attacks happened while they 
were there. Knowledge about time systems can be used to interpret the context of an 
event, in order to date the event.
Distance information is the third form of information which could be utilised when 
making recency judgements (Friedman, 1993). Distance-based information is
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assumed to change between the time of encoding and retrieval (Friedman, 1993). 
Memory strength could be classified as distance information. For example, if 
vividness was the basis for a person’s memory strength, then a highly vivid memory 
for a birthday party might be the basis forjudging that the birthday occurred very 
recently. That is, assessing levels of strength decay between encoding and retrieval is 
the basis of this form of distance information. Chronological organization of memory 
and contextual overlap between encoding and retrieval (see Figure 1 below) are 
theories which also fall under the bracket of distance information according to the 
Friedman (1993) model, and these will be discussed further on pages 36-38.
Friedman’s 1993 Framework of Memory 
a  for Recency
Distance Information
1 Chronological Organization
\  Location InformationRelative Information
3 Strength Measurement
2 Contextual Overlap
Figure 1. Interpretation of Friedman’s (1993) framework of memory for recency. In 
the black boxes are three potential forms of information that one might use in order to 
make a recency memory judgement. It was proposed that three types of theory fall 
under the bracket of distance, and these are indicated in the red boxes.
Friedman’s (1993) distinctions between the three classes of information described 
above (black boxes in Figure 1) are a way of thinking about memory for recency that 
is fruitful for research, because there is evidence to suggest that these types of 
information are discrete and that they form the basis for temporal memory judgements 
in different ways and under different circumstances -  as will be demonstrated in the 
following sections (for an in-depth review, see Friedman 1993; 2001).
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Relative, distance, and location are the three types of information that may contribute 
to judgements of memory for recency (Friedman, 1993), and it is distance information 
which is of most relevance to the current work. Distance information is of interest, 
because it is the least researched of the three types, but key evidence suggests that it 
may be very important under certain circumstances (e.g. Curran & Friedman 2003; 
2004; Hintzman 2003). Therefore, particular attention will be paid to research and 
theory that pertains to distance information, and its key role in informing memory for 
time and recency judgements. The different possible types of distance information 
will be discussed in detail later in this Chapter (p36).
What follows is a review of theory and research that is divided into three sections, 
which focus on the main types of recency information outlined by Friedman (1993). 
The discussion will describe work that may indicate how and when these forms of 
information might be used in recency memory judgements. It is distance information 
which is of most relevance to the work in this thesis, and this kind of information is 
described last. After these sections, the discussion will then focus on familiarity and 
recollection memory processes, how these may vary in a strength-based manner, and 
thus how they might be considered to be a form of distance information.
Studies o f Relative Information
This is the information type to which Friedman (1993; 2001; 2004) has given 
arguably the least weight in his framework, although it is the information type which 
has been explored the most. Sometimes it is necessary to re-organise events 
chronologically, and to re-order a series of items, one must make use of relative 
information - thus Associative Chaining theory and Perturbation theory could be
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categorised as falling under the bracket of relative information in Friedman’s (1993) 
framework. An example of a typical task which gives rise to reliance on relative 
information is presenting participants with a list of items at study, and then during 
test, presenting participants with a list of studied items and asking them to re-order the 
items according to order of original presentation (e.g. Naveh-Benjamin, 1990).
Another example would be to present participants with a list of items at study, then to 
re-present two items at test and ask participants to select the most recent item. Tasks 
which are likely to require participants to make use of relative information for 
temporal judgements, involve comparisons between 2 or more items along a time-line 
of some form (e.g. Tzeng & Cotton, 1980).
There is evidence that relative time of occurrence is a distinct class of information that 
is available when one aims to make a judgement of recency. In an important study 
relating to relative information, Tzeng and Cotton (1980) tested the ability of 
participants to determine the relative recency of words which were either semantically 
unrelated (e.g. dog -  jug) or related (dog -  cat). Participants were more successful in 
picking the most recent of the two items when the test words were semantically 
related, and this is thought to be because one word in the pair will more easily remind 
the participant about the recency of the other related word from the pair (see also 
Hintzman, Summers & Block, 1975; Naime & Neumann, 1993; Winograd &
Soloway, 1985). Friedman (1993) suggested that this is best explained if one believes 
that relative information, rather than distance or location information, is the basis for 
these recency judgements. Consider a list of 5 items: Dog, Jug, Map, Cat and Pit. If 
‘cat’ and ‘dog’ were presented in a pair and the participant asked to judge the relative 
recency, participants would be expected to be more accurate in this pairing than if
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‘dog’ was paired with ‘jug’. Relative theories can explain this finding since activation 
of the word ‘cat’ may reactivate knowledge about the position of the word ‘dog’.
Since ‘dog’ and ‘jug’ are not categorically related, there would be no reason for 
relative order information to be generated for this pairing. A distance or location 
information theory cannot account for these findings.
The finding that temporal order is judged more accurately if the stimuli are related is 
consistent over relatively short time periods, but Friedman (2007) has shown that the 
semantic relation between items over very long periods of time may not influence 
relative ordering. Participants in Friedman’s study were presented with a list of 
movies put into pairs. If the participant had previously seen both movies in the pair, 
they were to make a temporal order judgement. The movie pairs were either 
semantically related (since they contained the same person in the lead roles), or they 
were semantically unrelated (they had different people in the lead roles). When 
making judgements of temporal order for movies approximately 5 years old or more, 
the effect of semantic relation did not influence ordering. This was also the case in a 
second study of announcements across a three week interval (Friedman, 2007). It is 
therefore possible that relative order information is lost with increasing time.
Skowronski, Walker and Betz (2003) also conducted a study to investigate recency 
memory in a way that relative information was likely to be relied upon. They asked 
participants to log one event per day over a period of 9 weeks. One week after the end 
of the diary section of the experiment, participants took part in a computer recency 
test. Two selected events from the diary (based on the same theme) were presented on 
screen and the participants were asked to give a relative order judgement (Skowronski
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et al., 2003). The key finding was that semantically related events were not more 
accurately dated over a long time scale, consistent with Friedman (2007). Perhaps 
contextual or strength-based information are the types of information used in temporal 
judgements on larger time scales, however the finding that semantic relation 
influences recency memory performance over the short term suggests that this is a 
source of information distinct from the other two categories defined by Friedman 
(1993).
Naveh-Benjamin (1990) conducted a series of relative ordering experiments in which 
participants were always presented with a series of 20 words. After the study period, 
participants were asked to re-order the stimuli according to the study presentation 
sequence. Ordering performance was better for groups who were expecting to 
complete a re-ordering task in advance of the test, in comparison to participants who 
were not expecting to re-order the stimuli (1990). It was also found that when 
attention was less available for the encoding of order, re-ordering performance was 
reduced at test. Finally, when participants were told how to improve encoding of the 
order of the stimuli, performance was enhanced (Naveh-Benjamin, 1990). This 
research suggests that relative information for temporal order is not automatically 
encoded. However, this was a complex task where all 20 items were expected to be 
re-ordered. It might be the case that when re-ordering tasks are less complex, 
automatically encoded recency information may be recruited by participants.
In a task where participants were asked to re-order a list of just 7 items in the original 
order of presentation, participants were also more accurate when the temporal re­
organization task was anticipated (Van Asselen, Van der Lubbe & Postma, 2006).
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This task is likely to make use of relative information, since recency information must 
be compared for each item to complete this task. Participants had been presented with 
lists of items where they were told to focus on either the spatial locations or on the 
temporal order. On some spatial trials, participants were unexpectedly asked for order 
information. A correct expectation led to a reduced error rate, thus it is likely that 
some information about temporal order is not automatically encoded in memory 
(consistent with the findings of Naveh-Benjamin, 1990). Furthermore, spatial 
judgements were found to have no primacy or recency effects as a function of 
temporal order -  a finding that suggests spatial and temporal short -term memory are 
distinct source memory types (Van Asselen et al., 2006). These findings conflict with 
the notions of Hasher and Zacks (1979) outlined on plO, and present a strong 
challenge to time tag theories of memory for recency.
There is some evidence that use of relative information might be dependent on the 
integrity of the frontal lobes. In a neuropsychological study, three groups of patients 
with amnesia were compared with healthy controls on a relative ordering memory 
task. The patient groups consisted of frontal lobe lesion patients, Korsakoff patients 
and a mix of non-Korsakoff related amnesic patients. Patients with frontal lesions 
were impaired on a word sequencing activity, where re-ordering of words according 
to order of presentation was required, despite the finding that their recognition 
memory performance did not differ from that of normal controls (Shimamura, 
Janowsky, & Squire, 1990). The same group of patients also performed more poorly 
than the other groups in their ability to accurately order news events chronologically. 
The findings suggest that the integrity of the frontal lobes is necessary for 
performance on tasks that require re-ordering abilities (Shimamura et al., 1990), but
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not in tasks that require only recognition memory. This of course also suggests that 
recency memory and recognition memory do not rely on entirely the same processes. 
This point will be returned to in later sections (see in particular, p46).
In another neuropsychological study, frontal lobe patients and healthy controls were 
asked to reconstruct the temporal sequence after studying a list of words (Mangels, 
1997). In one condition the participants knew they would be tested for temporal order 
and in another condition they were unaware of the task that would follow. Patients 
with damage to the dorsal lateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC) did not benefit from 
prior knowledge about the temporal task, whereas healthy controls did suggesting that 
they made use of strategies which would aid their ability to reorder the stimuli 
(Mangels, 1997). Patients with frontal lobe deficits did not differ in terms of their 
temporal ordering performance under incidental conditions, in comparison with the 
normal controls (Mangels, 1997). This suggests that the frontal lobes do not have a 
selective role for dealing with temporal information. Instead, this finding lends 
support to the view that the frontal lobes are necessary for implementing strategies 
which support general source memory processing (i.e. the mechanisms underpinning 
memory for the context in which an item was first presented).
Early imaging research utilising functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in the 
investigation of memory for recency also showed that the frontal lobes are implicated 
in these memory processes (Eyler-Zorrilla, Aguirre, Zarahn, Cannon & D’Esposito, 
1996). After studying a long list of words, participants were asked to make 
judgements of recency (choose the most recent item from a pair) or to make a 
judgment about oddity (choose the odd one out), in alternating blocks. Recency
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judgements were associated with activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
bilaterally, while oddity judgments were not (Eyler-Zorilla et al., 1996). This research 
provides further evidence that the frontal lobes are implicated in tasks where relative 
time judgements are made.
The notion that the frontal lobes support recency memory non-selectively is 
reinforced by fMRI evidence that the right DLPFC activity is reflective of a generic 
strategic ordering process (Rajah & McIntosh, 2006). Normal participants were 
scanned during a reverse alphabetizing task (said to be related to strategic ordering) 
and during separate old/new recognition memory and recency memory tasks. In the 
recognition task participants were asked to pick the old (repeated) item from a pair. In 
the recency task two words from the study list were presented and the most recent was 
to be judged. The greatest activation in the DLPFC was associated with strategic 
ordering in the alphabetizing task and activity in this area was more active during the 
recency than the recognition task (Rajah & McIntosh, 2006).
This finding supports the notion that a sub-region of the frontal lobes is not a critical 
recency area, but is implicated in recency memory in an executive-based manner -  
that is, the area is likely to be associated with executive functioning. Executive 
functioning in memory is likely to involve a strategic or planned control of memory, 
and not automatic internal responses (Burgess, 1998). Tests of executive functions 
generally require working memory, inhibition and/or cognitive flexibility (Oosterman 
et al., 2008). Thus, where most need for strategic control of memory is required (as in 
the reverse alphabetising task), then the greatest activation in the DLPFC is observed.
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In summary, the studies detailed above have implicated the frontal lobes in recency 
memory judgements, using tasks where relative information is likely to have been 
employed. Many other relative information studies have also provided evidence to 
support the idea that the frontal lobes perform an executive role in memory for time of 
this form (Butters, Kaszniak, Glisky, Eslinger & Schacter, 1994; Dobbins, Rice, 
Wagner & Schacter, 2003; Dumas & Hartman, 2003; Kessels, Hobbel & Postma, 
2007; Konishi et al., 2002; McAndrews & Milner, 1991; Schmitter-Edgecombe & 
Simpson, 2001; Yasuno et al., 1999).
Summary o f Relative Information
Numerous studies in which memory for recency has been investigated have employed 
tasks in which participants are likely to make use of information about relative times 
of occurrence. In order to perform successfully in these tasks, participants had to be 
able to judge the relative recency of each item in a sequence. From this brief review 
of studies in which it is likely that relative information is utilised, it is clear that some 
progress has been made into understanding memory for recency.
Behavioural studies have led to findings showing that relative information is likely to 
be a distinct form of memory information that participants use in their recency 
judgements, and that this is likely to be more available for items or events which have 
occurred recently (Tzeng & Cotton, 1980), as compared to those occurring in the 
more distant past (Friedman, 2007). From the results of behavioural studies it is clear 
that relative information is not automatically encoded for short complex tasks (e.g. 
Naveh-Benjamin, 1990), though whether this is true for events and items over much 
longer periods of time is yet to be understood.
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Neuropsychological and imaging studies have shown that the frontal lobes are 
implicated in memory for recency and that recognition memory does not rely on the 
frontal lobes in entirely the same way (Shimamura et al., 1990). Furthermore, 
neuropsychological and imaging evidence has shown that the frontal lobes are 
implicated in recency judgements in an executive manner -  presumably in organising 
data and implementing strategies (Mangels, 1997; Rajah & Mackintosh, 2006).
In this section some important evidence has been reviewed that suggests relative 
information is utilised for recency judgements in memory under some circumstances. 
The frontal lobes have been implicated in tasks where participants are required to 
make use of relative information for recency judgements. What now follows is a 
review of studies where participants are likely to make use of what Friedman referred 
to as location information (1993).
Location Studies
Friedman (1996; 2001) focused largely on the contributions of location information 
and distance information (see following section) to memory for recency. Tasks where 
location information is likely to be utilised for recency judgements typically involve 
studying separate lists of items. Participants are then presented with words from the 
different lists and are asked to make a JOR for each. List 1 vs. List 2 judgements are 
likely to provide clear location information since items within the list may act as 
temporal landmarks -  whereby participants form an association between the list 
(location) and the item (Friedman, 2001).
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The existence of scale effects is said to be the most convincing evidence suggesting 
that location information can be utilised when making judgements about recency 
(Friedman, 2001). Scale effects are demonstrated where one is able to make a fairly 
accurate recency judgement on a fine timescale, but to be less accurate on a wider 
timescale (Friedman, 2001). For example, in reminiscing, a person might be accurate 
in judging that they dropped a birthday cake at lunchtime (fine scale - within a day), 
while being inaccurate in judging that the birthday cake was dropped two years ago, 
when it was actually dropped three years ago (wide scale - within years).
One early study in which a scale effect was observed was conducted by Hintzman, 
Block and Summers (1973). Participants were presented with four separate study lists 
of words. After all study phases, the participants were asked to indicate, for each test 
word, which study list it had come from and where in that study list (list position) the 
item had been presented. Participants were often incorrect when judging which study 
list the item belonged to (wide scale), despite being correct about the item’s list 
position (fine scale) (Hintzman et al., 1973). Distance information is presumably not 
the basis for these effects, because it is likely that big differences in strength (across 
lists) should be easier to distinguish than small, positional strength differences. 
Relative order information is also unlikely to be responsible, because it should be 
easier to assess an item in relation to a big temporal landmark (such as list 1, list 2, 
etc) than to compare relative information within a list of very many items. Location 
information can account for this finding, however, because it is likely that information 
about a fine time-scale would be stored as part of the episode context. These findings 
therefore support strongly the position that location information is a discrete form of 
information that can support recency judgments.
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Chalmers (2005) conducted a study where participants were likely to rely on location 
information for their temporal source judgements. Participants studied two lists of 
novel faces, and half of the faces were repeated three times within each list (frequency 
manipulation). At test, half of the participants were asked to make a recency 
judgement for each presented face, while the remainder of the participants were asked 
to make a frequency judgement. Only frequency level influenced judgements about 
frequency, whereas an item’s frequency and actual recency influenced recency 
judgements, with faces which were presented three times in list 2 attracting the 
greatest level of accurate responses (Chalmers, 2005). Since frequency judgements 
were more accurate than recency judgments, it was suggested that the capacity to 
make these judgements is likely to be dependent on different memory processes 
(Chalmers, 2005).
These data extend those of Hintzman (2001) who found that, although they are 
related, participants do not confuse recency and frequency of presentation very often, 
therefore these types of judgements cannot be based on entirely the same memory 
processes. Participants have been found to be quite poor in judging the recency of 
faces in comparison to previous research of a similar nature with pictures (Huppert & 
Piercy, 1978). Chalmers (2005) suggested that this might have been due to a 
decreased ability to form associations between each face and its associated context 
(location information), suggesting that decreasing the availability of location 
information leads to less accurate recency judgements.
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The frontal lobes have been implicated in recency memory in tasks where location is 
likely to be utilised. Shimamura, Jemigan and Squire have shown that patients 
suffering from Korsakoff’s Syndrome (KS) typically have damage to the frontal lobes 
(1988). These patients also have damage to the midline diencephalon nuclei, which 
project to the DLPFC (Langlais, 1995). Korsakoff patients have been reported as 
exhibiting temporal memory deficits, amongst their other cognitive deficits, such as 
spatial memory (Postma et al., 2006). In one study, for example, a group of Korsakoff 
patients were presented with two lists containing twelve words. At test they were 
required to determine which of two previously studied words (one from each list) was 
presented the most recently. Korsakoff patients had impaired recency memory in 
comparison with control participants who had damage restricted to the medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) (Downes, Mayes, MacDonald, & Hunkin, 2002).
The task reported by Downes et al (2002) was one that is likely to tap recency 
memory capacities in a location-based manner, since the task involves two well 
defined separate lists and clear temporal landmarks. This research supports earlier 
findings with Korsakoff patients, which implemented a time interval of over more 
than an hour between lists (Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1997). Researchers 
have postulated that the impairments exhibited by these patients may stem from 
higher order executive difficulties (Brokate et al., 2003). It is possible that the frontal 
lobes are contributing to the impairments demonstrated by the KS patients, although 
the diffuse damage associated with this condition encourages some caution. If this 
account is correct, however, then the findings are further evidence that the frontal 
lobes play a role in memory for recency that is not specific for this form of memory, 
since damage to these regions also impairs spatial memory in KS patients.
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A separate study using a similar form of task (list 1/list 2 discrimination) found that, 
when using face stimuli, there was only a marginal differentiation between patients 
with damage to the frontal lobes and patients with damage to the posterior cortex in 
regard to performance on a recency task (Daum & Mayes, 2000). Frontal patients 
were also impaired in their spatial memory abilities and in tasks measuring executive 
function (relative to controls). This study provides further evidence to suggest that 
recency memory is not a selective impairment associated with frontal lesions. It is 
likely that frontal patients are exhibiting difficulties related to executive functioning 
such as planning or other forms of organisation (Daum & Mayes, 2000).
Fradera and Ward (2006) conducted a study with older and younger adults. They 
aimed to assess whether increasing the availability of location information for an 
event increases the accuracy with which participants can date those events. In this 
study, a young adult group (mean age 20 years) had not been alive at the time of the 
actual newsworthy events, unlike the older group of adults (mean age 74 years). 
Participants were provided with a booklet of events. The task required them to date 
each event from a multiple choice (9 year intervals across choices), and to answer two 
multiple choice questions to demonstrate their contextual knowledge of the event 
(Fradera & Ward, 2006).
Fradera and Ward (2006) showed that the level of contextual knowledge of an event 
for young adults was related to the accuracy of dating the event. This was not found to 
be the case for the older group of participants. Though the older group was able to 
provide a greater volume of contextual information for the events (as shown by their
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level of accuracy in answering questions about the events), this group was poorer at 
dating when the event had occurred. This experiment provides some support for the 
idea that older adults have poorer recency memory abilities (Fradera & Ward, 2006) 
and suggests that they do not make use of the location information available to them 
to the same extent as younger participants in tasks of very long-term memory (over 30 
years). It may be that this is caused by deterioration of the frontal lobes with 
increasing age (Moscovitch & Winocur, 1995), leading to a decline in the ability to 
use location information -  a reconstructive process likely to demand many 
organizational aspects of memory relating to executive functioning.
Summary o f Location Information
Fewer studies investigating memory for recency have employed tasks in which 
participants are likely to make use of location information, in comparison with 
relative information. In order to perform successfully in these tasks, participants are 
likely to find associated contextual cues in the memory trace which might indicate 
when the test item or event was originally presented. Behavioural studies have shown 
that location information is likely to be a form of information available to participants 
when carrying out recency judgements (e.g. Chalmers, 2005; Hintzman et al., 1973). 
Interestingly, a recent study has revealed that greater accuracy in recency judgments 
may be achieved by increasing availability of contextual information (Chalmers,
2005), which supports the idea that location information is being relied on in this task 
(rather than relative or distance information). Furthermore, there is good evidence 
which suggests that scale effects exist, whereby participants may be more accurate at 
recency memory judgements on a fine time scale than on a grosser scale (Hintzman et 
al., 1973). This is likely to arise from a reliance on location information where
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contextual information for the episode is strong, thereby allowing for high accuracy 
within a narrow timescale. Behavioural research has also shown that recency 
judgements are not based on entirely the same form of information or memory 
processes as judgements of frequency (Chalmers, 2005; Hintzman, 2001).
In addition, the findings reported above suggest that the frontal areas of the brain 
contribute in some way to memory for recency judgements in tasks where location 
information is likely to be employed (e.g. Daum & Mayes, 2000). It is probable that 
recency memory relies upon the frontal lobes in an executive manner, in the same 
way as was argued in the relative information section. Findings from numerous other 
neuropsychological and imaging studies support this claim (e.g. Simons, Gilbert, 
Owen, Fletcher & Burgess, 2005; Trott, Friedman, Ritter, Fabiani, & Snodgrass, 
1999).
Evidence in support of the notion that Friedman’s (1993) relative and location forms 
of recency information are distinct, and that they are likely to be utilised when making 
JORs, has now been reviewed. The primary empirical focus in this thesis is on the 
third potential form of recency information, which is called distance information. A 
review of studies relating to this category of information follows.
Distance Studies
Friedman (1993) described distance theories as being a partial account of memory for 
time (as is the case for relative and location information), however he acknowledged 
the key influence that distance based information can have on temporal judgements. 
Friedman (2001) argued that scale effects and primacy effects (where memory 
accuracy is high for items at the start of a list) are unlikely to be explained by use of
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distance information, thereby indicating that recency memory judgments must be 
supported under some circumstances, by other kinds of information. However, it is 
still likely that distance information is important for many recency memory 
judgements, and in some situations may be the principal kind of information relied 
upon for these types of temporal memory decisions.
Friedman (1993) noted that perhaps the appropriate experiments to show the 
usefulness of distance information have not yet been conducted. Tasks which 
presumably measure primarily the use of distance information must involve studying 
a list of items which is relatively free of location markers (such as the beginning of a 
list, for example). Presentation of a very long list, with no clear divisions, is likely to 
mean that participants will have to rely on distance information when asked about the 
recency of an item (or event) from that list. A long list will also be likely to exclude 
the possibility that participants can make JORs based on relative information -  since 
it would be unfeasible to compare the recency of an item to every other item in the 
list. If they were to compare items, it would have to be a specifically selected few 
items which are likely to be helpful for the JOR, and distance information would 
therefore be likely to be the basis of such a selection.
Friedman (1993) outlined that there are three types of information falling under the 
bracket of distance in his framework. These are strength-based measurements, 
contextual overlap of information, and chronological organisation information. 
Common to all three categories is that they involve the use of information in memory 
that is said to change between the time of encoding and retrieval (Figure 1, p21). 
Firstly, Friedman (1993) suggested memories that are chronologically organised in
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order of occurrence, as in a SIMPLE account (Brown, Neath & Chater, 2007), could 
be viewed as belonging to a distance category of recency information (Figure 1: 
Subcomponent 1). If memory was found to be chronologically organised, it could be 
used as a distance-based form of information in that changes in memory (that is, the 
encoding of new memories) occur between encoding and retrieval, and could be used 
to make judgements about recency. If a memory is processed fluently, for example, it 
could be judged as being more recent, because relative fluency might be inferred as a 
proxy for recency. According to Brown and Chater (2001), changes in fluency occur 
because more recent items occupy a less congested part of psychological space.
As was outlined on p i6, theories that depend on memory being organised in terms of 
actual order of occurrence in real time still have to account for some simple memory 
phenomena (e.g. primacy effects: Friedman, 2001). In addition, these theories cannot 
account for other relevant phenomena, such as there being little evidence that one 
event primes another in terms of temporal information, unless memory context is a 
cause for a relation between two events (e.g. both events took place in my seminar -  
so I know they both occurred in July: Wagenaar, 1986). Also, Friedman and 
Huttenlocker (1997) have shown that items presented within the same week were not 
more likely to be judged as next to one another in time than were items presented in 
different weeks, a finding that is difficult to explain in terms of a chronological 
account of memory.
Friedman (1993) also identified the contextual overlap between a retrieval cue and a 
memory trace as being another potential form of distance information (Figure 1: 
Subcomponent 2). For example: if a person were to judge how long ago they had last
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attended a lecture, they might think of it as having occurred more recently if they 
were in another lecture at the time of judgement, compared to being in the 
supermarket at the time of judgement. One line of evidence in support of this theory is 
that when emotional state is consistent at the time of encoding and at the time of 
retrieval, the event in question will appear to have occurred more recently than when 
no correspondence in mood exists (e.g. Gebauer et al., 2008). It is likely that 
contextual overlap does have some real basis, although detailed theoretical delineation 
and experimental testing of these ideas is lacking and therefore shall not be 
considered here.
Finally, and most crucially for the current work, as has been mentioned earlier (p37), 
another important type of distance information involves the outcome of a strength 
assessment of the memory trace (Figure 1: Subcomponent 3). The experiments 
described in this thesis were designed with the aim of exploring how memory strength 
could be used as a form of distance information when judging recency, in particular 
relating to the concepts offamiliarity and recollection. This will be done in order to 
extend what is known about this very interesting and well described, but little studied 
area of memory for time. What follows is a review of relevant studies where a 
strength account of distance information has been implied, and from this point 
onwards this is the only subcomponent of distance information that is considered in 
this thesis.
Behavioural studies involving children have shown that distance information is likely 
to be available and used earlier than either relative or location forms of recency 
information in memory. Friedman and Kemp (1998) have suggested that the ability to
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re-order events along a timeline is something which does not change with age, since 
they are of the view that order information is automatically encoded (for an alternate 
view, see Naveh-Benjamin, 1990). Experiencing an event is said to cause the retrieval 
of a previous event, establishing an order pattern automatically. In young children 
however, these orderings are of limited use since they have little knowledge of time 
cycles and so cannot link events to locations in time (Friedman & Kemp, 1998).
Recently published literature suggests that this is indeed the case - young children are 
able to do simple re-ordering tasks, but that they fail to make use of the temporal 
information to answer further questions (McCormack & Hoerl, 2007). For example, 
four year old children were shown Doll A going into a house to brush his hair, and 
then Doll A putting the brush into Cupboard A. This was followed by a viewing of 
Doll B going into the same house, doing his hair and putting the same brush into 
Cupboard B this time. The children could correctly state which doll had brushed their 
hair first, but could not use that information to correctly state where the hairbrush was 
now located (McCormack & Hoerl, 2007).
Friedman and Kemp (1998) have reasoned that the ability to make use of location 
information in temporal judgements is likely to develop with age more than reliance 
on other types of recency information, because children learn more about time 
patterns with increasing age. In a recent investigation into the ability of children to 
implement reconstructive memory processing, which would be required in order to 
make use of location information, Friedman and Lyon found that only children aged 
around 6yrs and over have this capacity (2005). In their study, groups of children 
between the ages of 5 and 13 years were compared on their ability to construct and
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make use of contextual information relevant for temporal dating accuracy.
Participants were involved in two salient events, close in time to Halloween. 
Approximately 3 months later, the children were asked questions about the events, the 
associated environmental contexts, and about the date of the events. Although the four 
year olds could recall some context from the events, only by around 6 years of age 
and onwards could the children recall sufficient information for temporal 
reconstruction. Good knowledge about time patterns, such as seasons and calendar 
information, was found in the age groups above 8 years (Friedman & Lyon, 2005). 
Despite this, the amount of contextual information available to participants did not 
relate to the accuracy of their temporal judgements (in terms of clock time, month or 
season) at any age (Friedman & Lyon, 2005). This suggests that children do not make 
use of location-based information for dating events over a long time period, despite 
increasing capacity to do so with age, in contrast with young adults (Fradera & Ward,
2006).
Friedman and Kemp (1998) have also shown that children are able to, and do, make 
use of distance information, in order to make partially accurate judgements about the 
time of salient events on a wide time scale of up to five months. Young children just 
under 5 years of age were asked to arrange events along a timeline. The six events, 
including Valentine’s Day and Hanukkah for example, were presented in a random 
order. Recency judgements increased in subjective distance as did actual distance in 
time for events up to 5 months in the past (Friedman and Kemp, 1998). This supports 
the notion that distance information is a valid category as described in Friedman’s 
1993 paper, in addition to location and relative information. It is likely that, in 
children at least, distance information is less useful for more remote temporal memory
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judgements. This is because (as has been demonstrated by Altom and Weil, 1977) 
recency judgements of children begin to flatten out, rather than increasing with 
increasing distance in the same manner as actual events. This could mean that 
distance information is less useful with judgements which need to be made over a 
very long period of time.
The finding that children’s recency judgements begin to flatten out after a period of 
time is a pattern which is similar to the availability of distance information in adults. 
After the American festival Thanksgiving, Friedman and deWinstanley (1998) asked 
adults to rate their memories for the event at regular weekly or bi-weekly intervals 
over the proceeding 25 weeks. The memories of the adults for the event became less 
clear over time, but this decline mainly occurred over the first twelve weeks 
(flattening out thereafter). This finding gives some support for the notion that people 
are aware of differences in memory strength over time (see also Thompson, 1982) and 
therefore memory strength differences are potentially useful for recency memory.
Few adult studies of distance information have been carried out, where researchers 
have tried to limit the possible use of other types of information in recency 
judgements. Kemp and Burt (1998) asked participants to rate the level of vividness 
they experienced for newsworthy events, along with asking them to date the event and 
to rate their level of contextual knowledge of the event (signifying the level of 
distance information available for each event). Participants were also asked to squeeze 
a dynamometer, with the pressure of squeeze signifying the recency of the event. 
Knowledge and vividness ratings were highly linked to the level of squeezing on the 
dynamometer, suggesting that this measure was used by participants to indicate the
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strength of their memories. There was a reasonable relationship between squeezing 
and actual date of the event, though context ratings were much more highly associated 
(Kemp & Burt, 1998). This study suggests that strength of memories could be relied 
on at least to some extent in order to make recency judgements.
In a series of experiments, Muter (1979) compared response latencies for recency 
memory judgements. Participants were presented with a study list of four or ten 
words. After the presentation of the list, participants were asked to pick the most 
recently presented word from a pair. Pairs were made up of randomly chosen words 
from the study list. Muter (1979) found that the most recently presented probe’s 
position affected response latency, unlike the position of the earlier probe. Reaction 
time (RT) increased as the position of the most recent word increased (i.e. occurred 
later in the list). This suggests that when the most recent item’s recency has been 
decided, no further search for information about time is carried out. Hacker (1980) 
extended these findings to show that this is the case even for items which are 
incorrectly judged as being the most recent item.
A strength account of these findings is likely to be the most appropriate, rather than 
location or relative order information. According to this account, items occurring 
earlier in the study list are likely to have decayed to a greater extent than more recent 
items (Hinrichs, 1970). When items are presented for the recency task described 
above, it is likely that participants make the judgement on the basis of memory 
strength. The more recently an item occurred, the stronger the memory. The stronger 
the memory, the faster the response. RTs are dependant on the position of the most 
recent item in the list, even when participants are incorrect about the most recent item
43
(as in the case of Hacker, 1980). In this instance, they are incorrect about the recency 
because the strength of the less recent item is greater, but the RTs are still determined 
by this stronger item. These important findings provide additional evidence to suggest 
that distance information is likely to be relied upon for judgements of recency, and 
thus is a distinct form of mnemonic information in addition to the location and 
relative categories outlined by Friedman (1993).
In another study where participants were likely to use strength information for 
recency judgements, it was found that the more semantic (or contextual) information 
participants reported having for an event, the more recent the date attributed to that 
event (Brown, Rips & Shevell, 1985). Participants were given a long list of news 
events, which were matched for age and genre within pairs. In one experiment, the 
task required one group to rate their knowledge for the events, followed by a 
judgment about the date on which they believed the event had taken place. A second 
group conducted the tasks in the opposite order. The participants who rated recency 
before context judged the events as occurring less recently than the other group. The 
researchers suggested that this finding was due to the availability of prior contextual 
information, which made memories for the events more accessible, and thereby more 
likely to attract shorter recency judgements (Brown et al., 1985).
To ensure that participants were not attempting to keep their judgements consistent 
due to researcher desirability, another experiment was conducted (Brown et al., 1985). 
One group of participants was asked to report all information that they could retrieve 
for each event in the list. A second group was asked only to provide a recency 
judgement for each event. Here the level of contextual (or semantic) information
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available to participants was more highly associated with the subjective date than the 
actual date (Brown et al., 1985). This research indicates that contextual or semantic 
information is used by participants, perhaps in a strength-based manner (in that high 
levels of recovered information leads to high memory strength), for making their 
recency judgements.
Of particular relevance to the research and key themes of this thesis are a series of 
studies conducted by Hintzman (2003; 2004; 2005) using a variant of a task employed 
initially by Yntema and Trask (1963). As described on page 10, Yntema and Trask’s 
focus at the time was on ‘time tagging’ accounts of memory, according to which time 
judgments are made via recourse to some form of unique temporal tag that is attached 
to an event. For the purposes of the current research however, this work is important 
because of the experimental paradigm that was employed. Long lists of items, where 
there are few if any temporal landmarks, were employed, so distance information is 
the most likely kind to be used when making recency judgements, as noted already. 
The link between performance on this kind of task and considerations relevant to 
distance information as a basis for time judgments was developed by Hinrichs (1970; 
also see page 11 above), who provided evidence in support of the idea that the 
estimation of memory age is based on the amount of memory-related activity 
produced when a trace is reactivated.
In important work Hintzman (2003; 2004; 2005) conducted a series of studies using a 
variant of the task employed by Yntema and Trask (1963). Across experiments, words 
were repeated after various lags (ranging from 5-60 intervening items). Participants 
were required to make old/new recognition judgements in response to each word
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presented in the list. For items judged to be old (i.e. those recognised as being 
repeated in the experiment by participants), numerical JORs were also required.
These experiments were devised to be devoid of any location-based information 
(temporal landmarks), that is -  any contextual information which could serve to date 
the memory. Using this type of experiment, Hintzman found that manipulations which 
can reasonably be assumed to alter the ‘strength’ of a memory trace (e.g. 
concreteness, frequency, etc) had an effect on the JOR. The ‘strength’ here was 
inferred from findings on recognition memory tasks: for example, old/new 
discrimination is superior for low than for high frequency words.
In each of Hintzman’s experiments, the subjective recency of an item was shorter as a 
function of increasing strength. For example, an item repeated after 20 intervening 
items might be given a JOR of 15 if pictorial, or a JOR of 25 if presented in word 
form. The explanation offered by Hintzman is that this pattern came about because 
pictures elicit stronger memories than do words (Nelson, Reed & Walling, 1976). The 
same argument was applied to explain the fact that, in these continuous tasks, the 
mean JOR for concrete words is shorter than that for abstract words, and shorter for 
low than for high frequency words.
Hintzman (2005) also claimed that JORs are not based on entirely the same processes 
as those used for making old/new recognition memory judgements, since repetition 
lag affects recognition memory judgements to a lesser degree than JORs.
Furthermore, recognition confidence does not follow the same pattern as JORs for the 
same reason (Hintzman, 2005). On the basis of these findings, Hintzman has 
suggested that a unitary strength account of JORs is insufficient. As a result,
46
Hintzman (2005) suggested that there is a second factor -  factor T- that supports JORs 
This ‘factor T  was not defined, but Hintzman argued that is probably a distance- 
based form of information. Location-based processes were ruled out on the basis of 
the argument that the task structure minimises the availability of location-based 
information.
It is also unlikely that relative information is being utilised in the continuous recency 
tasks described above. If participants were relying on relative information, it would be 
expected that JORs would be more closely linked to time than to the number of 
intervening items (since recency would need to be compared with other items in the 
list backwards in time). Hintzman (2004) explored this issue by implementing a 
continuous recognition task like that described above, and varying the interval 
between trials, which was either 500ms or 2500ms (blocked fast vs. slow trials within 
the list). Mean JOR was longer in slow than fast blocks and this was more strongly 
linked to time than number of intervening items (Hintzman, 2004). Therefore relative 
information is unlikely to be utilised by participants in a continuous recency task.
Feelings of familiarity are considered by some researchers to be a distinct memory 
process that is graded in nature (Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Yonelinas, 1994). 
Familiarity could be one memory process that underlies recency judgements, because 
of this strength-based property. Indirect evidence supporting the possibility that a 
strength assessment of familiarity could act as distance information comes from fMRI 
research by Brozinsky, Yonelinas, Kroll & Ranganath (2005). They presented words 
to participants which repeated after varying lags. Old/new judgments were required. 
The imaging data showed that the left anterior parahippocampal gyrus reliably
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increased activity levels during trials for old items at longer lags (16 and 32 
intervening items) when compared with items repeated at lags of shorter duration (2 
and 8 intervening items). This region has been linked selectively with familiarity, 
rather than with recollection (e.g. Aggleton and Shaw, 1996; Aggleton & Brown,
1999; Montaldi, Spencer, Roberts & Mayes, 2006; Yonelinas et al., 1998 - though see 
Squire et al., 2007; Yonelinas et al., 2005). Since there is evidence that familiarity 
varies in a strength-based manner, it could be used as a form of distance information.
More recent fMRI research of these effects provided further evidence that this 
activity is graded in line with increasing numbers of repetitions (Johnson, Muftuler & 
Rugg, 2008), this time in right lateral hippocampus regions as well as in the region of 
the left parahippocampus identified by Brozinsky et al. (2005). This suppression 
effect may be used as an index of familiarity levels (Xiang & Brown, 1998) and 
therefore could potentially be used to make strength-based recency judgements.
Yassa & Stark (2008) conducted a novel and interesting experiment of repetition 
effects that is relevant for this thesis. In a continuous recognition task, participants 
were presented with novel pictures between 1-4 times, and with reference pictures 
once, about which pre-experimental familiarity levels would be high (e.g. Mona Lisa). 
These researchers demonstrated that activity in the parahippocampus was graded in 
line with increasing repetitions of novel items, and that activity differed according to 
whether a stimuli was a reference picture or a novel one (Yassa & Stark, 2008).
Within the left perirhinal cortex, activity was graded according to number of 
repetitions, but activity here did not distinguish between reference and novel stimuli 
(Yassa & Stark, 2008). Thus, this evidence can be used to support the notion that the
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both the parahippocampus and perirhinal cortex reflect recency information, but that 
additionally, the former brain structure also reflects long term familiarity. Both 
regions are candidates for providing Friedman’s (1993) distance information, since 
activity decreased with repetition in the parahippocampus and increased in the 
perirhinal cortex as the interval between first and second item presentations increased 
(Yassa & Stark, 2008).
Summary o f Distance Information
Few studies have been conducted which restrict the use of location and relative 
information in recency judgements. At present, our understanding of distance 
information - and how participants may use this for JORs - has largely stemmed from 
behavioural studies, which have shown that subjective reports of memory strength can 
be associated with actual dates (Kemp & Burt, 1998), and have shown that recovery 
of greater levels of semantic or contextual information for an event will lead to that 
event being judged as having occurred more recently, as compared to recovery of 
lower levels of that information (Brown et al., 1985).
In addition to earlier findings from recency tasks which emphasised the use of 
location information, other studies have shown that recognition judgements and JORs 
are based on different memory processes, at least to some extent (Hintzman, 2005). 
Behavioural research has also provided evidence to indicate that strength 
manipulations can have an effect on JORs; as an item’s memory strength increases, 
the more recent the JOR for that item (Hintzman, 2003). Imaging research has also 
produced data which indicated that familiarity could be one potential basis for 
distance information (e.g. Brozinzky et al., 2005). This literature review of distance
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information has revealed that behavioural research has and can continue to provide a 
wealth of information about judgements of recency. Furthermore, it is clear that 
imaging data can also increase understanding of memory for recency and how these 
forms of temporal judgements are considered and made. These pathways of research 
into distance information should be encouraged to expand in future to bring our level 
of knowledge in line with that for relative and location information forms.
As was described earlier in this Chapter, the main focus in this section has been on 
strength assessment of recency memory -  rather than relating to contextual overlap or 
chronological organization theories, that also fall under the bracket of distance 
information. The research in this thesis is based on strength theories of recency, 
because this well described theory has received little empirical investigation despite 
the fact there is evidence to suggest that it may be important under certain 
circumstances (e.g. Curran & Friedman 2003; 2004; Friedman & Kemp, 1998; 
Hintzman 2003).
How do these findings relevant to distance information sit with the earlier sections, in 
which there was good evidence for the use of multiple kinds of information when 
recency judgments were required? One inference is that different forms of 
information may be available in combination or at different times to support recency 
judgments. The failure to address explicitly this possibility is one criticism of 
Friedman’s work, but this element has been incorporated in a recent extension of that 
account. What follows is a review of a recent model that extends the work of 
Friedman (1993; 2001), providing information about how and when the different 
types of recency information may be utilised.
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Developing Friedman’s Account: Janssen (2006)
One shortcoming of the framework put forward by Friedman is that it fails to 
explicitly address the possibility that different forms of information, which could 
provide clues to recency, may be available all at once or at different times depending 
on the circumstances. Janssen et al. (2006) recently presented a model relevant to this 
topic based largely on the work of Friedman (1993), which is consistent with the 
possibility outlined above, suggesting that people are likely to use multiple forms of 
temporal information. This model, the proponents claim, covers both the potential 
availability of different forms of temporal information, and the circumstances under 
which these might be used. Episodic details such as who was present, where the event 
took place and so on, are referred to as primary temporal information in the model. 
Landmarks and event ‘context’ are referred to as secondary clues to the time or date 
of a memory (Janssen et al., 2006). There is a focus on distance and location 
information in the model and it is suggested that when primary and/or secondary 
indications about date are available, one is likely to make recency judgements based 
on location information. Where these clues are unavailable, one is more likely to 
make use of distance information where possible (Janssen et al., 2006). Additionally, 
in this model it is outlined that one is more likely to use distance information for 
remote events, and to rely on location information for relatively more recent events.
Janssen et al. (2006) suggested that distance-based memory judgements give rise to 
less accurate recency memory judgments than do location-based recency memory 
judgements. Furthermore, on the basis of studies exploring long-term memory, these 
researchers suggested that people are likely to use a combination of different types of 
temporal information on occasions, in order to aid them in their recency memory
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judgments (Janssen et al., 2006). Perhaps the availability of, and differential reliance 
on, these three information types is why not all data (e.g. scale effects) fit any one 
theory of memory for recency described earlier.
This model is still under development (Janssen et al., 2006) and current problems with 
the model include the assumption that distance information is only available for 
remote memories, which cannot be the case based on the results of Hintzman (2003). 
This is because participants can still make JORs where location information is likely 
to be unavailable due to a lack of contextual landmarks in continuous memory tasks 
that require JORs for items still in short-term memory (Hintzman, 2003). In contrast 
with the views of Janssen et al. (2006), Brown and Chater (2001) have made the 
opposite claim, suggesting that location information would be more useful than 
distance information for dating events that originally occurred in the more remote 
past. Since only distance information is likely to be available over the short-term, with 
little contextual information to reconstruct about these events, location information is 
likely to be utilised for events that occurred in the distant past (Arbuthnott & Brown, 
2009; Brown & Chater, 2001). Altom and Weil’s (1977) research also suggests that 
distance information is less likely to be useful for more remote memories, since 
recency judgements flatten out in these instances.
Janssen et al’s (2006) theory of memory for time is important for the context of this 
thesis despite the aforementioned theoretical difficulties, because it suggests that 
different kinds of temporal information (first categorised in Friedman’s 1993 
framework) may be available under different circumstances. Though Friedman has 
argued in the past for and against the use of the three main information types (1993,
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2001), it is feasible that all three are used at different times -  potentially in 
combination -  in order to carry out recency judgements. This possibility is appealing 
for several reasons. For example: in a listl/list2 experiment, Huppert and Piercy 
(1978) showed that frequency and recency are confused in some amnesic populations, 
unlike in healthy controls. The Janssen et al. (2006) view of temporal memory could 
provide a neat explanation of this data, in that the amnesic population are entirely 
reliant on distance information, whereas controls use both distance and location 
information to perform more accurately on this task. The notion that relative, location 
and distance information form three distinct ways of forming recency judgements 
may also underlie feelings of time discrepancies in memory. For example, one might 
reflect that being at school feels like yesterday and that it’s hard to believe how much 
time has passed (using location information, where you can reconstruct a vivid image 
of being in school), but on other occasions you might feel that school happened very 
long ago indeed (using relative information, you have thought of many events that 
occurred between now and then).
The key point is that all three types of information are likely to be used for making 
recency judgements under different circumstances. Indeed, one may use more than 
one form of information, depending on the type of memory judgment that is required 
of them (e.g. when there is need to be highly accurate). If one form of information is 
unavailable for whatever reason (e.g. brain damage, lack of contextual landmarks), 
then another category from Friedman’s framework might be relied upon more heavily 
for that particular judgment. In a task where frequency and recency are being 
manipulated, for example (e.g. Huppert & Piercy, 1978), distance information is
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useless for dating and so location information will be relied upon if available to the 
participant.
Focus o f the Current Research
It is clear that there are three categories of information that can support recency 
judgments. As the literature review on pages 36-50 shows, research which 
investigates the potential use of distance information is relatively sparse, in 
comparison to other kinds of recency information. In addition, the principal focus in 
previous research has been on the concept of memory strength, but with little attention 
paid to what kinds of strength might support JORs. The focus in this thesis is on the 
question of what kinds of strengths might support JORs, and the starting point is the 
possibility that two processes -  recollection and familiarity -  may contribute to JORs 
in a strength-based manner.
How might these processes contribute to JORs? Familiarity is considered to be a 
graded strength signal: old (previously studied) items are assumed to have greater 
strength than new items on recognition memory tasks. Familiarity could therefore 
support JORs, whereby the greater the level of familiarity experienced for an event, 
the shorter the associated JOR. Conversely, if an event elicits little familiarity then 
one would be likely to judge that this occurred in the distant past. Familiarity is 
widely considered to be a graded memory process (Yonelinas, 2002), and therefore 
could be expected to support JORs in this way. Since an assessment of the strength of 
familiarity is considered as potentially underpinning memory for recency, this falls 
under the bracket of distance information according to the categories proposed by 
Friedman (1993).
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Recollection may also play a key role in underpinning recency judgements in a 
similar way. Recollection is recovery of qualitative information about a prior event 
(Yonelinas, 2002). Consider Hintzman’s 2005 experiment as an example, where items 
are repeated after lags of 5-30 intervening items. Although it may appear unlikely that 
participants had much contextual information to reconstruct about these rather 
meaningless events, it is possible that recollection was helpful to some degree. 
Participants may base their JORs upon the quantitative amount that they were able to 
recover about the study episode. For example, if presented with the word ‘Nectar’ for 
a second time, a participant may recall that during study they had imagined a bumble 
bee (contextual retrieval of imagery). On the second presentation of ‘Evade’, 
however, they may be unable to recover any contextual information about the study 
episode. If the volume of recollected information is employed as a basis for JORs, 
then for ‘Nectar’, the lag judgement would be shorter than the judgment for ‘Evade’ 
on the grounds that ‘Evade’ must have been presented a long time ago (since they 
could not recover a similar amount of contextual information). These ideas are 
perhaps comparable to what Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) termed ‘noncriterial 
recollection’.
If this line of thought about JORs is correct, it would suggest that there are at least 
two separate memory processes which could support memory for recency in a 
distance-based manner in a continuous recency task -  one being strength of the 
familiarity signal, another being the volume of contextual recovery of information, or 
the strength of recollection (Figure 2, p56). It could be the case that only one of these 
memory processes underpins JORs, or it may be the case that participants perform an
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assessment of the strength o f  both recollection and familiarity in order to make 
recency judgements. The experiments reported in this thesis were conducted in order 
to examine whether these two possible sources of distance information, strength of 
familiarity and recollection, do underlie JORs in this manner. In this way a strength 
assessment of familiarity and/or recollection would fall under the bracket of providing 
distance information in terms of the strength measurement (see Figure 2 below). It is 
not accepted universally, however, that recollection and familiarity do constitute 
distinct memory processes, hence in the following section the justification for 
assuming this separation is provided.
3 types of Distance 
Information „
1 Chronological Organization
Relative Information \  Location Information
▲ 3 Strength Measurement
2 Contextual Overlap
Recollection
Familiarity
Friedman’s 1993 Framework of Memory 
4  for Recency
Figure 2. Returning to the interpretation of Friedman’s (1993) framework, 
recollection and familiarity (grey boxes) may be two forms of memory which are 
graded and can be used as a form of distance information when making recency 
judgements.
What follows is a further description of the two memory processes of familiarity and 
recollection, along with a review of research relating to these concepts. Persuasive 
evidence suggests that familiarity and recollection are distinct recognition memory 
processes, but there is as yet no consensus on this matter.
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Familiarity and Recollection
Identifying that something has previously been encountered constitutes recognition 
memory (Mandler, 1980). There are principally two classes of theory concerning the 
composition of recognition memory. According to dual-process accounts, recognition 
memory is based on two processes, recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002).
One definition of recollection is that it is a threshold process involving retrieval of an 
event which includes remembering associated contextual information. Familiarity is a 
basis for recognition memory judgments that does not involve recalling associated 
context, and it is considered to be a strength-based signal that can give rise to a 
feeling that an event has been experienced previously (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000).
Single process theories of recognition memory, by contrast, advocate the idea that 
recognition memory relies on only one memory process. There has been much debate 
concerning these theories (e.g. Ratcliff, van Zandt, & McKoon, 1995; Squire et al.,
2007), however dual process models of recognition memory (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Yonelinas, 2002) have gained increasing support over the past few years. This 
growing evidence for dual memory processes stems mainly from brain imaging 
studies (Woodruff, Hayama & Rugg, 2006), behavioural studies (e.g. Gardiner, 1988; 
Jacoby, 1991) and through data from neuropsychological cases (e.g. Aggleton et al., 
2005; Yonelinas et al., 2002) (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002). A brief summary of 
single process theories of recognition memory follows first.
Single Process Models o f Recognition Memory
Raaijmakers and Shriffin (1981) devised the Search of Association Model (SAM), 
which postulates that recognition memory depends upon a single process of
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familiarity. The SAM model of recognition memory proposes that items requiring 
recognition judgements are assessed against all information held in long-term memory 
in a parallel manner. When a cue fits a particular context in memory, a particular level 
of familiarity signal is elicited. This familiarity level will be assessed against a pre­
determined criterion and if the level is above this set criterion, then a judgement of 
recognition is likely to be given (Gillund and Shriffin, 1984).
Theory of Distributed Associative Memory (TODAM) is a single process view of 
recognition memory which has similarities to the SAM framework. Murdock (1982) 
proposed that items in memory are seen as lists of random features. Presentation of a 
test cue results in a comparison process with information stored in memory. 
Mismatches result in 'new' judgements, whereas a particular degree of matching of 
test item and stored information in long-term memory will result in 'old' judgments.
The overall principle behind single process theories of recognition memory is that 
there is one continuous memory signal (which can be described as familiarity) and 
that old items will elicit a greater signed than new items. Ratcliff et al. (1995) propose 
that single process models of recognition memory can account for outcomes derived 
from the manipulation of study time, word frequency and context during encoding. 
However, dual process theories of recognition memory have dominated the field of 
recognition memory for more than thirty years (Higham & Vokey, 2004). The 
evidence in support of dual process accounts of recognition memory follows.
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Dual Process Theory
As previously mentioned, the two memory processes of familiarity and recollection 
are highly important concepts for this thesis. If recollection and familiarity are 
separate memory processes, then there should be some manipulations which influence 
recollection and not familiarity. There should also be evidence for this to occur in the 
opposite direction, with familiarity alone being influenced by some manipulations 
(Yonelinas, 2002). Evidence which suggests that this is the case comes from 
behavioural studies showing that dividing attention constrains recollection more than 
it does familiarity (Anderson et al., 1998; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin & 
Anderson, 1996). This finding has been more recently supported using ERPs (Curran, 
2004) and in studies of aging populations (Castel & Craik, 2003).
Conversely, criterion setting has been demonstrated as having a larger influence on 
familiarity than on recollection. Changes in response criterion required to accept an 
item as being old has been shown to have very little effect on recollection (e.g. 
Postma, 1999). Processing fluency manipulations have also been found to have a 
greater effect over familiarity in comparison with recollection. Priming leads to an 
increase in the level of familiarity, but does not influence recognition responses based 
on recollection (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). These dissociations suggest that 
recollection and familiarity are processes which are functionally separable, at least 
during retrieval.
There is also evidence that recollection and familiarity have different neural substrates 
(Ranganath, Johnson & D’Esposito, 2003; Yonelinas, Hopfinger, Buonocore, Kroll & 
Baynes, 2001; Yonelinas et al., 2005). Recollection is said by some to be largely
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dependent on the integrity of the hippocampus, whereas there is animal and clinical 
evidence to suggest that familiarity processes are supported by the parahippocampal 
gyrus (for a review see: Brown & Aggleton, 2001). The nature of recollection and 
familiarity signals, and whether they are dual processes or single processes 
contributing to memory judgments, remains a matter of ongoing debate in 
psychological studies, in patient studies, as well as in animal studies (for reviews and 
alternative perspectives, see Squire et al., 2007; Yonelinas, 2002). This brief summary 
is extended in the section below, where findings relevant to the recollection 
/familiarity split are considered in the context of three lines of research in which these 
processes have been investigated: these comprise research using the process- 
dissociation procedure, receiver operating characteristics, and the remember/know 
procedure.
Process Dissociation Procedure
The process dissociation procedure was developed in order to assess the relative 
contributions of familiarity and recollection in recognition memory tasks (Jacoby, 
1991). The applications of this procedure are based on the premise that recollection 
and familiarity are independent processes (Jacoby & Kelley, 1992).
In a typical process dissociation paradigm, words from different categories (e.g. male 
voice/female voice presentation) are studied in two distinct lists. At test a mixture of 
new and studied words (from both categories) are presented visually. Participants are 
asked to make old responses only for items presented in one of the two categories 
(e.g. female voice only) and these are known as targets. The words previously 
presented from the other category are non-targets, and participants must respond
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‘new’ to both non-targets and new items in the test. In this example, if participants 
incorrectly judge male voice items from the first list to be old, this will be down to 
familiarity, since conscious recollection would have allowed for retrieval of source 
context and would have led to source accuracy. Participants are then asked to perform 
a second test phase where instructed to classify all studied words as old (inclusion 
condition).
Equations have been devised to estimate the separate contributions of familiarity and 
recollection. R+F - RF = Inclusion indicates the probability of correctly classifying an 
item as being old during the inclusion condition. F - RF = Exclusion estimates the 
probability of incorrectly classifying a non-target item as being old in the exclusion 
condition. R = Inclusion -  Exclusion, is the equation which estimates correctly 
classifying a target item as old based on recollection. To estimate the contribution of 
familiarity to successful old responses in the exclusion condition the equation F = 
Exclusion/(l-R) is used (Jacoby, 1991).
This task has been used extensively since its development over 20 years ago, showing 
the different properties of recollection and familiarity processes. For example, Jacoby, 
Woloshyn and Kelley (1989) found that recollection is more heavily influenced than 
familiarity by divided attention. In another experiment employing this procedure, 
aging was shown to have a greater effect on recollection than familiarity (Jennings & 
Jacoby, 1993). More recently, implementation of the process dissociation procedure 
has shown that familiarity undergoes a faster rate of deterioration than recollection 
(Yonelinas & Levy, 2002).
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In addition to the process dissociation procedure, two widely employed and tested 
measures of the contribution of recollection and familiarity processes to recognition 
memory have been devised. These are the remember-know procedure and receiver 
operating characteristics (ROCs). Use of these measures has given rise to evidence in 
support of dual process theory of recognition memory in different ways as described 
below.
Remember-Know Procedure
The R/K procedure involves studying subjective states of recognition based on 
responses given by participants. They are asked to provide a description of their basis 
for old judgements, indicating whether they remember (R) or know (K) that the 
item/items has/have been previously encountered (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 
2000; Tulving, 1985). Remember responses are made when one recognises a previous 
episode based on retrieval of some associated memory context. Know responses are 
given when recognition is based on awareness that an episode has previously been 
encountered only. From a dual-process perspective, Remember responses are assumed 
to be associated with recollection memory processes. Know responses are assumed to 
be associated with familiarity processes (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).
Many variables influence these categories of response differently. Use of non-words 
(in comparison to words) leads to an increase in Know rather than Remember 
responses (Gardiner & Java, 1990), and dividing attention has been shown to decrease 
Remember responses more dramatically than Know responses (Yonelinas, 2001). 
Items which differ in size at encoding relative to test increase Know responses, but 
decrease Remember responses (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Pharmacological studies
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have shown that some drugs can reduce Remember responses but not Know responses 
using this procedure (e.g. Curran, Gardiner, Java & Allen, 1993). Remember 
responses have been found to increase by deep encoding tasks (as compared to 
shallow encoding), whereas Know responses were greatly decreased (Rajaram, 1993), 
which contrasts with the work of Gardiner (1988) who found deep processing 
increased Remember responses without affecting Know response levels.
These studies suggest that two recognition memory processes are operating in this 
task since some manipulations can influence one more than the other, or can influence 
them in different ways. Though the remember/know procedure was associated with 
the assumption that recollection and familiarity are mutually exclusive (Gardiner & 
Parkin, 1990), it has now been illustrated that they are likely to be independent 
memory processes (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).
ERP studies of recognition memory have shown that Remember and Know responses 
differ to some extent in the patterns of brain activity they elicit (e.g. Smith, 1993). 
Research has shown that brain activity associated with Remember responses come 
much later in the recording epoch than activity linked to Know responses (Duzel, 
Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze & Tulving, 1997; Rugg, Schloerscheidt, & Mark, 1998) 
and is also qualitatively different This fits with the notion that information associated 
with recollection memory processes is available after a faster paced familiarity 
process. Taken together, the findings described above are evidence to suggest that 
there are two memory processes which provide the basis for recognition memory 
judgements, and thus support dual process theory.
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Despite broad agreement that the R/K procedure is a valid technique for measuring 
the extent of recollection and familiarity experienced under different circumstances, 
there is evidence to suggest that the introspective paradigm is not always a useful tool 
for distinguishing clearly between these types of memory. For example, Wais, Mickes 
and Wixted (2008) asked participants to study a series of words in various colours. At 
test, words were represented among new lures in black and participants were asked to 
make an old/new judgement, followed by a remember/know judgement and a source 
judgement. When participants made source colour judgements, either before or after 
an old/new recognition judgement, they had above chance accuracy with both R and 
K responses (Wais et al., 2008). This does not fit with the idea that familiarity does 
not support contextual retrieval, unless one accepts the view that familiarity sustains 
within-item contextual associations (Jaeger, Mecklinger & Kipp, 2006; Mayes, 
Montaldi & Migo, 2007).
Further evidence which is not in line with dual process accounts of R/K comes from 
research in which participants were asked to make speeded recognition decisions. 
Lengthening the response deadline led to an increase in levels of R and K judgements 
for old items and during a short response deadline very few K responses were made. 
This does not fit with the idea that K responses reflect the quick and automatic nature 
of familiarity (Gardiner, Ramponi & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999). Therefore, either 
the R/K procedure does not measure familiarity, or dual process theory, in the form 
described within this thesis, is not supported by these findings. A third possibility also 
exists, however -  that the reason for the Gardiner et al. (1999) findings is that people 
only make familiarity judgements after they have attempted to recollect. This is one 
way of accommodating these findings within a dual-process framework.
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Receiver Operating Characteristics
ROCs are correctly identified old items (hits) plotted as a function of new items 
accepted as being old (false alarms) at different criterion points. In memory 
experiments, recognition judgements are often followed by confidence judgments, 
which are assumed to reflect different criteria. Thus, for each recognition judgment 
made, participants will be asked to rate their confidence in the judgement on a point 
scale (usually ranging from something like: sure old  to sure new). In this way, hit 
rates can be plotted in terms of confidence across levels of false alarms. ROCs are 
cumulative probability functions that can be plotted from confidence ratings where 
the left most point shows the most confident hits versus the most confident false 
alarms, the second point is a mixture of the most and the second most confident 
ratings and so on.
Receiver Operating Characteristics
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Figure 3. Two types of ROC curves (for original, see Yonelinas, 2001). According to 
single process accounts, the upper curve represents higher memory strength than the 
lower, because more test items were given a high confidence rating here (leading to 
an asymmetrical curve). Dual process theorists instead suggest that the asymmetry is 
caused by a greater contribution of recollection (the greater the asymmetry, the 
greater the contribution of recollection).
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The most common ROC shape observed in recognition memory tasks is the upper of 
the two plots in Figure 3. This shape is not predicted by single-process accounts of 
recognition memory in which the variance of the old and new item strength 
distributions is equivalent. According to this model, ROC curves should be 
symmetrical (as illustrated by the lower of the two ROC plots in Figure 3).
Single process advocates have explained asymmetrical ROCs by suggesting that the 
reason ROC curves are often skewed is because study of items leads to greater 
variance in old item strength than new item strength (Heathcote, Raymond & Dunn, 
2006; Wixted, 2007). Dual-process advocates explain the asymmetrical ROCs by 
proposing that, in addition to an equal variance familiarity strength distribution, a 
threshold-like recollection process supports high-confidence recognition memory 
judgments for old (but not for new) items, and the influence of this process is to push 
the left-most points of the ROC up, thereby making it asymmetric.
While the debate over the interpretation of ROCs and their utility for discriminating 
between different models is ongoing, there are data points that are very hard to 
account for other than by a dual-process account. These include the findings that 
patients with damage restricted to the hippocampus show relatively symmetrical ROC 
functions, and that the shapes of these functions don’t change when manipulations 
that improve overall accuracy are employed (e.g. Aggleton et al., 2005; Yonelinas, 
Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara & Knight, 1998).
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Summary
In this section a review of dual process theory of recognition memory has been 
presented, along with some important evidence either in support of or against this 
theory. The distinction between recollection and familiarity is of particular 
importance for this thesis, since these may be two processes that can support 
judgments of recency. While findings using the three main approaches described 
above can be criticised in isolation, the fact that, in all three cases, the data can be 
readily accommodated in a dual-process framework, means that in combination they 
present a compelling case for the validity of the recollection/familiarity split. In 
addition, a further source of evidence for this distinction has come from event-related 
potential (ERP) studies of memory retrieval, and these studies are the focus of the 
next section, as ERP indices of recollection and familiarity are used in this thesis to 
assess how these processes might support judgments of recency
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CHAPTER 2: EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS AND MEMORY
Memory for Recency and the Usefulness ofERPs
The literature review in Chapter 1 of this thesis demonstrated that memory strength 
manipulations influence JORs in a number of behavioural studies (e.g. Hintzman 
2003; 2004). It is possible that strength of familiarity and also strength of recollection 
are two bases for distance information. Since there is persuasive evidence that event- 
related potentials index recollection and familiarity (p71-85), and that ERPs can also 
reflect processes that are assumed to reflect control operations in memory (p85-91), 
investigation of how known ERP effects behave in recency tasks may contribute to an 
understanding of the processes that support memory for recency.
How they can do this is elaborated later in this chapter (p97), but what follows first is 
a description of ERPs, an outline of how ERPs can be employed in studies of memory 
processing, the limitations of recording ERPs, and finally a review of the literature 
regarding three ERP old/new effects (explained on p71) which can be measured with 
the aim of understanding memory for recency.
Event-Related Potentials
Electrical brain activity can be recorded and measured non-invasively using ERPs as a 
marker of cognitive processes. Since the 1930s, brain activity in the form of the 
electro-encephalogram (EEG) has been measured in an attempt to understand more 
about cognition (Kutas & Dale, 1997). ERPs are useful in the study of memory for a 
number of reasons. The first reason for this is that ERPs have high temporal 
resolution, allowing cognitive processes to be studied in real-time. ERPs also enable
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the researcher to detect activity in the brain in the absence of behavioural responses, 
allowing one to detect covert processing (e.g. Paller & Kutas, 1992). Another reason 
ERPs are useful to aid investigation into cognitive processes is that, by looking at 
scalp topographies, one can determine when brain activity is reflective of qualitatively 
different neural and hence cognitive processes (Rugg & Coles, 1995).
When a stimulus is presented to a participant, an electrical response can be recorded 
which is known as an evoked potential. Different recording epochs can be defined in 
relation to the stimulus. These time-locked voltage changes are known as event- 
related potentials. The series of peaks and troughs in a voltage waveform are known 
as ERP components. In keeping with EEG, these time-locked electrical fields will 
only be recorded if the population of neurons is large enough to be detected, and if the 
neurons are firing in a synchronous manner. To attain an ERP, the difference in 
voltage between two electrode sites must be measured and recorded (Rugg & Coles,
1995).
Different experimental conditions can give rise to both qualitative and quantitative 
differences in electrical brain activity. A qualitative change in response to a functional 
manipulation will result in variation in the ERP distribution of activity across the 
scalp for the different conditions, potentially coupled with differences in signal 
latency and peak amplitude. When there are quantitative changes in brain activity 
across two or more experimental conditions, the ERP scalp topographies will be 
equivalent and only the signal latency and magnitude might differ (Donaldson, Allan 
& Wilding, 2002). Qualitative changes are indicative of the engagement of different 
cognitive processes. Quantitative differences in response to some experimental
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manipulation are suggestive of only a difference in the extent to which the same 
cognitive processes are engaged.
Properties o f Event-Related Potentials
There are some limitations in recording neuronal activity using the ERP method. It is 
certain that there is much activity in the brain which is never picked up by scalp-based 
electrodes (Vaughan & Arezzo, 1988). Active neurons firing asynchronously will be 
missed, since these will not be sufficient to generate electrical fields that can be 
recorded at a distance. There are brain structures which are organised in such a way 
that the neurons contained within them will never fire synchronously. The largest 
proportion of activity recorded using ERPs is generated by pyramidal cells located in 
the neocortex (Donaldson et al., 2002). Approximately 70% of the neocortex is made 
of these pyramidal cells.
Another limitation which needs to be considered in making use of ERP data to 
investigate brain activity is that ERPs recorded around the surface of the scalp do not 
have very high spatial resolution. This means that one cannot conclusively determine 
the neural source of electrical activity detected (Donaldson et al., 2002). Since 
numerous sources could give rise to the same distribution of activity across the scalp, 
it is impossible to be certain about exactly which neural generators are giving rise to 
the pattern of electrical activity (Binnie et al., 1996).
These properties of ERPs mean that one must be cautious in interpretation of data 
collected, since much activity in the brain cannot be indexed using this technique. 
When looking for divergences between the ERPs elicited in two conditions in an
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experiment, for example, one may reasonably conclude there are different cognitive 
processes involved when finding non-overlapping ERP activity, however in finding 
an absence of divergences one cannot conclude with confidence that there is no 
variation present. It may be the case that the differential activity is such that it is 
undetectable using this methodology because the level of activity is not sufficient to 
propagate to the scalp, or because of the structure of local cellular configurations 
(Rugg & Coles, 1995). Despite these limitations, however, the fact that elements of 
the electrical record map closely onto cognitive operations makes ERPs a valuable 
complement to behavioural measures in experiments designed to isolate and 
characterise the properties and contributions of distinct information processing stages. 
That is how ERPs are used primarily in this thesis, and how they do so is expanded 
upon below.
ERP Old/new Effects
Three ERP effects have been identified as being associated with familiarity, 
recollection and executive/control processing. Therefore, investigating how these ERP 
effects behave in recency tasks may contribute to an understanding of the processes 
that support memory for recency. What follows is a review of the literature in respect 
of these three ERP old/new effects, that is -  the difference in ERP waveforms 
according to whether an item is correctly identified as being new or is correctly 
identified as being old.
Left Parietal Old/new Effect
The left parietal old/new effect is a modulation that has been investigated for over 
twenty-five years (Sanquist, Rohrbaugh, Syndulko & Lindsley, 1980). This ERP
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effect comprises a greater positivity evoked by correctly identified old items (hits) 
compared to correctly classified new items (correct rejections), with greater positivity 
over the left than the right hemisphere (Rugg et al., 1996). The left parietal old/new 
effect is typically observed at a latency of between 450-500ms post stimulus, with a 
typical duration of approximately 400-500ms (Rugg, Cox, Doyle & Wells, 1995).
This ERP old/new effect is not evoked by old words incorrectly identified as new 
(misses) or by those items incorrectly identified as old (false alarms) and can 
therefore be regarded as an index of successful memory retrieval (Wilding, Doyle & 
Rugg, 1995).
Early support for the notion that the parietal old/new effect is an index of processes 
tied to recollection comes from the work of Smith (1993) where participants 
completed a modified recognition memory task. They studied a list of words and at 
test were presented with a mixture of old and new items requiring recognition 
memory judgments. Old judgements were to be followed by a subjective report about 
whether they remembered, or simply knew, that the item had been present in the study 
list. The activity associated with correct old and new judgements differed from around 
350ms post stimulus at anterior sites, and from around 450ms post stimulus at 
posterior sites. Between 550ms and 700ms at posterior sites, items given a remember 
response were more positive-going than those given a know response. If remember 
responses are based on recollection, then this data suggests that this ERP effect 
indexes recollection.
Wilding et al. (1995) provided evidence in two experiments supporting the idea that 
the left parietal effect is reflective of memory judgements based on recollection rather
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than familiarity in a task which did not rely on subjective assessments of recollection. 
Mixtures of auditorially and visually presented words were studied by participants. At 
test, they were required to indicate whether words were old or new, and if old were 
then asked to judge in which modality the word had initially been presented to them 
(test words were presented visually in one experiment and auditorially in the other).
Correctly identified old items associated with correct source (auditory/visual) 
judgements elicited more positive-going activity at left parietal sites in a 500-900ms 
time-window, in comparison with correct rejections. This left parietal old/new effect 
was reduced for old items attracting incorrect modality judgements when test words 
were visual, and was present over a limited latency span when test words were 
auditorially presented (Wilding et al., 1995). Since there were no increases in effect 
magnitude when words were presented at test and study in the same modality, a 
priming account of the effect was rejected based on the notion that fluency of 
processing would be increased under these circumstances (Wilding et al., 1995). Since 
familiarity is not thought to support contextual retrieval, the attenuation of this ERP 
effect for items attracting incorrect modality judgements also does not support a 
familiarity account of this effect.
Further evidence that the left parietal old/new effect is reflective of recollection comes 
from a study by Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward and Knight (2004). Here,
ERP recording was conducted dining both encoding and retrieval. Participants were 
presented with words during encoding, to which they were cued to respond with either 
living/non-living judgements or ease of manipulation judgements. At test subjects
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were then asked to make old/new decisions, followed by a ‘remember’ or ‘know’ 
judgement to items they believed to be old (Duarte et al., 2004).
Memory judgements to items made on the basis of familiarity (as indexed by Know 
judgments) had a different spatial topography and time-course during encoding 
compared with those based on recollection processes (as indexed by Remember 
judgments) (Duarte et al., 2004). In addition, during retrieval the left parietal old/new 
effect was only observed in response to items that were recollected rather than in 
response to items judged to be familiar. It is likely that if recollection and familiarity 
are supported by distinct neural mechanisms then there should be an observable 
difference in the patterns of brain activity recorded during both encoding and retrieval 
(Duarte et al., 2004). Therefore these findings support the recollection based account 
of the left parietal old/new effect and also suggest that recollection and familiarity 
have different neural bases during encoding and subsequent retrieval.
Some of the strongest support for the notion that the left parietal effect indexes 
recollection comes from an experiment conduced by Wilding and Rugg (1996). 
Participants were presented with a list of words and non-words at study, either in a 
male or female voice. At test, they were required to make old/new recognition 
judgements to visually presented words, followed by a source judgement about voice 
gender. There was activity maximal over the left parietal scalp with an onset latency 
of400ms post stimulus. This activity was more positive for items for which the study 
context (voice) could be accurately recalled, in comparison to correctly rejected or 
correctly recognised (without accurate source judgement) items (Wilding & Rugg, 
1996). This indicates that the left parietal old/new effect is likely to index retrieval of
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contextual information, which is associated with the process of recollection rather 
than familiarity.
There is also evidence that the left parietal old/new effect can be dissociated from 
other potentially confounding ERP effects (Rugg & Curran, 2007). Importantly, 
Herron, Quayle & Rugg (2003) have shown that the left parietal old/new effect is 
reflective of recollection processes alone, and does not vary with target probability. 
This is important because the P300 potential has a time course and scalp distribution 
that overlaps with that of the left-parietal old/new effect (Horst, Johnson & Donchin, 
1980). In Herron et al.’s study, participants completed recognition memory tasks in 
which the proportions of old and new items varied across study/test blocks. The P300 
is sensitive to probability changes, but the left parietal old/new effect did not differ 
according to the ratio of old and new items (Herron et al., 2003). Thus this ERP 
old/new effect can be dissociated from other posterior effects which occur during a 
similar time-window.
There is now broad support for the view that the left parietal effect is an index of 
recollection from experiments in which single items were presented at test. Other 
research has shown that the left parietal old/new effect varies in associative 
recognition tasks. Rugg et al. (1996) conducted a study in which participants 
performed an old/new recognition task for pairs of items. During study, participants 
were presented with a series of word pairs for which they were asked to form a 
sentence. At test, participants were presented with single words for recognition. When 
items were judged as 'old’, participants were asked to retrieve the other word from the 
study pair. Activity over parietal areas, especially over the left hemisphere, was more
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positive-going for correct judgments to old items compared to new items. Items 
judged ‘olcT by participants (for which they were later able to recall the other word 
from the study pair) were associated with even greater positivity (Rugg et al., 1996). 
This is strong evidence to suggest that the left parietal old/new effect is indeed a 
correlate of successful recollection, since familiarity is not likely to support 
associative memory for non-semantically-related pairs of words (Ecker, Zimmer, 
Groh-Bordin & Mecklinger, 2007; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; but see Speer & 
Curran, 2007).
In a related experiment (Donaldson and Rugg, 1998) participants were presented with 
a series of word pairs at study. During test the participants were required to indicate 
whether presented pairs were old or new, followed by a ‘same’ or ‘rearranged’ 
judgement for pairs they believed to be old. There was greater posterior positivity for 
correctly identified old words in comparison with new, which is further evidence to 
support the recollection theory of this ERP effect. This is believed to be the case, 
since rearranged pairs were found to evoke effects which were smaller in magnitude 
in comparison with the same test pairs. The authors suggested this was due to the fact 
that less contextual information would be recalled for the rearranged pairs because 
neither word was from the same episode, which would therefore lead to less potent 
recollection and greater reliance on familiarity (Donaldson & Rugg, 1998).
One interpretation of these findings in associative recognition is that the left parietal 
effect can be graded according to the level of contextual information derived from 
memory search (see also Smith, 1993; Wilding et al., 1995; Wilding & Rugg, 1996). 
This is important for the current thesis because this sensitivity is necessary if the
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effect is to be used to assess the possibility that recollection supports recency 
judgments in a strength-based manner. Direct evidence in support of this graded 
account comes from the finding that the level of accuracy in source memory tasks 
requiring multiple source judgments is linked to the magnitude of the left parietal 
old/new effect (Wilding, 2000). In this experiment, participants were presented with a 
series of spoken words, either in a male or female voice. For each item participants 
were cued to make either a passive/active judgement or a pleasant/unpleasant 
judgement.
During test trials participants were presented with words on a computer screen and 
were asked to make an old/new judgement, followed by a task and voice (source) 
judgement ERP recording revealed that the size of the left parietal old/new effect 
increased as a function of increasing levels of contextual retrieval (Wilding, 2000, see 
also Vilberg & Rugg, 2007). This study suggests that if the left parietal old/new effect 
indexes the volume or amount of contextual retrieval, then this could potentially be 
utilised by participants in line with a distance theory of recency in the manner 
outlined in Chapter 1.
The weight of the evidence reviewed above is in support of the idea that the left 
parietal old/new effect is an ERP index of the memory process of recollection. It has 
been shown that activity between 500-800ms post stimulus is more positive going for 
recognised old compared to new items, for which associated contextual information 
can be recovered. Recollection is likely to be one process that underlies Friedman’s
(1993) location information because of these contextual and reconstructive memory 
properties. However, since there is also evidence that recollection can be graded (e.g.
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Wilding, 2000), this ERP effect may also provide the basis for a strength-related form 
of distance information. Thus, measuring how this effect might differ across JORs 
could provide useful information for understanding memory for recency.
Mid-Frontal Old/new Effect
The mid-frontal old/new effect has also been described as the FN400 (Curran, 2000). 
This negative-going waveform has a typical onset latency of 300ms and has been 
found to last around 200ms. It takes the form of greater positivity for old compared to 
new items (Friedman & Johnson, 2000) that attract correct memory judgments. This 
ERP effect occurs within the same time-window as the N400 component, which has 
been linked to semantic processing (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The mid-frontal effect 
differs from the N400 component, since it is usually evident primarily at frontal sites 
rather than being limited to central regions (Curran & Cleary, 2003).
The earliest study documenting the mid-frontal ERP old/new effect, linking it to 
familiarity, was undertaken by Rugg et al. (1998). Participants completed a standard 
old/new recognition memory task, with the manipulation involving depth of 
processing at study (shallow vs. deep encoding). The mid-frontal effect was evident 
for correctly identified old items and did not differ according to the encoding 
manipulation. Rugg et al. (1998) therefore suggested that this was a likely index of 
familiarity processes, since depth of processing has been shown to influence 
familiarity to a lesser extent than recollection (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002).
Curran (2000) also claimed that the mid-frontal old/new effect is likely to be a neural 
correlate of familiarity. In this research, participants studied lists of 40 words and
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were instructed that their memory would be tested for the words and for their 
plurality. At test, 60 words were presented, with an equal mixture of new, studied and 
similar (with plurality changed) words. It was expected that ''old' responses to 
plurality reversed words would be based on familiarity, since recollection would not 
permit these types of errors. Curran (2000) found that the left parietal effect was 
greater for correct responses to correctly identified old items in comparison to words 
for which plurality had been altered at test. In the 300-500ms epoch however, there 
was no difference in ERP activity across these conditions, but both differed in 
comparison with correctly rejected new items at mid-frontal electrode sites. This 
research is therefore strong evidence that the mid-frontal effect is an index of 
familiarity memory processes, since if this effect reflected contextual retrieval, it 
would be expected to differ across studied and similar 'o ld  items.
Other evidence that the mid-frontal old/new effect is associated with familiarity 
comes from a study by Nessler, Mecklinger and Penney (2001). These researchers 
constructed categories of words and created lists of nouns for each category. After 
studying the lists of nouns, participants were presented with a recognition memory 
test that contained studied words from a particular category, non-studied words from 
the same category, and non-studied words from a different category.
Nessler et al. (2001) found that a mid-frontal old/new effect was evident for items 
correctly classified as old, and for items incorrectly classified as old that were 
semantically similar to old test items. The researchers also reported that the left 
parietal old/new effect was observed in response to items correctly classified as being 
old, and that this activity was smaller for lures accepted as being old (Nessler et al.,
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2001). These results therefore give further support to dual process theories of 
recognition memory (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002), suggesting that the mid- 
frontal old/new effect is indeed an index of familiarity and that the left parietal effect 
is an index of recollection.
Curran and Cleary (2003) have provided evidence to suggest that familiarity is 
indexed by the mid-frontal old/new effect using non-verbal stimuli. Participants were 
required to study a series of sequentially presented line drawn pictures. At test the 
participants were presented with studied pictures, new pictures and pictures which 
were mirror reversals of studied pictures. During test the participants were required to 
make old and new judgements for each picture. There were mid-frontal old/new 
effects in response to both the old and the highly similar but unstudied items. It was 
suggested that the mirror drawings would invoke a feeling of familiarity, but would 
not lead to recollection, unlike the old items (Curran & Cleary, 2003). This 
interpretation supports the theory that the mid-frontal old/new effect is an index of 
familiarity.
Further evidence that the mid-frontal old/new effect is an electrophysiological index 
of familiarity comes from an experiment carried out by Woodruff, Hayama and Rugg 
(2006), in which the researchers utilised confidence judgements to indicate the 
different levels of familiarity experienced by participants. At study, participants were 
presented with a list of words to which they were asked to make an animate/inanimate 
judgement. During a test of recognition memory, participants were required to 
indicate their form of recognition experience, be it remember (something contextual 
about the study episode could be recovered), confident old (though not able to recall
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any detail about the study episode), unconfident old, unconfident new and confident 
new.
An early left frontal old/new effect was elicited to a greater extent by items designated 
as being highly familiar, compared to items categorised as being less familiar (as 
indexed by the confidence ratings). This effect did not differ in size for recollection 
(contextual recovery) judgements and highly familiar (confident old) judgements.
Late left-parietal positivity however, was associated only with items given a 
recollection response and did not vary across confidence (Woodruff et al., 2006). This 
study suggests that this frontal old/new effect indexes familiarity in a graded fashion. 
These findings also provide compelling support for dual process accounts of 
recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2002).
Other related evidence in support of the mid-frontal old/new effect and the link to 
familiarity processes comes from work by Azimian-Faridani and Wilding (2006). 
They manipulated the response criterion used in an old/new recognition paradigm. 
Participants were required to respond 'old’ to words at test only if they were confident 
that the item was old (the “conservative” condition). In the “liberal” condition, 
participants were required to respond 'new' to an item if they were confident that the 
word was new. ERPs elicited by old as well as new test items at mid-frontal electrodes 
were more positive-going in the conservative than the liberal condition.
This finding is consistent with the view that the mid-frontal ERP old/new effect 
indexes familiarity if greater positivity equates to greater familiarity, because in the 
conservative condition a higher level of familiarity should have been associated on
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average with correct old as well as with correct new judgments. Given that previous 
behavioural research suggests that familiarity is more influenced by changes in 
criterion than recollection (e.g. Yonelinas, 2001; Postma, 1999), this study is evidence 
in support of the notion that the mid-frontal old/new effect is an index of familiarity 
processes and that this process is graded in nature, in line with the views of Yonelinas
(1994), and the data produced by Woodruff et al. (2006) described earlier.
Despite the persuasive evidence in support of a familiarity account of the mid-frontal 
old/new effect, however some theorists remain unconvinced. Instead, these 
researchers interpret the collated data in terms of conceptual priming -  differential 
processing of presented stimuli following a preceding semantically related event 
(Paller, Voss & Boehm, 2007). Although convinced that familiarity is an existing 
memory process, these theorists argue that much previous research has failed to rule 
out conceptual priming as the basis for the mid-frontal old/new effect.
In line with the conceptual priming account, it has been suggested that the mid-frontal 
ERP old/new effect is merely reflective of verbal processing activity (Yovel & Paller, 
2004). In their experiment, novel faces (paired with an occupation label) were used 
rather than words. At test, recollection of faces was indicated by the recovery of 
additional contextual recovery of occupation label along with a correct old judgement, 
whereas familiarity was associated with old judgements alone. Here, both familiarity 
and recollection were indexed only by parietal activity which differed in magnitude 
across the conditions (smaller for familiar faces). It was proposed that the mid-frontal 
activity observed in previous studies arose because the researchers had made use of 
verbal rather than pictorial stimuli, or pictorial stimuli for which names readily come
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to mind (Yovel & Paller, 2004). However, other researchers investigating the 
characteristics of the mid-frontal effect have found it to be elicited when using stimuli 
such as novel objects, faces and highly diminished visual stimuli (e.g. Curran, Tanaka 
& Weiskopf, 2002; Jaeger et al., 2006; Johansson, Mecklinger & Treese, 2004; Speer 
& Curran, 2007), therefore the bulk of the evidence is still in favour of a familiarity 
account of the mid-frontal old/new ERP effect.
Voss and Paller (2006) presented data which they argued ruled out the possibility that 
familiarity could be the basis of the mid-frontal ERP activity. Participants were 
presented with famous and non-famous faces directly after presenting them with 
biographical information. Only some of the famous faces were primed with matching 
biographical information before the presentation of the face. Participants were 
required to decide whether the information matched each face. Participants were then 
tested for explicit memory (familiarity rating of ‘very familiar’ to ‘not at all familiar’ 
on a 5 point scale) and conceptual priming (press button only for famous faces). ERP 
recordings were taken during the conceptual priming task (Voss & Paller, 2006).
Frontal ERPs for primed famous faces were more positive-going in comparison with 
un-primed famous faces in the time-window and scalp region of the mid-frontal 
old/nerw effect. Priming took the form of faster RTs in response to matching 
biographical face data in the conceptual priming task, compared to mismatching face 
data trials. When this data was analysed in regard to the explicit memory task, only 
posterior ERPs in a later time-window differed according to condition (Voss & Paller,
2006). The authors of this study therefore concluded that the mid-frontal ERP activity 
is selectively associated with conceptual priming, rather than familiarity.
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In direct contrast with the account outlined above, other research has found evidence 
that mid-frontal activity in the 300-500ms time-window varies with familiarity and 
not with conceptual priming (Ecker, Zimmer & Groh-Bordin, 2007b; Groh-Bordin et 
al., 2006; Schloerscheidt & Rugg, 2004). For example, Groh-Bordin and colleagues 
(2006) conducted research where participants studied a list of nonsense figures and 
real object figures of different colours. Participants were asked to memorise these for 
a future recognition task. At test, participants were presented with a mixture of new 
items, incongruent colour items and congruent colour items. For each item 
participants made recognition judgements, followed by a judgement about colour 
congruency (when an old judgement was made). ERPs were recorded during the 
old/new judgements (Groh-Bordin et al., 2006).
Mid-frontal old/new effects were present for nonsense figures as well as for drawings 
of known objects, and were larger when the items were presented in the congruent 
colour at test. Since the nonsense figures were hard to name and were also 
meaningless, this research can be taken as evidence in support of a familiarity account 
of the mid-frontal old/new effect since only perceptual, and no conceptual changes, 
were implemented at test. Stronger evidence supporting this argument was the fact 
that the effect was still elicited for items rated as ‘low’ in meaning by participants 
(Groh-Bordin et al., 2006; see also Ecker, Zimmer & Groh-Bordin, 2007a). Despite 
this research, and other studies eliciting similar findings, supporters of the conceptual 
priming account remain unconvinced, suggesting that meaning could have been 
attributed to the nonsense figures by the participants (Paller et al., 2007).
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Although there are arguments both for and against a familiarity basis for the mid- 
frontal old/new effect, it is presumed in this thesis that the ERP effect is an index of 
familiarity rather than an index of conceptual priming. The weight of available 
evidence is in line with this view. Rugg and Curran (2007) have reviewed evidence in 
support of both theories. It was noted that conceptual priming advocates of the mid- 
frontal effect need to address issues such as: why new items falsely identified as old 
still elicit mid-frontal activity; why misses elicit less positive mid-frontal activity than 
do correctly identified old items; and why this effect varies with response criterion 
(Rugg & Curran, 2007; for an alternative perspective see Paller, Voss, & Boehm,
2007).
In sum, the bulk of the evidence is in favour of the notion that the mid-frontal activity 
discussed in this section is an ERP index of familiarity. It has been demonstrated in 
various studies that this activity is related to items that have been mistakenly 
identified as old on the basis of feelings of familiarity and that this ERP effect can be 
graded. Familiarity is likely to be one process that underlies Friedman’s (1993) 
distance information because of these properties. Thus, if the mid-frontal old/new 
effect does index familiarity, then measuring how this effect might differ across JORs 
could provide useful information for understanding memory for recency.
Right Frontal Old/new Effect
One of the earliest reports of the late right frontal old/new effect was in the mid­
nineties, where greater positivity for old (compared to new) words was evident over 
right frontal electrodes, from 1100-1400ms post stimuli (Wilding & Rugg, 1996). In 
this experiment, as described earlier, participants were presented at study with a series
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of words for which they were asked to make a word/non-word judgement and a 
male/female voice judgement. For the test part of the experiment, participants were 
visually presented with a series of new and repeated words and their task was to make 
an old/new discrimination for each word, followed by a male/female voice decision 
for words given an ‘olcf judgment (to indicate original mode of presentation).
Along with a left parietal old/new effect in the 500-800ms time-window, the right 
frontal activity described above was also elicited in this experiment (Wilding & Rugg,
1996). For words which were correctly identified as being old and that attracted 
correct voice gender judgements, the right frontal effect was larger in comparison 
with correct old judgements for which the source judgement was incorrect. The 
authors argued that since this effect was smaller for non-contextual retrieval, it is 
likely that it is reflective of retrieval monitoring or organisation of contextual 
information (Wilding & Rugg, 1996). These cognitive operations working over the 
products of retrieval have been termed ‘post-retrieval operations’ and are likely to 
reflect activity located in the pre-frontal cortex (see Allan et al., 1998).
There is, however, no consensus on the functional role of the right frontal ERP effect. 
In an experiment by Senkfor and Van Petten (1998), participants studied a series of 
spoken words, half presented in a male voice and the other half presented in a female 
voice. There were two types of recognition tests. In one, the participants were 
required to indicate whether presented stimuli were old or new words only. In the 
second recognition test participants were required to judge whether the items were old 
or new, and further to decide whether the old items had been presented in the same 
voice as at study, or if the voice was different (source judgements). There was
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evidence of a frontal old/new effect (800-1200ms post stimulus) only during the 
source task, and the effect was evoked during both accurate and inaccurate voice 
gender judgements (Senkfor & Van Petten, 1998). The authors argued this suggested 
that the frontal old/new effect is reflective of a source memory retrieval search, since 
the effect was equivalent for accurate and inaccurate judgements.
In a similar study by Wilding and Rugg (1997), participants were presented with 
spoken words at study and were asked to perform different encoding tasks depending 
on the gender of the voice. At test the participants were then required to distinguish 
between targets (old words which had been spoken in a particular gender) and non­
targets (new items and old items that had been spoken in the non-target gender). A 
right frontal old/new effect was elicited in response to target items alone, and this 
effect was not present for non-targets. This led Wilding and Rugg (1997) to propose 
that this ERP effect is an index of successful source retrieval monitoring processes, 
which they suggest are controlled voluntarily by the participants. This is an important 
paper because it shows that the left parietal effect is dissociated from the right frontal 
effect, since the left parietal effect was elicited by all accurate old responses, whereas 
the right frontal effect was only elicited when targets were correctly identified as 
being old (Wilding & Rugg, 1997; see also Wilding, Fraser & Herron, 2005).
In an experiment by Trott et al. (1999), participants studied sentences from two 
distinct lists and this was followed by a word recognition test. In addition to their 
old/new judgements, participants were required to make a source judgement for items 
classified as old. Participants elicited similar patterns of right frontal activity 
regardless of whether their source judgements were correct or incorrect. These
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researchers also reported that the ERP effect was larger for incorrect source 
judgements (see also Trott, Friedman, Ritter & Fabiani, 1997). Trott et al. (1999) 
proposed that a change in voice gender utilised in the Wilding & Rugg (1997) study 
may have led to a more clearly marked contextual difference in the ‘to be 
remembered’ items. Thus, task differences may have led to these disparate findings.
Ranganath and Paller (1999) conducted an experiment involving recognition tests 
which differed according to retrieval specificity requirements. Participants were 
presented with study lists of 10 drawings shown twice. At test, some presented 
drawings were new, some old, and some similar to old. Participants were asked to 
either endorse only identical items as being old, or to endorse identical and similar 
items as being old.
There were late right frontal old/new effects between 900 and 1100ms when 
participants performed the recognition test using lax criteria to classify items as old 
(i.e. when similar and identical items could be accepted as old). When adopting more 
stringent old item criteria, a right frontal effect of greater magnitude was observed. 
These findings led Ranganath and Paller (1999) to conclude that the right frontal 
old/new effect varies with both strategic control and possibly retrieval effort. They 
argued that more cognitive effort would be required during the test where only 
identical items could be accepted as old, therefore a greater right frontal effect 
magnitude level would be expected if this ERP effect indexes retrieval effort.
Familiarity is likely to be relied upon for this task when using lax criteria and 
recollection when using strict criteria (Azimian-Faridani & Wilding, 2006). Thus,
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although the right frontal old/new effect was of increased magnitude in the strict 
condition compared to the lax or liberal condition, this effect cannot be said to be tied 
exclusively to judgements of a contextual nature (since familiarity is non-contextual 
and still elicits the right frontal effect). Further support for this notion comes from the 
findings of research with R/K judgements, where judgements assumed to be 
exclusively associated with familiarity were found to elicit late right frontal activity 
(Duzel et al., 1997).
In a recent study reported by Kuo and Van Petten (2006), the late right frontal effect 
was classified as indexing a secondary memory search for relationships between 
stimulus characteristics. Participants saw a series of drawings and for each drawing 
they were asked to make a size or colour judgement. A mixture of old identical, new, 
and old incongruent colour drawings were presented sequentially at test. Participants 
could respond ‘old same’, ‘old different’ or ‘new' for each item presented at test (Kuo 
& Van Petten, 2006).
The colour study task was expected to lead to good memory for the test item and its 
colour attribute, whereas the size study task was not expected to produce such strong 
colour memory (Kuo & Van Petten, 2006). As was hypothesized by the researchers, 
the late right frontal old/new effect was not present when participants had been asked 
to focus on colour in the study phase of the experiment, but was present when they 
had been asked to attend to stimulus size. Attending to size resulted in lower source 
accuracy and an increased magnitude of the right frontal old/new ERP effect, which is 
consistent with Wilding et al. who also found that the magnitude of this effect was
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greater in tasks where source accuracy was comparatively lower (2005; see also Kuo 
& Van Petten, 2008 for a conflicting result).
Finally, Hayama, Johnson and Rugg (2008) aimed to establish whether the right 
frontal ERP old/new effect could be elicited in circumstances where no monitoring of 
episodic retrieval products was necessary, and whether it was present for other types 
of retrieval monitoring. Participants were presented with a list of nameable pictures of 
objects to study. For each item presented, they were cued to make one of two different 
types of semantic judgement. At test, participants were again presented with a list of 
items and for each item judged to be old, they were to make either another type of 
semantic judgement, or a source memory judgement depending on the test block 
(Hayama et al., 2008).
Late right frontal old/new effects were present in both the episodic and semantic 
retrieval tasks. These effects were equivalent in terms of latency, magnitude and scalp 
distribution (Hayama et al., 2008). These researchers also went on to evaluate whether 
new items could also elicit late right frontal activity if participants were required to 
make the same semantic judgements (instead of making those judgements for old 
items). A greater right-frontal positivity for new items requiring a semantic judgement 
in comparison with old items (not requiring any further monitoring) was obtained 
(Hayama et al., 2008). The researchers argued that these findings are highly 
suggestive of a monitoring account of the right frontal effect, and one which is not 
tied exclusively to episodic retrieval.
90
From this review it is clear that the late right frontal ERP old/new effect varies with 
source accuracy in different ways across experiments. The most recent line of 
research has created a new pathway for investigating the nature of this effect (Hayama 
et al., 2008). The most parsimonious account of the right frontal activity to date is that 
it indexes some form of executive memory processing, likely involving evaluation 
and monitoring of the outcomes of a retrieval search. If this effect does indeed reflect 
activity in the frontal lobes as was suggested earlier in this section, it is probable that 
the late right frontal activity will vary in ERP studies of recency memory, since the 
frontal lobes are likely to be implicated in temporal memory judgements -  and this 
effect is therefore relevant for this thesis. The inconsistencies outlined above 
however, make it difficult to make detailed predictions about how the right-frontal 
old/new effect will vary for correct and incorrect recency judgments.
In Summary, the majority of the evidence reviewed in this section is in support of the 
idea that the left parietal old/new effect is an ERP index of the memory process of 
recollection, and that the mid-frontal old/new effect is an ERP index of familiarity. It 
has also been suggested that the late right frontal ERP old/new effect is most likely to 
index some form of executive memory processing. For these reasons it is proposed 
that the use of ERP recording is a valid means of assessing whether recollection and 
familiarity are implicated in recency memory, in a way that is compatible with 
distance theories of memory for time. Before moving forward however, it is important 
to determine whether these claims are fitting with other forms of evidence.
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Neural Generators o f the Mid-Frontal and Left Parietal Old/New Effects 
In Chapter 1 it was noted that recollection and familiarity have been widely associated 
with the hippocampus and perirhinal cortices respectively (see pages 59-60). In terms 
of ERP data, however, activity over parietal scalp has consistently been linked with 
the process of recollection. In addition, much evidence has been cited here that would 
suggest that activity over frontal areas is related to familiarity. How can these ERP 
findings be reconciled with the wealth of animal, fMRI and neuropsychological 
evidence of MTL involvement in episodic memory processes (for a review, see: 
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas & Ranganath, 2007)?
Firstly, as was mentioned early on in this chapter (p70), one limitation of this 
technology is that ERPs recorded around the surface of the scalp do not have high 
spatial resolution, unlike fMRI, and therefore it is impossible to be certain about 
exactly which neural generators are giving rise to a given pattern of electrical activity 
(Binnie et al., 1996). That being said, there is strong evidence that specific regions in 
the parietal cortex are involved in recollection and familiarity (for a review: Vilberg 
& Rugg, 2008) and that regions of the frontal lobes are also implicated in familiarity 
memory processing (e.g. Yonelinas et al., 2005).
There is also evidence that the MTL and parietal cortices are linked via neural 
pathways (e.g. Vincent et al. 2006). Here it was shown that resting state fMRI bold 
signal correlated between the hippocampus and parts of the parietal cortex, providing 
evidence of a physical connection between the two brain regions (Vincent et al., 
2006). More recent research has lead to the proposal that this hippocampal-parietal 
memory network involves the medial section of the parietal region, whereas the
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lateral parietal cortices are differentially connected to the lateral temporal lobe 
(Takashi, Ohki & Kim, 2008). These lines of research provide a formal model of how 
the MTL and parietal areas might be anatomically related.
Why, then, should there be a lack of evidence of episodic memory disturbances 
resulting from brain injuries in these parietal regions (for a review: Simons & Mayes,
2008)? One reason for this could be that the supposed ERP indices of these memory 
processes are actually reflecting other non-mnemonic cognitive operations that run 
downstream of recollection and familiarity -  there is indeed support for this in terms 
of the parietal activity associated with recollection (for a review: Vilberg & Rugg,
2009). However, good evidence is now emerging that parietal disturbances do indeed 
impair memory processing (e.g. Rossi et al., 2006; Davidson et al., 2008), albeit in 
subtle ways. For present purposes, however, the key point is that, irrespective of the 
neural generators of the effect, the parietal old/new effect acts as a robust index of 
recollection in a graded fashion.
The same argument can be applied to the mid-frontal ERP old/new effect, and at 
present a specification of the neural generators responsible for it is not more specific 
than the observation that its focal scalp distribution is consistent with a generator in 
the prefrontal cortex. The properties of the generators of ERP effects, and the ways in 
which they propagate to the scalp mean that it is not possible at present to make 
strong claims about whether this midline maximum effect is in fact generated by brain 
regions in the right or left hemisphere, or is in fact an combination of activity initiated 
in both hemispheres. To reiterate, however, these unanswered questions about neural 
generators do not preclude the use of these ERP old/new effects to investigate
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memory processing, and how they have been employed in recency tasks is described 
below.
Memory for recency and ERPs
Researchers have used event-related potential recordings to uncover information 
about the types of memory processes involved in recency judgements, but these types 
of studies are rare. In an experiment by Tendolkar and Rugg (1998), participants were 
presented with two study lists of words, and at test they were asked to identify the 
most recent item for each presented pair. Test pairs were either both old (repeated, 
one from each list), both new, or were made up of one old and one new item. For pairs 
where both items were old, accurate recency judgements elicited greater positivity 
over fronto-polar locations in comparison with new pairs. This activity was not 
present when the task required recognition memory judgements, rather than recency 
judgements. This finding suggests that additional cognitive operations are required in 
recency memory tasks (Tendolkar & Rugg, 1998). However, the fronto-polar effect 
reported in this study may not index recency selectively, and is likely to be present in 
other experiments where source judgements are required. This task is one in which 
location information is likely to be utilised according to Friedman’s (1993) 
framework, since the list 1 and list 2 divisions act as temporal landmarks which could 
serve as contextual clues to recency (location information).
In a more recent experiment, Tendolkar et al. (2004) presented participants with two 
distinct lists of words during study. At test, pairs of words were presented which were 
either both new items, old items from the same study list, or old items from different 
study lists. The task required participants to determine which of the items had been
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presented most recently. Correct recency judgements (both old items in the pair) 
elicited more positive-going activity in comparison to old/new judgements. This 
occurred between 700 and 1000ms post stimulus at fronto-polar sites. This effect did 
not differ according to whether the task was to compare the recency of items from the 
same or from different lists. The late fronto-polar effect may be an index of cognitive 
processes linked to monitoring and implementation of cognitive strategies (Van Petten 
et al., 2002). If these assumptions about the putative indices of monitoring processes 
are correct, this study provides evidence that tasks requiring scrutiny of temporal 
context require a generic executive control process. Why these frontal effects did not 
differ across classes of recency judgement is unclear, which might be expected since 
judging the recency of items from the same list could require greater cognitive control 
or effort.
In another ERP study of recency memory, Curran and Friedman (2003; 2004) 
employed tasks where location information and distance information might be used in 
different ways. Participants were asked to study a list of items in a particular 
environmental context (list 1) and on the following day, they were asked to return to 
study an additional two lists of items (list 2 in the same context as the previous day, 
list 3 in a different context). At test, memory was assessed for both recency 
discrimination based on contextual retrieval (lists 2 vs. 3), and for recency 
discrimination based on elapsed time (list 1 vs. list 2). The use of distance-based 
information was encouraged in the day test and location-based information in the 
context test through use of different instructions (they were told to use their instincts 
in the day test, and to attempt to retrieve context in the context test).
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Reaction times were slower for recency judgements in the context task, suggesting 
that making recency judgements based on location information takes longer than 
judgements based on distance information (Curran & Friedman, 2004). This would fit 
with the idea that location information is based on recollection and distance 
information on familiarity, since recollection is thought to be a more effortful and 
time consuming process (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002).
No clear ERP old/new effects differed across list 1 and list 2 in the day task (Curran & 
Friedman, 2004), however late right frontal ERPs (800-1800ms) differed between the 
day and the context tasks; the difference between old and new items was larger in the 
context task. This difference across the tasks was attributed to the implementation of 
cognitive processes which aid reconstruction of location information in memory for 
the recency judgements (Curran & Friedman, 2003). The results of this study 
converge with neuropsychological data reviewed earlier (see page 96) suggesting that 
the frontal lobes are implicated in tasks where location information is utilised by 
participants, to a greater degree than tasks where distance information is relied upon 
for recency judgements. A more sensitive test of recency may be required in order to 
assess whether there are differences in the levels of activation across time in regard to 
the mid-frontal and left parietal old/new effects (linked with familiarity and 
recollection, see Chapter 2), and whether they map onto differences in recency 
judgements. This is one issue with which this thesis is concerned, and the thesis aims 
are outlined below.
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General Aims in Conducting this Research
The first three experiments carried out in this thesis involved the use of ERPs and 
were conducted in order to test whether two possible sources, strength offamiliarity 
and recollection, underlie JORs in a manner that would classify them as distance 
information. Across the three ERP experiments, it was reasoned that if familiarity is 
utilised in a task where distance information must be relied upon, the mid-frontal 
old/new effect will be larger for short JORs in comparison with relatively longer 
JORs, regardless of accuracy. Similarly, if recollection is involved in recency 
judgements and is employed in a strength-based manner, then the left-parietal old/new 
effect will increase in magnitude with decreasing JORs. This argument is key to the 
designs of Experiments 1-3 described below. The link here is that, for both of these 
ERP old/new effects, larger (more positive-going) effects index an increase in 
familiarity or recollection, respectively. If memory strength supports JORs, then 
increases in strength will result in shorter average JORs. Hence larger ERP old/new 
effects should be associated with shorter JORs than with longer JORs. The fact that 
ERPs index recollection as well as familiarity also permits an assessment of how both 
of these processes, either singly or in combination, might support recency judgments.
The experiments reported in this thesis were all largely based on a task adapted from 
the work of Yntema and Trask (1963) and of Hintzman (2001; 2003; 2004). In these 
continuous recency memory tasks, participants are presented with a long list of items 
(words or famous names), free of contextual landmarks. Items are re-presented within 
the list after a number of intervening items or lags, which ranged from 5-35 
intervening items across experiments. For each item presented, participants were 
asked to make an old/new recognition judgement, followed by a JOR for the items
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which they identified as being old. Critically, in the experiments in which ERPs were 
acquired, the tasks were designed such that it was possible to analyse neural activity 
for items from the same repetition lag that were separated according to whether they 
attracted correct or incorrect judgments. In addition, incorrect judgments were further 
separated according to whether they were lag under-estimates or over-estimates. This 
is the critical manipulation that is necessary to assess how ERP indices of specific 
retrieval processes support recency judgments. Larger old/new effects for shorter than 
for longer JORs, would be consistent with the view that the memory processes 
indexed by the effects support recency judgments in a strength-based manner. 
Conducting a series of experiments using the continuous recency task described here 
therefore allows several goals to be accomplished:
1 -  An electrophysiological assessment of whether, and if so how, familiarity 
contributes to recency judgments in tasks where distance information is likely to be 
the form of information that is used for JORs.
2 -  An electrophysiological assessment of whether, and if so how, recollection 
contributes to recency judgments in tasks where distance information is likely to be 
the form of information that is used for JORs.
3 -  An assessment of whether recency judgments elicit electrophysiological 
signatures of memory processes that differ from those engaged in other kinds of 
memory tasks.
4 -  An assessment of how ERP indices of retrieval monitoring are engaged when 
recency judgments are required.
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These goals were accomplished in Experiments 1-3. Experiment 1 was designed such 
that a large number of trials at a single lag (15) were presented to participants, in 
order to obtain sufficient numbers of trials in the conditions of interest, such that 
shorter JORs (for items with the same lag) could be compared with longer JORs. The 
possible response options were 10, 20 and 15. In Experiment 2 a wider range of JOR 
response options was available to participants (5,15,25 and 35) and the lags reflected 
these options, allowing longer distances between them than in the previous 
experiment. In the final ERP experiment there were equal proportions of items 
recurring at every possible lag (5, 15 and 25) and participants were aware of this fact. 
The remaining experiments in this thesis comprise experiments in which recognition 
and JOR response accuracy were measured. ERPs were not acquired. The intention 
was to employ a series of behavioural manipulations in order to provide converging 
evidence for the claims that could be made on the basis of the outcomes of the ERP 
experiments.
The behavioural experiments all involved continuous recognition tasks with stimuli 
not previously utilised in other recency research. The stimuli used were famous and 
non-famous first and last (full) names. The reason for using famous as well as non- 
famous names was that it was assumed that their pre-experiment strength would vary. 
Memory strength across experiments was also varied by manipulating the kind of 
encoding operations and the number of stimulus presentations in study phases that 
preceded the continuous recency tasks. The encoding manipulations that were 
employed were intended to load differentially on recollection and familiarity, thereby 
allowing an assessment (complementing the ERP data) of how these processes 
contribute to JORs.
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A crucial advantage of using famous and non-famous names in this behavioural series 
of experiments over stimuli used by Hintzman (e.g. high vs. low frequency words, 
concrete vs. abstract words, pictures vs. words), is that famous names can be used to 
give a direct assessment of how pre-experimental levels of memory strength can 
predict lag judgements. This was accomplished in the final experiment reported in this 
thesis (Experiment 8).
In Experiment 4, famous and non-famous names were used in a continuous recency 
memory task for the first time in order to assess how a manipulation of fame would 
influence JORs. Experiment 5 was conducted in order to attempt to elevate the 
strength of non-famous names prior to the recency task in such a way that familiarity 
would be the process that was primarily affected. The aim in Experiment 6 was 
similar to that in the previous experiment, with the intention to use a manipulation 
that would load primarily on recollection. Toward this end, the non-famous names 
were presented in a deep encoding task, as this manipulation has been shown to 
influence recollection to a greater degree than familiarity (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).
The design of Experiment 7 was a departure from that of the previous behavioural 
experiments in that no famous names were presented. Instead, an attempt was made to 
pre-experimentally elevate the availability of familiarity for 50% of the non-famous 
names. This was done in order to assess whether manipulations of familiarity alone 
would have an influence on subsequent JORs. If studied non-famous names in this 
experiment were associated with shorter JORs than non-studied names, it could be 
concluded that familiarity is a strength-based process underlying recency judgements.
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Again in this way, familiarity would fall under the bracket of distance information. 
Finally, Experiment 8 was carried out in order to deduce whether increasing the 
availability of recollection (through deep encoding) for famous names in a study 
session prior to the continuous recency task would have a subsequent effect on JORs 
within the later continuous task. If the amount of contextual information associated 
pre-experimentally for famous names was related to JOR, it would suggest that 
recollection is utilised as a form of distance information under these circumstances. In 
summary, the behavioural experiments will:
4 -  Enable an assessment of how recollection and familiarity contribute to recency 
judgments, in a manner complementary to that employed in the preceding 
electrophysiological experiments.
5—Generalise the broad pattern of findings described by Hintzman to a different 
stimulus set.
6 -  Extend Hintzman’s work to circumstances where the ‘strength’ manipulation is 
within the experiments, rather than being a function of the attributes if the stimuli 
employed (e.g. high versus low frequency words).
Summary o f Aims
As described above, the chief objective in conducting the research reported in this 
thesis was to address some important issues relating to memory for recency. 
Hintzman’s (2005) data suggests that there is more than one memory process 
underlying memory for recency. The research in this thesis involving continuous 
recognition memory was expected to enforce reliance on the strength subcomponent 
of distance information, since there are no temporal landmarks to act as location
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information. Furthermore this task was expected to allow only very limited reliance 
on relative information, since the list of items is very long, with regular test intervals. 
Use of a continuous recognition and recency memory paradigm adapted from Yntema 
and Trask (1963) allowed for a comparison of neural activity associated with short 
and long JORs, which has not been analysed in other recency memory imaging 
studies. Briefly, if the level of familiarity and or recollection experienced is one basis 
for distance information, then neural activity associated with long and short recency 
judgements should vary in a graded fashion. If the frontal lobes are involved in 
recency memory processing in a task in which a reliance on distance information is 
likely, then it might be the case that the late right frontal ERP effect varies across 
JORs.
Finally, another aim in this thesis was to replicate previous findings that JOR alters as 
a function of memory strength (Hintzman, 2003; 2004, 2005) with a new set of 
stimuli, namely famous (high strength) and non-famous (low-strength) names. It was 
reasoned that if the key findings reported by Hintzman could be replicated with this 
set of stimuli, then some of the properties of famous names could be used to explore 
further recency memory issues in an interesting and novel way. In particular, since 
participants are likely to have different levels of pre-experiment experience with each 
famous name, then JORs may vary in accordance with this. For names where 
participants possessed a high level of associated contextual information (as in the case 
of famous names), it was expected that JORs would be short, in comparison to names 
where the level of associated contextual information was lower (as in the case of non- 
famous names). This stimulus set therefore provided an innovative way to assess the 
contributions of these kinds of memory contents to recency judgments.
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The following three chapters describe the ERP experiments conducted in light of the 
literature reviews and experimental aims reported in this thesis. Chapters 3 to 5 
describe the verbal recency experiments in which ERP data were gathered alongside 
behavioural measures, and the experiments based on famous and non-famous names 
are described in Chapter 6. At issue throughout is the nature and number of memory 
processes that support recency judgements in tasks where the use of information in a 
strength-based manner is encouraged by the task designs. These chapters are preceded 
by a short section that outlines the general experimental methods. Critically for the 
first three experiments, ERPs provide indices of recollection and familiarity. As a 
result, acquiring ERPs during recency tasks provides the opportunity to assess the 
contributions that these two processes might make, as well as the ways in which they 
make them. At issue is the nature and number of memory processes that support 
recency judgements in tasks where the use of information in a strength-based manner 
is encouraged by the task designs.
General ERP Methods
The following methods were employed in all ERP experiments in this thesis.
Participants
All were right handed with normal or corrected to normal vision. All were 
undergraduates at Cardiff University. The participants reported speaking English as 
their native language and none were taking any psychotropic medication, or reported 
having a diagnosis of dyslexia. All participants gave informed consent prior to the 
experiment. All experiments in this thesis were approved by the ethics committee of 
the School of Psychology, Cardiff University.
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Stimuli and Design
Low frequency words taken from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (4-9 letters, 
Kucera-Francis written frequency 1-7 per million, imageability rating 300-700, 
concreteness rating 400-700; www.psy.uwa.edu.au/MRCDataBase/uwa_mrc.htm) 
were used within the tasks. Stimuli were presented on a computer monitor located lm 
away from participants. All stimuli were presented in uppercase size 40 Times New 
Roman font in white, set against a black background. They subtended maximum 
visual angles of 0.6° (vertical) and 5° (horizontal).
Procedure
Participants were fitted with an elasticated electrode cap prior to the experiment. They 
were seated in a sound attenuated booth facing a monitor with their fingers resting on 
a keypad. The participants read through an instruction sheet and the instructions were 
then relayed verbally. Recency-related continuous recognition memory tasks were 
employed, where the items were presented sequentially in long lists. Most presented 
items were repeated at some later point in the list. The repetition intervals are referred 
as lags. Participants were required to make an old (i.e. repeated) or new (i.e. first 
presentation within this task) recognition judgement in response to every presented 
item in the list. For those items which they identified as being old, the participants 
were also required to make a lag (or recency) judgement, indicating how many 
intervening items that were believed to have intervened between first and second 
presentations of the item at hand.
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Electrophysiological Recording Procedure
Electroencephalogram (EEG) readings were recorded from 25 silver/silver chloride 
electrodes housed in an elastic cap. The sites were located at midline (Fz, Cz, Pz), as 
well as at left and right hemisphere locations (FP1/FP2, F3/F4, F5/F6, F7/F8, C3/C4, 
C5/C6, T7/T8, P3/P4, P5/P6, P7/P8, 01/02; Jasper, 1958). Additional electrodes 
were placed on the left and right mastoids. Electrooculogram (EOG) readings were 
recorded from above and below the right eye (VEOG) and from the outer canthi 
(HEOG). Trials containing large EOG artefacts were rejected, as were trials 
containing A/D saturation or baseline drift (difference between first and last data 
point) exceeding ± 80pV. Other EOG blink artefacts were corrected using a linear 
regression estimate (Semlitsch, Anderer, Schuster, & Presslich, 1986).
EEG was recorded continuously at 200Hz (5ms per point) with Fz as the reference 
electrode, and was re-referenced computationally off-line to the equivalent of a linked 
mastoid reference into baseline corrected epochs of 1280ms (256 data points), each 
including a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline. The data from Fz were reclaimed. EEG and 
EOG were recorded with a bandwidth of 0.03-40Hz (-3 dB). Participants were 
excluded from analysis if not contributing at least twelve trials after EOG artefact 
rejection to the categories of interest. These categories are described in the ERP 
results section. The averaged ERPs underwent a 7-point binomially weighted 
smoothing filter prior to analysis.
Experimental Condition Terminology
Correct new responses to items presented for the first time in each experiment are 
referred to as correct rejections (CR). Correct old responses to items presented for the
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second time in the experiments are referred to as hits (H). Incorrect old responses to 
items presented for the first time in the experiments are referred to as false alarms 
(FA). JORs are referred to in terms of the actual lag presented combined with the lag 
response (R) -  so for example, hits that were presented at lag 15 and that attracted a 
JOR of 10 will be referred to as H15R10.
Analysis Strategy
The key behavioural findings for each experiment are presented in tables or in graphs. 
All tables and figures are presented in the text. The following flow charts briefly 
describe the ERP analysis strategy taken for Experiments 1-3 as a useful guide. The 
three time-windows included in these analyses are 300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800- 
1100ms. In the a priori analyses F3,Fz,F4 (300-500ms) and P3,Pz,P4 (500-800ms) are 
examined. Non-significant trends are defined as p values under .1 but greater than .05. 
Reaction times (RTs) are measured from stimulus onset.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Global Old/New Analysis 4*
H15R15 compared with CRs. Carried out in order to identify whether there 
was evidence o f any old/new ERP differences.
A Priori Planned Old/New Comparisons 4^
H15R15 compared with CRs at anterior and then posterior sites. Carried out 
in order to identify whether there is evidence of any old/new ERP 
differences that reflect previously identified ERP old/new effects.
Single Lag Global Analyses 4/
H15R10; H15R15; and H15R20 are compared. Carried out in order to 
determine whether there was evidence that differences in JORs are reflected 
in the electrical record.
Paired Global Single Lag Analyses 4/
H15R10; H15R15; and H15R20 are compared in pairs, in all three possible 
combinations. Carried out in order to determine whether there was evidence 
that differences in JORs are reflected in the electrical record in a way that 
would support a distance account of recency.
Single Lag A Priori Planned Comparisons 4^
All possible paired contrasts involving the conditions H15R10;H15R15 and 
H15R20 were conducted. Carried out to determine whether previously 
identified electrical activity varies with JOR in a way that might support a 
distance account of recency.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Global Old/New Analysis 4^
H15R15 and H25R25 compared with CRs. Carried out in order to identify 
whether there was evidence of any old/new ERP differences.
Paired Global Old/New Analysis 4^
H15R15 compared with CRs, then H25R25 compared with CRs. Carried out 
in order to identify whether there is evidence of any old/new ERP 
differences for each individual lag.
A Priori Planned Old/New Comparisons 4/
CRs and hits attracting correct JORs were compared in pairs as in the stage 
above, at anterior and then posterior sites. Carried out in order to identify 
whether there is evidence of any old/new ERP differences that reflect 
previously identified ERP old/new effects.
Paired Global Hit Comparisons 4^
H15R15 and H25R25 were compared. Carried out in order to determine 
whether there was evidence that differences in lag are reflected in the 
electrical record. Followed by the appropriate a priori comparisons.
Single Lag Global Analyses 4^
H25R15, E125R25 and H25R30. Carried out in order to determine whether 
there was evidence that differences in JORs are reflected in the electrical 
record.
Paired Global Single Lag Analyses 4/
H25R15; H25R25 and H25R30 compared in pairs in all possible 
combinations. Carried out to determine whether previously identified 
electrical activity varies with JOR in a way that might support a distance 
account of recency. Followed by appropriate a priori comparisons.
Global Over-estimate Comparison 4/
H15R15 vs H15R25 comparison was conducted. Carried out in order to 
determine whether there was evidence that differences in JORs are reflected 
in the electrical record. Followed by the appropriate a priori comparisons.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Global Old/New Analysis 4/
H5R5, H15R15 and H25R25 compared with CRs. This was carried out in 
order to identify whether there was evidence of any old/new ERP 
differences.
Paired Global Old/New Analysis 4/
H5R5 compared with CRs; H15R15 compared with CRs; and H25R25 
compared with CRs. This was carried out in order to identify whether there 
was evidence of any old/new ERP differences fo r  each individual lag.
A Priori Planned Old/New Comparisons 4/
CRs and hits attracting correct JORs were compared in pairs as in the stage 
above, at anterior and then posterior sites. Carried out in order to identify 
whether there is evidence of any old/new ERP differences that reflect 
previously identified ERP old/new effects.
Paired Global Hit Comparisons 4/
H5R5, H15R15 and H25R25 were compared. Carried out in order to 
determine whether there was evidence that differences in lag are reflected in 
the electrical record. Followed by the appropriate a priori comparisons.
Global Over-Estimate Comparison 4*
H5R5 and H5R15 were compared. Carried out in order to determine whether 
there was evidence that differences in JORs are reflected in the electrical 
record in a way that supported the idea that distance information was being 
used. Followed by the appropriate a priori comparisons.
Global Under-Estimate Comparison 4*
H25R15 and H25R25 were compared. Carried out in order to determine 
whether there was evidence that differences in JORs are reflected in the 
electrical record in a way that supported the idea that distance information 
was being used. Followed by the appropriate a priori comparisons.
109
CHAPTER 3 -  EXPERIMENT 1
Introduction
The first ERP experiment was conducted in order to establish whether ERPs vary 
according to JOR. The main objective of this experiment was to assess whether ERP 
activity varies with judgements of recency and if so, whether it does in a strength- 
based manner. As outlined in the previous chapters, familiarity and recollection are 
two memory processes with purportedly known electrophysiological indices. If these 
are involved in supporting recency judgements, they will differ according to the type 
of JOR given. Furthermore, if these memory processes are involved in memory for 
recency in a way that falls into a distance category of memory processing, their 
electrophysiological correlates should increase in magnitude as a function of 
decreasing JORs.
In recency-related continuous recognition memory tasks, items are typically presented 
sequentially in long lists. Every presented item is repeated at some later point in the 
list. The repetition interval is referred to in this thesis as the Tag’. It is the task of the 
participant to make an old/new recognition judgement in response to every presented 
item in the list. For those items which they identify as being ‘olcT, the participant 
must also make a ‘lag’ or recency judgement, indicating how many intervening items 
they thought there were between first and second presentations of items.
Experiment 1 was devised in order to maximise the number of trials at one single lag 
(15) in order to have sufficient numbers in the categories of interest, which were lag 
under-estimates, correct lag judgments, as well as over-estimates. If familiarity is
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employed in a strength-based manner in this task, the mid-frontal old/new effect will 
be larger for under-estimated lag judgements, in comparison with correct and over­
estimated lag judgements. Similarly, if recollection is involved in lag judgements and 
is employed in a strength-based manner, then the left-parietal old/new effect will 
increase in magnitude with decreasing JORs.
Finally, the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 has shown that the frontal lobes are 
implicated in memory for recency (e.g. Eyler-Zorilla et al., 1996; Mangels, 1997; 
Tendolkar et al., 2004). No ERP studies have been conducted using distance-based 
tasks such as the continuous recency memory paradigm introduced by Yntema and 
Trask (1963; although for a somewhat different task, see Curran & Friedman, 2003), 
so there is little knowledge about how late-right frontal old/new effects vary with the 
accuracy of recency judgments. A subsidiary aim in this experiment was to explore 
how ERP activity varies with JORs in late time-windows over anterior scalp 
locations.
Method
Participants
There were 25 participants aged between 18 and 28 years (mean age 21 years) in the 
experiment. Two participants were excluded on the basis of excessive EOG artefact.
A further 5 participants were excluded because they did not contribute sufficient trials 
to the categories of interest (specified below). Of those included, 15 were female, 
each being paid £20.
Stimuli
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These were 330 low frequency words. Each participant took part in three experiment 
blocks (480 trials in total). Within each block there were 100 words, sixty of which 
were repeated after a lag of 15 intervening words. No words appeared in more than 
one block. The 100 words in each block were divided into 5 mini-blocks, each 
containing 20 words. 3 of the 5 mini-blocks were designated as repeated words, and 2 
as new (not to be repeated) words. This procedure was repeated a further four times, 
yielding 5 lists per block in total, such that across lists each word was designated as a 
repeated word on 3 lists, and a new word on 2 lists. 30 new words, 10 of which were 
repeated, were used in an initial practice block. Words within each list were organised 
pseudo-randomly for each block, with new words acting as fillers among new to-be- 
repeated words.
Procedure
Each experiment block began with a ‘Ready’ signal, lasting 5000ms. Each trial began 
with a fixation mark (*) which lasted 500ms, followed by a blank screen (100ms). 
Words were then presented for 300ms, followed by a blank screen during which 
participants decided whether the word was old or new via key press (old or new with 
left or right thumb -  counterbalanced across participants). Once this judgement had 
been made, a blank period of 1000ms passed before participants were presented with 
the words ‘How Far Back?’. If the participant had indicated the word was new, they 
were instructed to press the same key again at this point to carry on to the next trial. If 
they had indicated that the word was old, they were instructed to judge whether the 
word had initially been presented 10, 15, or 20 intervening words previously.
The three judgement of recency (JOR) options were made via three key buttons, three 
on one hand, with the hands used for responses balanced across participants (with the
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middle three fingers of the left or right hand being used for responses -10,15,20 or 
20,15,10). The JOR was followed by a 500ms blank screen before the next trial. 
Participants were able to remind themselves of which keys to press throughout the 
experiment through a display on the floor, which they were advised they could look at 
when, but not before, the ‘How Far Back?’ signal was displayed.
An equal number of participants completed each of the 5 lists of three blocks (n=5) 
except for lists 4 and 5 (which n=3 participants completed). An equal number of 
participants were presented with each of the block presentation orders (bl,b2,b3; 
b2,b3,bl; or b3,bl,b2). Response hands, list and block order were counterbalanced so 
that each person conducted the experiment with a unique combination of these three. 
There was a short practice session before the first block was presented, and a break of 
approximately five minutes between blocks. Participants were instructed to balance 
speed and accuracy equally. Participants were not informed of the ratios of repeated 
items presented at each lag. The individual blocks took 15-20 minutes to complete. 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment and the minor deception 
concerning the lag judgment was explained to them.
Behavioural Results
The mean probability of a correct rejection (CR) was .96 (SD =.03), and of a correct 
response to an old item regardless of JOR was .96 (SD =.05). Old/new discrimination 
(p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably greater than chance (t(17) =89.1 l;p<.001). The 
mean RT for CRs was 775ms (SD = 132ms). The conditional probabilities and the 
RTs for recency judgements are provided in Table 1 (pi 14). A one way ANOVA 
involving the three different classes of hits (H15R10, H15R15, H15R20) revealed a
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main effect (F(2,51) =16.0;p<0.001). Follow-up paired t-tests showed that H15R10 
and H15R20 responses were less likely than H15R15 responses (t(17) >5.00;p<.01 in 
each case), and that the probabilities of H15R10 and H15R20 responses were not 
reliably different. A one-way ANOVA showed that the mean reaction times did not 
differ across the three classes of hit.
Table 1. Mean Probabilities (p) and Reaction Times (RT) of each lag judgment (10, 
15 & 20), conditional on a correct old judgment (n=18) §._____________________
P RT
JOR
10 .29 (.11) 892(159)
15 .43 (.05) 883 (131)
20 .28 (.10) 896(158)
§SD reported in brackets.
Correct JOR highlighted in Bold.
ERP Results
ERP Analysis Strategy
The analyses were conducted using ANOVAs. Degrees of freedom are shown with 
epsilon corrected degrees of freedom for non-sphericity where appropriate 
(Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959). Only the highest order interactions obtained in each 
case are described in the text (unless indicated otherwise), but all reliable effects 
involving category are shown in tables. No references to main effects and interactions 
that do not involve the factor of response category are made here. The data were 
analysed over three separate time-windows, which were 300-500ms, 500-800ms and 
800-1100ms, since these largely span the recording epoch and these correspond to the 
time-windows that have been employed in previous recognition memory and source 
memory studies (Allan et al., 1998).
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Initial global analyses included the factors of response category (CC), 
anterior/posterior (AP) dimension (three levels: anterior: F3/F4/F5/F6/F7/F8, central: 
C3/C4/C5/C6/T7/T8, and posterior: P3/P4/P5/P6/P7/P8), hemisphere (HM; two 
levels: left/right), and site (ST; three levels: inferior: F7/F8/T7/T8/P7/P8, mid-lateral: 
F5/F6/C5/C6/P5/P6, and superior: F3/F4/C3/C4/P3/P4). In addition to the global 
ANOVAs, focused analyses were conducted involving the parts of the electrical 
record in which ERP indices of familiarity and recollection have been identified 
previously (e.g. Mecklinger, 2000; Nessler et al., 2005; Rugg et al., 1998). For 
familiarity, these were F3, Fz, F4 during the 300-500ms time-window (e.g. Curran, 
2000). For recollection these were P3, Pz, P4 during the 500-800ms time-window 
(e.g. Rugg et al., 1998).
Figure 4 (pi 16) supports the decision to analyse the data within three separate time- 
windows. The figure shows the scalp distributions of neural activity that differentiates 
items attracting correct lag judgements (H15R15) from correct judgements to new 
items at lag 15 over the 300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800-1100ms epochs. As with all 
scalp maps in this thesis, for each epoch and contrast the amplitudes are scaled over 
the colour range according to the maximum and minimum amplitude values within 
that epoch. These values are shown below each scalp map. The scalp maps show 
marked differences in the distributions of the old/new effects across the three 
recording epochs. The ways that these distributions change with time correspond 
broadly with the ways in which ERP old/new effects have varied in previous studies 
(e.g. Allan et al., 1998). In the 300-500ms epoch, there is a central maximum 
positivity. The anterior activity diminishes after 500ms, with the distribution moving
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toward the back of the head with a left lateralised maximum. The distribution then 
begins to move anteriorly in the 800-1100ms time-window.
300-500m s, 3.5,1.0 500-800m s, 7 .0 ,1 .0  800-1100ms, 4.0,0.0
H15R15-CR
Figure 4. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity 
associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800- 
1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by 
subtracting mean amplitudes within each time-window for correct rejections from 
amplitudes associated with correct lag 15 judgments (n=18).
The ERPs elicited by correctly identified old  items (H15R15) were first compared 
with those elicited by correct rejections. Critical follow-up comparisons to these 
global analyses of old/new effects were between the different recency judgements 
given to the items, to assess whether differences in JOR are reflected in the electrical 
record, and if so, whether these differences can be tied to recollection or familiarity. 
This follow-up comparison is important, as any differences in JOR can be attributed 
to recency memory processes, since actual lag does not differ across these categories. 
The mean number of trials (range in brackets) contributing to the correct rejection 
category for the analysis was 255 (216-286). For the other categories, the values were: 
H15R15 = 58 (37-75), H15R10 = 40 (24-76), H15R20 = 37 (16-66).
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Global Old/new Analyses
The outcomes of the global analysis involving the categories CR and H15R15 for the 
3 critical epochs are shown in Table 2 (pi 18). The table shows that in all cases, there 
were interactions involving category and scalp locations. In the 300-500ms epoch, the 
ANOVA revealed that there was a CC by ST interaction which came about because 
the H15R15 condition was more positive-going, with a reduction in the size of this 
positivity with increasing distance from the midline. In the 500-800ms time-window, 
there was a CC, AP and ST interaction which came about because the H15R15 
condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences at posterior locations 
and a reduction in size with increasing distance from the midline. In the 800-1100ms 
epoch, the ANOVA revealed a CC, HM and ST interaction because the HI 5 condition 
was more positive than CR, with larger differences over the left hemisphere than over 
the right, at mid-lateral and inferior sites. In this epoch, there was also a CC, AP and 
ST interaction which came about because the differences between categories were 
largest at posterior-superior electrode locations.
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Table 2. The outcomes of the global analyses of the ERP old/new effects for words attracting correct old/new judgements (n=18) §.
300-500ms 500-800ms 800-1100ms
CC (1,17) 48.96*** 105.00*** 23.82***
CCxAP (1.1,19.5) - 15.92** 4.20*
CCx ST (1.2,20.5) 41 06*** 50.64*** 3.77*
CC x AP x ST (2.8,47.2) - 9 4 5*** 7.55**
CCxH M x ST (1.2,21.2) - 3.80* 5.01*
§ The factors are Condition (CC), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (AP), Hemisphere (HM) and Site (ST). Conditions = CR; H15R15 
Full degrees of freedom are shown.
•trend
*p<0.05
**p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms time-window a focused analysis (F3,Fz,F4) was conducted for the 
CR and H15R15 conditions (Figure 5, pl20). The ANOVA revealed a CC by ST 
interaction (F(1.8,31.2) = 7.82;p<0.01), which came about because the H15R15 
condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences at Fz. There was also 
a main effect of CC (1,17) = 34.62;p<0.001). The second planned comparison was 
carried out in the 500-800ms time-window at posterior locations (P3,Pz,P4) (Figure 6 , 
pl20). The ANOVA comparing CR and H15R15 revealed a main effect of CC also 
(F(l,17) = 75.51;p<0.001), and a CC and ST interaction (F(1.9,32.3) = 5.60;p<0.01). 
The interaction came about because the H15R15 condition was more positive-going, 
with the largest differences at P3.
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^H----------1--------------  H----------1--------------  H----------1--------------
0 500ms 0 500ms 0 500ms
 CR ■■— H15R15
Figure 5. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs and correct rejections at selected anterior electrodes (n=18).
P3 Pz P4
0 500ms 0 500ms 0 500ms
 CR  H15R15
Figure 6. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs and correct rejections at selected posterior electrodes (n=18).
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Single Lag Global Analyses
Of principal interest for addressing the experiment hypothesis was whether any 
differences are present between the H15R15, the H15R10 (under-estimates) and the 
H15R20 (over-estimates) conditions (see Figure 7). All reliable effects involving 
condition in these analyses are reported in the text. In the 300-500ms epoch, no 
reliable effects between the conditions were detected. In the 500-800ms time-window, 
there was a trend for a CC, AP and HM interaction (F(3.1,52.9) = 2.39;p=0.078). In 
the 800-1100ms time-window, there was also a trend the same interaction term 
(F(3.2,55.2) = 2.57;p=0.06).
300-500ms, 1.0,-0.2 500-800m s, 0.4,-0.2 800-1100ms, 1.6,0.0
H15R10-H15R20
Figure 7. Topographic maps showing the scalps distributions of neural activity 
differentiating correct and incorrect lag judgments for lag 15 words over the 300- 
500ms, 500-800ms and 800-1100ms epochs. The maps were computed on difference 
scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes associated with the over-estimated 
lag judgements from the under-estimated lag judgements.
Paired Global Single Lag Analysis
These paired contrasts were restricted to the time-windows in which the trends 
reported above were revealed. Again, all reliable effects involving category in the 
ANOVAs are reported in the text. In the 500-800ms time-window, there was a trend 
for a four way interaction (F(2.9,49.8) = 2.33;p=0.088) for the contrast between 
H15R15 and H15R10. There was also a statistically reliable interaction between
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H15R10 and H15R20 involving the factors CC, AP and HM, (F(1.9,32.1) = 
3.88;p<0.05), which came about because the under-estimate condition was more 
positive-going than the over-estimate condition, with larger differences over the right 
hemisphere than the left, at frontal and central locations. In the 800-1100ms epoch, 
there was a trend for a CC, AP and HM interaction for the contrast between the 
H15R15 and the H15R20 conditions (F(1.8,29.9) = 3.03;p=0.07). There was also a 
statistically reliable CC, AP and HM interaction between the under-estimate and the 
over-estimate conditions (F(2.0,33.9) = 3.52;p<0.05), which came about because the 
H15R10 condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences over right 
frontal and central locations. There were no reliable effects in the analyses from 300- 
500ms.
A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms epoch, the three JOR conditions were compared, followed by all 
possible paired contrasts at the front of the head (F3,Fz,F4) (Figure 8, upper panel 
p i23). No reliable differences were detected. In the 500-800ms time-window, this set 
of analyses was also performed including posterior electrodes (P3,Pz,P4) (Figure 8, 
lower panel p i28). Again no reliable differences were observed across JORs for lag 
15 items.
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Figure 8. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs and incorrect JORs for lag 15 words at selected anterior (upper panel) and posterior 
(lower panel) electrodes (n=18).
Discussion
One aim of this experiment was to establish whether ERPs might be useful for use in 
a task where participants are required to make a long series of recognition and recency 
judgements. The primary aim was to explore whether ERPs vary in line with JORs in 
a task where lag remained constant and only JORs varied. Recognition memory 
performance was at ceiling in the current experiment. The accuracy of the JORs was 
much lower in comparison, though this was above chance. Furthermore, under­
estimates and over-estimates of lag were less likely than accurate lag judgments. 
Therefore it is likely that the participants did have access to some form of recency 
information (although see p i27).
ERP Old/new Effects
When comparing the hits associated with accurate JORs and correctly rejected new 
items, hits elicited more positive-going activity during the 300-500ms time-window. 
The focused (a priori) analyses revealed that these effects were reliable at sites F3, Fz 
and F4. Based on the findings of previous research, it is likely that activity at frontal 
electrode locations in this epoch is an index of familiarity (for a review see Curran, 
DeBuse, Woroch & Hirshman, 2006; Mecklinger, 2000). During the 500-800ms time- 
window, the H15R15 category also elicited more positive-going activity in 
comparison with correctly rejected new items, with the greatest differences over 
posterior areas. There was also evidence of left lateralisation at the back of the head. 
This differentiation is likely to be a reflection of recollection processes (Allan et al., 
1998; Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg, Allan & Birch, 2000). In the 800-1100ms 
epoch the reported posterior activity was likely to be a continuation of activity from 
the earlier time-window. Anterior differences were beginning to emerge (as was
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indicated by the scalp maps, Figure 4, p i 16), suggesting that some form of executive 
processing was in the process of initiating by the end of the recording epoch.
As outlined earlier, the critical comparisons in this experiment were between the 
ERPs elicited by correct lag judgments, and those elicited by under-estimates and 
over-estimates for the same lag. If the ERP activity associated with these conditions 
varied such that larger old/new effects were associated with shorter lag judgements, 
this would comprise evidence that distance information is utilised for making recency 
judgements. Analysing the JORs across a single lag means that there is no confound 
with actual lag and could therefore provide evidence to suggest that the memory 
processes associated with these ERP effects are utilised by participants when making 
recency judgements.
Single Lag Comparisons
Experiment 1 did not reveal any strong evidence that ERPs varied with judgements of 
recency. Though visual inspection of the waveforms shows that hits accompanied by 
shorter JORs elicit more positive-going activity during the time-window previously 
associated with familiarity (Figure 7, pl21) compared to longer JORs, there was no 
statistical support for this impression. In the 500-800ms time-window, over-estimated 
lag judgements were associated with comparably more negative-going ERPs 
compared to under-estimated lag judgements. However, the fact that the activity 
predicting differences in lag judgements did not have a distribution reminiscent of the 
left parietal old/new effect makes these differences difficult to interpret. A discussion 
of these null results will be conducted later in this section.
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A late right frontal effect was associated with type of lag judgement in the current 
study, being more positive-going for under-estimates than over-estimates (Figure 7, 
p i21). Late effects with a similar distribution have been reported in previous studies 
(e.g. Wilding & Rugg, 1996). It was reported in the study by Wilding and Rugg as 
being a greater positivity for items for which the correct source was determined, in 
comparison with items for which the source was not retrieved. As outlined in Chapter 
2 in this thesis, late right frontal memory related activity has been associated with 
monitoring and other executive processes. However, if this is the case, why under­
estimates should require greater involvement of this type of processing than over­
estimates is unclear. In line with the evidence accrued by Hayama et al. (2008), it 
could be that late right frontal activity is related to monitoring the products of retrieval 
and if this is the case, perhaps a greater level of monitoring takes place for items of 
greater strength, potentially since a greater volume of information is likely to have 
been recovered for strong items.
This study builds on previous behavioural research into memory for time concerning 
recency judgements. Hintzman (2001; 2003; 2004) has shown over a number of 
behavioural studies that strength manipulations can influence JORs, and these 
findings support the notion that distance theories could contribute to the debate over 
how recency decisions are formed. This is because the current research has shown that 
three known ERP signatures can be recorded in a continuous recency memory task 
adapted from that of Hintzman and Yntema and Trask (1963) and these effects can 
therefore be measured in order to answer further questions about memory for recency. 
The use of ERP recording during a continuous recency memory task is apparently
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novel and an interesting way to investigate these issues in that it may capture any 
decrements in ERP amplitudes with increasing time or JORs.
As mentioned earlier, there was little statistical evidence in the current experiment in 
support of the view that ERP indices linked to familiarity and recollection varied in a 
manner consistent with a distance-based account. One possible reason for the lack of 
ERP amplitude variance across JORs in the time-windows associated with these 
memory processes is that strength differences do not support recency judgements. If 
this was the case, it would rule out a strength account of recency memory in the 
framework put forward by Friedman, at least in the way that it is presented in Figure 2 
(p56), however drawing this conclusion on the basis of the current experiment is 
premature.
Another potential source of the null results reported here is the possible criticism of 
this study is that participants did not ba9e their JORs on any reliable memory 
processes and instead, participants were encouraged to respond 10,15 or 20 simply as 
a consequence of being given these options. However, evidence to the contrary can be 
seen in the behavioural performance which showed that they were more likely to 
judge items correctly as being presented after 15 intervening items, rather than giving 
JORs that were too short or too long. This result is consistent with the view that 
participants had access to at least some recency information, although this does not 
mean that on all trials participants relied upon recency information. It is also possible 
that the increased likelihood of a lag 15 response is in whole or part a consequence of 
bias to choose the middle value, i.e. as a normal distribution of data might suggest that 
the middle value would be the one most commonly observed, however evidence to the
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contrary was obtained during initial piloting of this task, as when four response 
options were available to participants (10,15,20,25) a 15 response was still the most 
frequent JOR. Regardless, future studies will not use this design so it is not 
anticipated that this possible criticism will be an issue.
One other possible reason for the absence of statistically reliable effects in 
Experiment 1 in terms of the JORs is that there were insufficient distances between 
the lag judgement response options - the result being that the ERPs were not 
sufficiently sensitive to detect differences according to the judgements participants 
gave. The scalp map in Figure 7 (pl21) is encouraging, however at least for the 300- 
500ms epoch, where it can be seen that a focal frontal positivity differentiates 
between the neural activity associated with under- and over-estimates of lag.
The distribution of the ERP differences across lag, alongside some evidence for 
differences according to lag judgements in later epochs, motivated the design of 
Experiment 2, in which an attempt was made to make a larger separation between the 
neural activity associated with the critical classes of a wider range of lag judgement 
options to participants. The possibility that insufficient distances between the lag 
judgement response options led to a lack of statistically reliable effects in Experiment 
1 was addressed in the second ERP experiment via changes in the experiment design. 
In addition, the potential criticism of this study that participants did not base their lag 
judgements on any meaningful mnemonic information was also addressed by the 
inclusion of four actual lags in the second experiment, rather than including one lag as 
in Experiment 1. Further consideration of the findings in Experiment 1 can be found 
in the General Discussion (Chapter 7).
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CHAPTER 4 -  EXPERIMENT 2
Introduction
The second ERP experiment was also designed in order to explore recency-related 
memory processing. The task used here was altered from that employed in the 
previous experiment in order to increase the number of intervening items between the 
available JOR response options. Instead of having one repetition interval, four were 
used here (5,15,25 and 35). This increased the spacing between possible JORs 
relative to Experiment 1, with a minimum of 10 intervening items to a maximum of 
30. Experiment 2 was devised in order to maximise the number of trials at lags 15 and 
25 in order to have sufficient numbers in the categories of interest, specifically under­
estimated, correct and over-estimated lag judgements for each of these lags.
The key predictions concerning specific elements of the electrical record are the same 
as for Experiment 1. If familiarity is employed in a strength-based manner in this task, 
the mid-frontal old/new effect will be larger for under-estimated lag judgments, in 
comparison with correct and over-estimated lag judgements. Similarly, if recollection 
is involved in lag judgements and is employed in a strength-based manner, then the 
left-parietal old/new effect will increase in magnitude with decreasing JORs.
Method
Participants
Twenty-nine participants aged between 18 and 25 years (mean age 20 years) took part 
in the experiment. Four participants were excluded on the basis of excessive EOG
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artefact and one was excluded due to a computer malfunction. Of those included, 16 
were female and each participant was paid £20 for taking part.
Stimuli and Design
The stimuli were 824 low frequency words. There were four blocks in each complete 
task list. Each block comprised 196 stimuli, which included 116 words, 80 of which 
were repeated. The repeated words were presented after 5,15,25 or 35 intervening 
words. Ten were repeated at lag 5 and ten at lag 35. Thirty were repeated at lag 25 and 
thirty at lag 15. Order of presentation of lag 5,15, 25 and 35 items was determined 
pseudo-randomly. Five words which were not repeated were presented at the start of 
the block to act as buffer items. ERPs were not formed for these stimuli. A further 31 
words (different in each block) were presented only once. These were filler items that 
were presented towards the end of each list in order to ensure that items from each lag 
were distributed relatively evenly throughout each list. One further list was created 
from each initial block, such that all words at lag 5 and 35 were encountered at lags 
35 and 5, respectively, in the second alternate list. The same procedure was followed 
for Lag 25 and 15 words. This procedure resulted in the creation of four pairs of 
blocks. A further 25 words, 15 of which were repeated, were used in an initial practice 
block.
Procedure
Each experiment block began with a ‘Ready’ signal, lasting 5000ms. Each trial began 
with a fixation mark (*) which lasted 500ms, followed by a blank screen (100ms). 
Words were then presented for 300ms, followed by a blank screen during which 
participants decided whether the word was old or new via key press (left thumb for
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old, right thumb for new -  counterbalanced across participants). Once this judgement 
had been made, a blank period of 1000ms passed before participants were presented 
with the words ‘How Far Back?’.
If the participant had indicated the word was new, they were instructed to press the 
same key again at this point to carry on to the next trial. If they had indicated that the 
word was old, they were instructed to judge whether the word had initially been re­
presented after 5,15,25 or 35 intervening words. The four JOR options were made 
via four key buttons, two on each hand (either 5,15 or 25, 35) with the middle and 
index fingers, with the hands used for responses balanced across participants. The 
JOR was followed by a 500ms blank screen before the next trial. Participants were 
able to remind themselves of which keys to press throughout the experiment by means 
of a display on the floor, which they were advised they could look at when but not 
before the ‘How Far Back?’ signal was displayed.
An equal number of participants completed each of the two lists, and the order of 
block presentation was rotated evenly across participants. There was a short practice 
session before the first block was presented, and a break of approximately five 
minutes between blocks. Participants were instructed to balance speed and accuracy 
equally. Participants were not informed of the numbers of repeated items presented at 
each lag. The individual blocks took 15-20 minutes to complete.
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Behavioural Results
Table 3 (pi 33) shows the probabilities of correct old/new judgments to new words and 
to old words separated according to lag. Also shown in the table are the reaction times 
for these classes of response. Discrimination (p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably 
greater than chance at each lag (t(23) > 40.00, p<0.001 in each case). A one-way 
ANOVA contrasting these four discrimination measures revealed a main effect 
(F(2.02,46.41) = 8.42, p<0.01) and follow-up paired t-tests revealed that old/new 
discrimination deteriorated between lag 5 and 25 and between lag 5 and 35 (t(23) > 
3.00, p<0.01, in each case). Discrimination also deteriorated between lag 15 and 25, 
and between lag 15 and 35 (t(23) > 2.80, p<0.01, in each case).
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Table 3. Probabilities of correct old and new judgments and associated reaction times (RT), separated according to lag (n=24) §.
New Lag 5 Lag 15 Lag25 Lag35
p(correct) 0.95 (0.04) 0.86 (0.11) 0.85 (0.11) 0.81 (0.11) 0.77 (.17)
RT 814(168) 1003 (228) 977 (211) 969 (208) 1013 (246)
§ SDs are in brackets.
Table 4. Probabilities of each lag judgment (JOR 5, 15, 25, 35), conditional on a correct old judgment and separated according to lag (n=24) §.
Lag: Lag5 Lag 15 Lag25 Lag35
JOR5 0.44 (.18) 0.08 (.06) 0.03 (.03) 0.02 (.03)
JOR15 0.37 (.13) 0.48 (.10) 0.28 (.10) 0.19 (.15)
JOR25 0.15 (.14) 0.36 (.10) 0.48 (.09) 0.43 (.12)
JOR35 0.03 (.03) 0.09 (.06) 0.21 (.10) 0.36 (.18)
§ Correct lag judgments are in bold. 
SDs are in brackets.
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A one-way ANOVA comparing the RTs associated with correct old judgments at each 
lag (but regardless of JOR) shown in Table 3 revealed a main effect of condition 
(F(3.03,69.61) = 24.329;p<0.001). Follow up t-tests showed that RTs for CRs were 
faster than hits at all lags (t(23)>7.80;p<0.001, in each case). Paired sample t-tests 
also confirmed that there were significant RT differences between hits at lags 15 and 
35, and between hits at lags 25 and 35 (t(23)>-2.40;p<0.05, in each case), with 
participants being faster to respond in the shorter lag condition in each pair.
Table 4 (pi 33) shows the probabilities of each lag judgment (JOR 5,15,25, 35), 
conditional on a correct old judgment and separated according to lag and JOR. The 
bold values on the diagonal are the probabilities of a correct lag judgment and in each 
case, this was above chance (t(23)>9.50;p<0.001). Paired sample t-tests revealed that 
correct lag 15 judgements were more likely than a lag 25 judgement (t(23) = 
3.18;p<0.01) for words re-presented at lag 15. Paired sample t-tests also revealed that 
correct lag 25 judgements were more likely than an under-estimate (t(23) = - 
5.67;p<0.001) or an over-estimate (t(23) = 8.34;p<0.001) for words presented at lag 
25. These are the critical conditions for which ERPs can be formed, and which are 
described in detail below. A one-way ANOVA showed that there was a trend for a 
main effect of RT for hits associated with correct lag judgements (F(l.77,35.30) = 
2.99;p<0.07). The mean RTs for correct lag judgements were 955, 951, 975 and 
1026ms for lags 5,15, 25 and 35, respectively.
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ERP Results
ERP Analysis Strategy
Here the global old/new effects will be reported first, followed by paired contrasts 
between hits at lags 15 and 25 that attracted a correct JOR. By design, there were 
insufficient trials to complete these analyses for lag 5 and lag 35 items. The critical 
contrasts between different JORs at single lags will ensue. Figure 9 (pi36) supports 
the decision to analyse the data within three separate time-windows. The figure 
illustrates the ERP old/new effects for items attracting correct lag judgements 
(separated according to lag) for a subset of sites encompassing the spatial extent of the 
electrodes included in the analysis described below. Figure 9 shows the scalp 
distributions of neural activity that differentiates items attracting correct lag 
judgements from correct judgements to new items at lags 15 and 25 over the 300- 
500ms, 500-800ms and 800-1100ms epochs. The scalp maps show marked 
differences in the distributions of the old/new effects across the three recording 
epochs in the same way as was described in Experiment 1.
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Figure 9. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 500- 
800ms and 800-1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within each 
time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 15 and 25 judgments, respectively (n=24).
800-1100ms
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Only ERPs elicited by correctly rejected new items and correctly identified old items 
at lags 15 and 25 were analysed. These are the critical conditions that allow for a 
potential comparison of both under- and over-estimations of lag. The inclusion of lags 
5 and 35 with lower trial numbers precluded formation of reliable averaged ERPs of 
interest for these lags. First, an analysis of the old/new effects for correct lag 
judgments was conducted. 24 participants were included in these analyses. Figure 9 
shows that the scalp distributions of the ERP old/new effects in the 500-800ms epoch 
differ primarily in magnitude, with the effects decreasing in magnitude with 
increasing lag. For the earlier (300-500ms) epoch, the maxima of the scalp 
distributions of the ERP old/new effects move posteriorly with increasing lag. The 
principal reason for this shift is the progressive attenuation of the ERP old/new effects 
at anterior sites with increasing lag, alongside a less pronounced degree of attenuation 
at posterior scalp locations. From 800-1100ms, there is an extension of the posterior 
positivity from the earlier epoch. Here there is an emerging anterior effect which is 
lateralised to the left hemisphere for the H15R15 condition, and is over the right for 
the H25R25 condition.
Secondly a comparison of single lag judgements was conducted, involving lag 25 hits 
associated with a correct JOR (H25R25), an under-estimated lag judgement (H25u) 
and an over-estimated lag judgement (H25o). 17 participants were included in these 
analyses. Finally, for lag 15 items, hits associated with a correct JOR (H15R15) were 
contrasted with those associated with an over-estimated JOR (H15o). All 24 
participants were included in these analyses. For the analyses of the old/new effects at 
each lag, no follow-ups are conducted when the outcomes of paired ANOVAs 
revealed interactions involving scalp locations, as the intention is to characterise the
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broad distributions of the old/new effects before focussing on the critical contrasts, 
which are between old items separated according to the accuracy of lag judgments.
For the direct contrasts between correct or incorrect responses to old items at each lag, 
however, follow-up analyses at anterior and posterior locations are conducted where 
necessary in order to elucidate the specific distributions of differences between these 
critical conditions. The mean number of trials (range in brackets) contributing to the 
correct rejection category for the analyses including 24 participants was 365 (range = 
213-444). The corresponding value for H15R15 was 43 (19-61), for H25R25 this was 
40 (17-59) and for H15o this was 36 (14-59). For the 17 participant subset, the mean 
number of trials for CRs was 356 (213-443). For H25R25 the mean number of trials 
was 39 (17-55), for H25u this was 26 (12-47) and for H25o this was 19 (12-30). In the 
analyses below, the reports of the outcomes of the ANOVAs for the old/new effects 
(both global and planned comparisons) precede the reports of the direct contrasts 
between the ERPs associated with correct lag judgments.
Global Old/new Analyses
The outcomes of the global analysis involving the categories CR, H15R15 and 
H25R25 for the 3 critical epochs are shown in Table 5 (pl39). The table shows that in 
all cases, there were interactions involving condition and scalp locations, and in light 
of this, follow-up paired contrasts were conducted for all possible pairs for each 
epoch.
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Table 5. The outcomes of the global analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP old/new effects for words attracting correct old/new 
and correct lag judgements for the 3 selected time-windows. Experiment 1 (n=24)§.
300-500ms 500-800ms 800-1100ms
CC 36.55*** 71.24*** 26.60***
CCxAP - 13.76*** -
CCxHM - - 3.52*
CCxST 30.27*** 47.26*** -
CCxAPxST 5.13** 12.41*** 3.49**
CCxHMxST - - -
CCxAPxHMxST - - 1.95*
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H15R15, H25R25, CR.
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0.001 (epsilon corrected)
•trend
Table 6. The outcomes of the global paired analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP old/new effects for words attracting correct 
old/new and correct lag judgements for the 3 selected time-windows. Experiment 1 (n=24)§.
Enoch
Lag
300-500ms
15 25
500-800ms
15 25
800-1100ms
15 25
CC 79.31*** 47.27*** 104.70*** 70.03*** 26.60*** 28.69***
CCxAP - 2.86* 25.28*** 16.64*** - -
CCxHM - 4.70* - - 3.52* -
CCxST 75.54*** 25.57*** 62.09*** 42.24*** - -
CCxAPxST 7.48*** 5.96** 15.88*** 17.26*** 3.49** 4.62**
CCxHMxST - - _ _ _ -
CCxAPxHMxST - 2.60* - 3.02* 1.95* 3.46*
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H15R15vsCR; H25R25vsCR. 
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0.001 (epsilon corrected)
•trend
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Paired Global Old/new Analyses
For the 300-500ms time-window, a global ANOVA was conducted to assess whether 
there were differences between CR and H15R15 (Table 6 , pl39). For this analysis, the 
CC, AP and ST interaction came about because the H15R15 condition was more 
positive-going, especially over central and posterior locations, with differences in 
amplitude diminishing with increasing distance from the midline, as Figure 9 (pi36) 
shows. The same interaction term was reliable for the same reason for the paired 
contrast between CR and H25R25.
For the 500-800ms time-window, the ANOVA for the H15R15 versus CR contrast 
also revealed a CC, AP and ST interaction, which came about because the H15R15 
condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences over the back of the 
head at the midline. In the contrast between H25R25 and CR, the ANOVA revealed a 
CC, AP, HM and ST interaction. This came about for similar reasons to those for the 
H15R15 contrast. In addition there was a degree of lateralisation, with larger 
differences between conditions over the left hemisphere at posterior locations.
For the 800-1100ms time-window, the H15R15 versus CR ANOVA revealed a CC, 
AP and ST interaction which came about because the H15R15 condition was more 
positive-going, with the largest differences across posterior locations, and a reduction 
in size with increasing distance from the midline. In this time-window, an ANOVA 
comparing H25R25 and CR revealed that there was a CC, AP, HM and ST interaction 
and this came about for the same reason as the four-way interaction term for this 
pairing in the earlier epoch.
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A Priori Planned Comparisons
For these analyses, reliable outcomes are reported in the text. In the 300-500ms time- 
window a focused analysis (F3,Fz,F4) was conducted with the CR, H15R15 and 
H25R25 conditions (Figure 10, upper panel p i42), since this region is of interest in 
terms of the pre-experiment hypotheses. There was a trend for a CC and ST 
interaction (F(3.1,71.4) = 2.64;p=0.055) and a main effect of condition (F(1.8,41.4) = 
37.65;p<0.001). This was followed up with all possible paired contrasts. The CR and 
H15R15 comparison revealed a main effect of condition (F(l,23) = 62.38;p<0.001) 
and a CC by ST interaction (F(1.5,35.3) = 5.41;p<0.05), which came about because 
the hit condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences at Fz. The CR 
and H25R25 comparison revealed a main effect of condition (F(l,23) = 
66.52;p<0.001), which also came about because the hit condition was more positive- 
going than the CR condition.
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Figure 10. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs for lag 15 words and for lag 25 words at selected anterior and posterior electrodes 
(n=24).
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The second planned comparisons were carried out in the 500-800ms time-window at 
posterior locations (P3,Pz,P4) (Figure 10, lower panel pl42). The ANOVA comparing 
CR, H15R15 and H25R25 revealed a main effect of condition (F(1.5,35.4) = 
87.80;p<0.001), which came about because the CR condition was the most negative- 
going. This finding was also true for the ANOVA comparing CR and H15R15 
(F(l,23) = 121.41;p<0.001) and for that comparing CR and H25R25 (F(l,23) = 
80.84;p<0.001).
Paired Global Hit Contrasts
These comprised follow-up contrasts for the H15R15 and H25R25 conditions only for 
each epoch. The ANOVA from 300-500ms revealed a trend for a CC, AP and ST 
interaction (F(2.2,51.2) = 2.45;p=0.091). Furthermore there was a CC and ST 
interaction (F(l. 1,26.4) = 5.63;p<0.05), which came about because the H15R15 
condition was more positive-going than H25R25, with the a reduction in the size of 
the differences with increasing distance from the midline. For the 500-800ms time- 
window, there was an interaction between CC, AP and ST (F(2.1,48.2) = 3.55;p<0.05) 
which came about because the H15R15 condition was more positive-going and largest 
over central and posterior superior locations, as Figure 9 (pi36) shows. In this time- 
window there was also a CC and ST interaction (F(1.2,28.4) = 12.22;p<0.01) and a 
main effect of condition (F(l,23) = 11.47;p<0.01). In the 800-1100ms time-window, 
the ANOVA revealed a CC and HM interaction (F(l,23) = 5.02;p<0.05), which came 
about because the HI 5R15 condition was more positive-going over the right 
hemisphere, whereas the H25R25 condition was more positive-going over the left 
hemisphere.
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A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms time-window a focused analysis (F3,Fz,F4) was conducted with the 
H15R15 and H25R25 conditions. While both hit conditions were more positive-going 
than CR (as described above), they did not differ reliably from each other. In the 500- 
800ms epoch, a second focused set of analyses was performed (P3,Pz,P4) where a 
main effect of condition was revealed (F(l,23) = 12.29;p<0.01), which came about 
because the H15R15 condition was again more positive-going than the H25R25 
condition.
Additional Analyses
Based on inspection of the waveforms, an ANOVA was also conducted with these 
conditions over P3, Pz and P4 in the 300-500ms epoch. This revealed a main effect of 
condition (F(l,23) = 5.62;p<0.05) which came about because the ERPs associated 
with the H15R15 condition was more positive-going than the H25R25 condition.
Single Lag Global Analyses
Of principal interest for addressing the experiment hypothesis was whether any 
differences are present between the H25R25 condition, the H25 under-estimates 
(H25u) and the H25 over-estimates (H25o) (Figure 11, p i46). The analysis strategy 
for this comparison followed that of the old/new effect analyses reported above (with 
the exception that the CR condition was not included here). Appendix 1 (p309-311) 
shows the scalp distributions of the old/new effects for these two categories (see 
Figures AP1-AP3), as well as the outcomes of the analyses of the old/new effects in 
each case (see tables API and AP2). All reliable effects involving condition in these 
analyses are reported in the text. For the analysis involving all electrode sites of
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interest (specified above) for the H25R25, lag 25 under-estimate (H25u) and lag 25 
over-estimate (H25o) conditions between 300-500ms, an interaction was revealed 
between CC, AP and ST (F(4.2,67.4) = 2.94;p<0.05). From 500-800ms, the highest 
order interaction was between CC, HM, and ST (F(2.9,46.6) = 3.12;p<0.05. There 
was also an interaction between CC, AP, and ST (F(3.7,58.8) = 3.95;p<0.01). The 
global analysis for 800-1100ms showed that the highest order interaction was between 
CC and AP (F(2.2,35.2) = 4.19;p<0.05). There was also a main effect of condition in 
this epoch (F(l.6,25.3) = 9.05;p<0.01).
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Figure 11. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs for lag 25 words and with under- and over-estimated lag judgements for 
this lag, at selected anterior and posterior electrodes (n=17).
Paired Global Single Lag Analyses
Here all possible paired contrasts were computed for lag 25 items that attracted either 
correct or incorrect lag judgements. All reliable effects involving condition in the 
ANOVAs are reported in the text. In the 300-500ms time-window, there was a CC,
AP and ST interaction (F(2.8,45.4) = 3.52;p<0.05), for the contrast between H25u and 
H25o. This came about because the H25o condition was more positive-going, with the 
smallest differences at the back of the head. The ANOVA comparing H25o and 
H25R25 revealed a CC, AP and ST interaction (F(2.3,37.2) = 3.37;p<0.05), which 
came about because the H25R25 condition was more positive-going with the largest 
differences at frontal locations. Both interactions reported involved a reduction in the 
size of the amplitude differences as distance from the midline increased. No 
differences were found between H25u and H25R25 in this epoch.
In the 500-800ms epoch, ANOVA revealed a CC, HM and ST interaction for the 
contrast between H25u and H25o (F(l .8,28.5) = 5.38;p<0.05), which came about 
because the H25o condition was more positive going, especially over left hemisphere 
superior scalp. A CC, AP and ST interaction was also revealed between these 
conditions (F3.0,48.7) = 4.26;p<0.01), which came because the H25o condition was 
more positive-going, with the largest differences across the front of the head. Both 
interactions involved a reduction in size with increasing distance from the midline. 
When the H25u and H25R25 conditions were compared, the ANOVA revealed a CC 
and AP interaction (F(1.3,20.8) = 9.44;p<0.01), which came about because the H25u 
condition was more positive-going only at posterior locations. Finally for this epoch, a 
comparison of H25R25 and H25o revealed a CC, AP and ST interaction (F(2.1,33.4)
= 5.88;p<0.01). This came about because H25R25 was more positive-going at frontal
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and central locations, with a general reduction in size with increasing distance from 
the midline.
In the 800-1100ms epoch, there was a CC and AP interaction between H25u and 
H25o (F(1.3,20.2) = 7.95;p<0.01), which came about because the H25o condition was 
more positive-going, with the largest differences at frontal locations. There was also a 
main effect of condition between H25u and H25o (F(l,16) = 12.80;p<0.01), which 
came about because the H25o condition was more positive-going. The ANOVA 
comparing H25u and H25R25 revealed a CC and HM condition (F(l,16) = 
4.79;p<0.05), which came about because the H25R25 condition was more positive- 
going, with larger differences over the left hemisphere than over the right. A CC and 
AP condition was also revealed (F(1.2,19.9) = 6.34;p<0.05) which came about 
because the H25R25 condition was more positive-going, with a reduction in size with 
distance from the front of the head. Finally, the ANOVA comparing H25R25 and 
H25o revealed a CC, AP and ST interaction (F(2.1,34.3) = 4.05;p<0.05), which came 
about because the H25o condition was more positive-going, with the smallest 
differences at posterior sites. Differences between the conditions decreased in size 
with increasing distance from the midline. Mean ERP amplitudes in this time-window 
increased with rising JOR (Figure 11, pl46).
In summary, there were differences in all epochs concerning the under- and over­
estimate categories, but not in a way that is consistent with the psychological theories 
set out in the introduction, since the over-estimate conditions were somewhat larger in 
amplitude in most cases. The contrasts between correct lag judgements and over-
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estimates however showed that the correct lag judgements elicited greater ERP 
amplitudes than over-estimates in the 300-500ms and the 500-800ms epochs.
A Priori Planned Comparisons
No reliable effects involving condition were obtained in the frontal analysis in the 
300-500ms epoch or the posterior analysis in the 500-800ms epoch (Figure 11, pl46).
Global Over-estimate Comparison
Also of interest for addressing the experiment hypothesis was whether any differences 
are present between the H15R15 condition and the HI 5 over-estimates (H15o). All 24 
participants contributed sufficient trials to these categories (Figure 12, p i50). The 
analysis strategy for this comparison followed that of the old/new effect analyses 
reported above (with the exception that the CR condition was not included here). In 
the 300-500ms time-window, no differences were found when directly comparing 
these two conditions using a global ANOVA. In the 500-800ms epoch, the global 
ANOVA revealed that there was a trend for a main effect of condition (F(l,23) = 
4.13;p<0.055), which came about because the H15R15 condition was of moderately 
larger amplitude than the H15o condition. In the 800-1100ms epoch, the global 
ANOVA revealed no differences across the two conditions.
149
F3 Fz F4
500ms 500ms 500ms
1<W  CR H15R15 H15o
P3 Pz P4
500ms 500ms 500ms
10&   CR   H15R15 —  —  H15o
Figure 12. Grand average ERPs associated with correct lag judgements and over-estimated lag judgements for lag 15 words at selected anterior 
and posterior electrodes (n=24).
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A Priori Planned Comparison
No effects were found in the 300-500ms time-window in the outcome of the planned 
comparisons (F3,Fz,F4). Finally, a focused analysis was conducted during the 500- 
800ms time-window at the back (P3,Pz,P4) of the head. The posterior ANOVA 
revealed an effect of condition (F(l,23) = 4.98;p<0.05), which came about because 
the H15R15 condition was more positive-going than the H15o condition.
Discussion
The primary aim of the current experiment was to explore whether ERPs vary 
according to JOR and if so, whether this occurs in a strength-based manner in terms of 
recollection and familiarity. An attempt was made to make longer distances between 
the lag response options in comparison with Experiment 1. The behavioural data 
shows that there are decrements in old/new recognition memory accuracy with 
increasing distance between first and second presentations of items. These results are 
comparable with those in some previous reports (e.g. Brozinsky et al., 2005; Hinrichs 
& Buschke, 1968; Hintzman 2001; 2003). These discrimination differences are likely 
to be carried by a reliance on and a decline in familiarity, since forgetting rates for this 
memory process are faster than recollection (Yonelinas & Levy, 2002). There was 
some evidence that RT increased with increasing lag, suggesting that old/new 
discrimination was easier for participants at the shorter repetition lags. When the data 
were separated according to JORs, JOR accuracy deteriorated with increasing lag in 
line with previous research findings (e.g. Hintzman, 2005): at lag 35 participants were 
less likely to make a correct JOR than they were at earlier lags. Correct lag 35 
judgements were also associated with the longest mean RT, supporting the suggestion 
that task difficulty increased at the longest repetition interval.
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ERP Old/New Effects
The ERP old/new effects are consistent with previous research in terms of their 
changes over time, and are comparable with those in Experiment 1 (Figure 4, pi 16). 
The ERPs elicited by correct rejections were the most negative-going condition in all 
three selected time regions in comparison with those elicited by hits. The scalp 
distributions of these ERP old/new effects correspond largely with those previously 
reported in studies of episodic retrieval (e.g. Mecklinger, 2000; Nessler et al., 2005; 
Rugg et al., 1998). These comprised a broadly distributed positivity in the 300-500ms 
epoch, a more posterior distribution in the 500-800ms time-window and a lateralised 
anterior positivity in the 800-1100ms epoch. There is some evidence from the 
outcomes of the analyses in this experiment to suggest that the sizes of the old/new 
effects diminished with increasing lag. This kind of repetition effect has been reported 
in some previous studies but not in others (e.g. Curran & Friedman, 2004; Rugg & 
Nagy, 1989; Wolk, et al., 2006). This shall be discussed further in the General 
Discussion (Chapter 7, pages 256-258).
The main reason for conducting this experiment was to determine whether known 
ERP correlates of memory processes distinguish between different recency 
judgements. Figure 10 (p i42) shows that very small anterior and posterior differences 
in activity make a distinction between lag 15 and 25 hits which were associated with 
correct JORs in the 300-500ms time-window. This justified focused analyses between 
these conditions in this early time-window. Old/new effects were found at the front of 
the head as well as at the back in this epoch. On the basis of previous research it is 
likely that the anterior effect is distinct from the posterior activity, and that the
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anterior effect is related to familiarity, whereas the posterior activity may be related to 
implicit memory (see Azimian-Faridani & Wilding, 2006; Rugg et al., 1998).
The link between the anterior effect in this epoch and familiarity has been described 
extensively in Chapter 2 (see pages 78-85). The link between posteriorly related 
activity and implicit memory operations is somewhat weaker, with the suggestion 
having been made initially on the basis of the finding that the effect is in fact a 
repetition effect: it indexes the old/new status of test items but does not vary with the 
accuracy of memory judgments. Demonstrations of this insensitivity to response 
accuracy, and the fact that anterior and posterior memory modulations in the 300- 
500ms epoch can be dissociated, can be seen in Rugg et al. (1998) and in the scalp 
maps provided by Azimian-Faridani & Wilding (2006). Stronger evidence for a link 
between this early posterior effect and implicit memory would arise from changes in 
this effect in combination with a behavioural index of implicit memory. Priming 
manipulations are perhaps the most obvious candidate to consider here, because if the 
effect is in fact an index of implicit memory operations, then either the time course or 
the size of the effect should vary with reaction times. The key point here however, is 
that irrespective of the accuracy of die implicit memory account of the posterior 
effect, it is functionally dissociable from the anterior effect in this epoch (since the 
anterior effect is sensitive to response accuracy).
There was no statistical evidence in this study to suggest that the anterior old/new 
effect differed across lags 15 and 25 for words that were associated with correct JORs. 
There was however, statistical evidence to show that a parietal old/new effect was 
elicited in this task and that it diminished with increasing lag. The outcomes of the
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analyses demonstrated that correctly rejected new items were the most negative-going 
condition in 500-800ms epoch and that hits associated with correct JORs at lag 15 
were more positive-going at posterior electrodes than their lag 25 equivalent. The 
scalp maps indicate a left lateralisation for this old/new ERP effect (Figure 9, p i36), a 
pattern identified in previous recognition studies (e.g. Wilding, 2000; Wilding &
Rugg, 1996). This was not supported by the statistical analysis for lag 15 hits, but 
there was evidence for lateralization at lag 25 which was provided by an interaction 
involving hemisphere as well as condition. These findings provide support for the 
notion that recollection differed across lag. The 800-1100ms ERP old/new effects 
revealed again that the hit conditions were more positive-going than the CR condition, 
with the greatest differences at posterior electrode locations. There was also evidence 
to suggest that the H15R15 condition was more positive-going over the left 
hemisphere, whereas the opposite was true for the H25R25 category. Perhaps the 
posterior activity in this time-window is a continuation of the same effect that 
differentiates these classes of ERPs from 500-800ms.
One possible reason for the lack of a difference in the magnitude of the mid-frontal 
ERP old/new effect across lags 15 and 25 is that the effect did differ across these lags 
but not sufficiently so to make this a statistically reliable difference. Perhaps if more 
trials or participants contributed to the data set then this would have come out in the 
analysis. It may also be the case that familiarity does not diminish over these short 
distances in time (a difference of only ten intervening items) and if so it would 
suggest that this memory process would be an unlikely contributor for distance 
information in these task types. The finding that the parietal old/new effect did differ 
in magnitude across these lags lends support against this second possibility, since
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familiarity is said to have a faster level of deterioration than recollection (Yonelinas & 
Levy, 2002).
As was outlined in the introduction to this experiment, a key contrast was between 
under-estimates and over-estimates for a single lag. If the ERP activity associated 
with these conditions was found to vary systematically with JOR in the early and 
middle time-windows, this could indicate changes in memory strength and in turn 
would suggest that distance information is utilised for making these types of memory 
judgements. Although confidence and error related processing could also account for 
ERP activity associated with these kinds of memory judgements, this interpretation is 
unlikely in that it is difficult to conceive of a confidence or error related effect that 
will vary in a graded way, according to whether shorter or longer lag judgements 
(relative to a correct judgment) are made. Presumably many incorrect lag judgements 
will be accompanied by high confidence, so an ERP index of confidence would be 
unlikely to vary in the same systematic way as an ERP index of the strength of 
familiarity and recollection. Further discussion of these issues is presented in the 
General Discussion (Chapter 7, pages 263-264).
Single Lag Comparisons
The main ERP activity of interest is that which differentiates between correct and 
incorrect recency judgments, and also activity that differentiates between shorter and 
longer judgements of recency. For lag 25 items identified correctly as being old, the 
ERPs associated with under-estimates, over-estimates and correct lag judgements 
were compared across the three selected time-windows.
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The lag 25 ERPs are illustrated in Figure 11 (pl46), where the ERP waveforms are 
shown for H25R25, H25o and H25u. In the 300-500ms time-window, there was no 
evidence to suggest that distance based information was being utilised for JORs in the 
way outlined in the introduction. In the 500-800ms time-window, there was mixed 
evidence to suggest that recollection was utilised for JORs in a strength-based 
manner. In the global paired hit analysis, under-estimated lag 25 hits were associated 
with greater posterior positivity than lag 25 hits attracting correct JORs, although this 
was not supported in the follow up analysis. However, other findings (e.g. that over­
estimated lag judgements had greater positivity over the left hemisphere than under­
estimates) do not fit with the idea that posterior-related activity predicted lag 
judgements. Finally, in the late time-window, differences between the conditions were 
largest over the front of the head. The level of positive-going activity increased as 
JOR increased at lag 25 (see Figure 13, p i 57). This is an interesting finding, because 
it could suggest that executive memory processes associated with late frontal activity 
also contribute to JORs in a way that parallels distance theory. This pattern of activity 
was however, not seen in Experiment 1 for lag 15 items. One possible reason for this 
is task structure, whereas having only a single lag in Experiment 1, whilst providing 3 
possible response options confused participants, and that this led to variance in the 
late time-window, that was not related to memory related processing. Conducting 
another ERP experiment where there is a range of actual lags may shed light on these 
issues (see also the General Discussion, Chapter 7).
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Mean Amplitude Measures by Location
C F P
Mean
1I25U I125R25 lI25o II25u 1125R25 1125c II25u U25R25 11250
Figure 13. 800-1100ms. Mean ERP amplitude measures are collapsed across central (C) (T7,C5,C3,C4,C6,T8), frontal (F)(F7,F5,F3,F4,F6,F8) 
and posterior (P)(P7,P5,P3,P4,P6,P8) locations. The bars represent under-estimated (grey), correct (black) and over-estimated (red) lag 
judgements for words presented at lag 25. This figure demonstrates that amplitudes increase as a function of JOR increase (n=17).
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There were sufficient trials to permit a statistical comparison of lag 15 hits associated 
with over-estimated and correct lag judgements. There were no effects of interest in 
the 300-500 or 800-1100ms time-windows involving these conditions. In the 500- 
800ms epoch there was some evidence to suggest that the hits attracting an over­
estimated lag judgment were less positive-going than those associated with correct 
JORs. This fits with the idea that recollection processes are used in making JORs in a 
strength-based manner, since there is evidence here that the ERP effect associated 
with recollection varied with lag judgements, and that it did so in a direction 
consistent with the pre-experimental hypothesis. These findings support the notion 
that recollection may provide a form of distance information.
In summary, the outcomes of this experiment have -  in keeping with Experiment 1, 
revealed that ERP old/new effects differ across three separate time-windows in a 
continuous recency memory task. The patterns of activity here were found to be 
broadly similar to old/new effects found in previous memory research. There is mixed 
evidence concerning whether event related potentials vary systematically with 
judgements of recency. The reasons for the mixed results are unclear, but in this 
experiment design the null results may be related to the fact that participants were not 
told of the differing proportions of items across lags. If they expected an equal 
number of items to be re-presented at each lag, it could have affected the JORs they 
gave to the stimuli. When participants have an expectation that there is an equal 
number of words presented at each lag (when in fact there is not), then on at least 
some occasions they may distribute their responses in line with that expectation rather 
than relying on mnemonic information (for a discussion, see Postma, 1999).
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Another possible reason for the lack of differences in the 300-500ms time-window 
across lag judgements is that the memory process of familiarity is not utilised for 
making recency judgements in tasks of this type. This null result adds to that reported 
in the previous experiment, and these findings may give some weight to the notion 
that familiarity-related strength accounts of recency memory are insufficient under 
these circumstances. The findings across the first two experiments in this thesis give 
some support for the idea that recollection can be utilised for recency judgements, 
however there is still a possibility that some of the activity in the 500-800ms epoch 
may be related to lack of confidence related processing. One argument against the 
confidence viewpoint can be based on the findings of Hintzman (2003) who 
demonstrated that confidence ratings are less sensitive to lag than are judgements of 
recency, in that iso-JOR curves drop off much more rapidly than iso-confidence 
curves as a function of lag. In terms of the current findings, this means it is more 
likely that the ERP activity that varies in accordance with lag is more likely to be 
based on recency-related processing. Future studies might be important in ascertaining 
whether this is indeed the case.
If this is a reasonable account, then ERPs separated according to response accuracy 
may not provide a clear separation between ERPs that are in fact associated, to 
different degrees, with signals indexing mnemonic information that supports recency 
judgments. Conducting an experiment where there are equal proportions repeated at 
every lag is one way of addressing this concern. This was done in Experiment 3, 
which is described below. Further comment on the findings in this experiment can be 
found in the General Discussion (Chapter 7).
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CHAPTER 5 -  EXPERIMENT 3
Introduction
At issue in this experiment is the ways in which two classes of retrieval process, in 
isolation or in combination, support judgments for when events occurred. This 
experiment was designed to address the same issues that were outlined in Experiments 
1 and 2, using a design that may not be prone to some of the problems that were 
identified in the discussions of Experiments 1 & 2. In Experiment 1, the data permit 
the claim that electrical activity associated with old/new judgements in typical 
recognition tasks is also present in continuous recency memory tasks. Experiment 1 
provided little evidence that this activity varied across JORs, however. Experiment 2 
provided a demonstration that the old/new effects decreased in magnitude with 
increasing lag, but the evidence in terms of these effects varying meaningfully with 
JOR was mixed.
In the third ERP experiment, an attempt was made to decrease the complexity of the 
task, by reducing the number of lags from four to three. The longest lag (35) included 
in Experiment 2 was not used in Experiment 3, since participants were least accurate 
for this lag in terms of their JORs. Most importantly in Experiment 3, the proportion 
of repetitions was equal across the three lags that were used. The idea was to improve 
on the design of Experiment 2, in order to have proportions of items in line with the 
likely expectations of participants.
The three repetition lags used in this experiment were 5,15 and 25 and these were 
also the three JOR response options. This meant that the spacing across the JOR
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options was at least 10 intervening items and a maximum of 20, which is wider than 
in Experiment 1. The rationale for these changes to the method was that they might 
lead to a cleaner separation between correct responses, under-estimates and over­
estimates by virtue of reducing the possibility that lag judgements will be based upon 
task expectations, and by incorporating a reasonable gap between items presented 
after different lags.
Method
The method was different from that for Experiment 1 in the following ways. 
Participants
There were forty-two participants (12 male) aged between 18 and 24 years (mean age 
= 20), and they were paid £7.50/hr. The data sets from 36 participants (9 males) were 
included in the initial analyses described below. Three participants did not complete 
the entire experiment due to technical problems, and for the remaining 3, there were 
insufficient trials in critical conditions after artefact rejection (see below), in part 
because of low levels of correct lag judgments.
Materials and Design
The stimuli were 235 low frequency words. Each complete task list comprised two 
blocks. Each block contained 109 words, 90 of which were repeated, with an equal 
number (30) after 5,15 and 25 intervening words. The order of re-presentation of 
words at each lag was determined pseudo-randomly for each block. The 19 words in 
each block that were not repeated were presented towards the end of each block, 
ensuring that words repeated at each lag were distributed relatively evenly throughout
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blocks. Five further lists were created from the initial list, such that across lists all 
items were encountered at each lag, and each block within each list occurred at the 
start of the list. A further 17 words, 13 of which were repeated, were used in an initial 
practice block. In total, participants saw 428 stimuli (199 per block, 30 in the practice 
phase).
Procedure
Each experiment block began with a 'ready' signal, lasting 5000ms. Each trial began 
with a fixation mark (*). This was visible for 500ms and was followed by a blank 
screen (100ms). Words were then presented for 300ms, followed by a blank screen 
during which participants indicated whether the word was old or new via key-press 
using left and right thumbs. The screen was blanked for 1000ms after the response 
and then the words ‘How Far Back?’ were shown. Participants were instructed that, if 
they had indicated a word to be new, then pressing any key would initiate the next 
trial. For words judged to be old, they were instructed to indicate whether the word 
had been re-presented after 5,15 or 25 intervening words.
The three JOR options were made via three key buttons on one hand, with lag 5,15 
and 25 judgments made with index, middle and fourth fingers, respectively. This 
response was followed by a 500ms blank screen before the next trial commenced. An 
equal number of participants completed each task list, and an equal number completed 
the experiment for the four possible combinations of left/right hand responses for the 
old/new judgment and the second response. There was a break of approximately five 
minutes between blocks. Participants were asked to balance speed and accuracy 
equally, and each test block took on average 18 minutes to complete.
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Behavioural Results
Table 7 (pi 64) shows the probabilities of correct old/new judgments to new words and 
to old words separated according to lag. Also shown in the table are the reaction times 
for these classes of response. Discrimination (p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably 
greater than chance at each lag (t(35) > 30.00;p<0.001 in each case). A one-way 
ANOVA contrasting these three discrimination measures revealed a main effect 
(F(l .77,62.10) = 8.56;p<0.01) and follow-up paired t-tests revealed that old/new 
discrimination deteriorated with increasing lag (t(35) > 2.00;p<0.05, for each 
contrast). A one-way ANOVA on the RT categories for which the means are shown in 
Table 7 also revealed reliable differences across the categories (F(1.86,65.13) = 
7.03;p<.001). While not differing reliably from each other, RTs for all classes of hit 
were slower than RTs for correct rejections (t(35) > 3.00;p<.01 in each case).
Table 8 (pi 64) shows the probabilities of each lag judgment at each lag for words 
judged correctly to be old. The bold values on the diagonal are the probabilities of a 
correct lag judgment. For each lag, the likelihood of a correct lag judgment was above 
chance (0.33) (t(35) > 7.00;p<.001). Paired contrasts between the likelihoods of a 
correct response at each lag revealed only that correct lag 15 judgments were made 
more often than correct lag 25 judgments (t(35) = 3.47;p<.01), although the advantage 
for lag 5 over lag 25 judgments approached significance (p = 0.06). The mean 
reaction times for items attracting correct lag judgments were 924,923 and 946ms for 
lags 5,15 and 25, respectively. A one-way ANOVA on these RTs revealed no 
significant differences according to lag.
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Table 7. Probabilities of correct old and new judgments and associated reaction times 
(RT), separated according to lag (n=36) §
New Lag5 Lag 15 Lag25
p(correct) 0.95 (0.05) 0.88 (0.10) 0.85 (0.12) 0.83 (0.13)
RT(ms) 841 (204) 961(242) 925(211) 906 (203)
§ Standard deviations are in brackets
Table 8. Probabilities of each lag judgment (lag5,15,25) conditional on a correct old 
judgment and separated according to lag (n=36) §
Actual Lag
Lag5 Lagl5 Lag25
Judgment
Lag5 0.57 (.15) 0.14 (.09) 0.06 (.04)
Lagl5 0.36 (.13) 0.60 (.11) 0.45 (.12)
Lag25 0.07 (.05) 0.26 (.12) 0.48 (.14)
§ Correct lag judgments are in bold, standard deviations are in brackets
ERP Results
ERP Analysis Strategy
The analysis strategy was the same as that outlined in Experiment 1. Figures 14-16 
support the decision to analyse the data within three separate time-windows. Figure 15 
(pi 66) shows that the scalp distributions of the ERP old/new effects in the 500-800ms 
epoch differ primarily in magnitude, with the effects decreasing in magnitude with 
increasing lag. For the earlier (300-500ms) epoch (Figure 14, pl65), the maxima of
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the scalp distributions of the ERP old/new effects move posteriorly with increasing 
lag. The reason for this is the continuing reduction of the ERP old/new effects at 
anterior sites with increasing lag, with a lesser reduction at posterior scalp locations. 
In the 800-1100ms epoch (Figure 16, p i 66), the scalp maps reveal that the activity 
begins to subside at posterior electrodes, with a right lateralised anterior effect 
beginning to emerge. Figure 17 (p i67) shows the ERP old/new effects for items 
attracting correct lag judgments (separated according to lag) for a subset of the sites 
encompassing the spatial extent of the electrodes included in the analyses described 
below. The mean number of trials (range in brackets) contributing to the correct 
rejection ERP response category was 179 (121-204). The corresponding values for 
correct lag 5, 15 and 25 judgments were 26 (12-30), 28 (12-41) and 21 (12-37), 
respectively.
H5R5-CR, 4.0,1.0 H 15R15-CR, 3.0,1.0 H25R25-CR, 2.5,0.5
300-500ms
Figure 14. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity 
associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms time-window. The maps 
were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 
5, 15 and 25 judgments, respectively (n=36).
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H5R5-CR, 6.0,2.0 H15R15-CR, 5.5,1.5 H25R25-CR, 4.5,1.0
500-800ms
Figure 15. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity 
associated with correct lag judgments for the 500-800ms time-window. The maps 
were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 
5,15 and 25 judgments, respectively (n=36).
H5R5-CR, 3.5,0.5 H15R15-CR, 3.0,0.0 H25R25-CR, 3.5,0.0
800-1100ms
Figure 16. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity 
associated with correct lag judgments for the 800-1100ms time-window. The maps 
were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 
5, 15 and 25 judgments, respectively (n=36).
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Figure 17. Grand Average ERPs associated with correct rejections and with lag 5,15 and 25 items attracting accurate JORs. For each lag, the 
ERPs are shown for three frontal (F3,Fz, F4) and three parietal (P3,Pz,P6) electrodes (n=36).
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First, analyses of the old/new effects for correct lag judgments were conducted (36 
participants were included in these analyses). Second, a comparison of single lag 
judgements was conducted, involving lag 5 hits associated with a correct JOR (H5R5) 
and an over-estimated JOR (H5R15). Third, a further comparison of single lag 
judgements was conducted, involving lag 25 hits associated with a correct JOR 
(H25R25) and an under-estimated lag judgement (H15R15). The second and third set 
of analyses were restricted to data from a subset of 23 participants who made 
sufficient correct and lag 15 (incorrect) responses to lag 5 as well as lag 25 items to 
permit formation of reliable averaged ERPs.
The mean number of trials contributing to the ERP correct rejection response 
category for this subset was 190 (range = 154-204). The corresponding values for 
correct lag judgments to lag 5 and 25 items were 27 (12-35) and 23 (12-37), while the 
values for incorrect (lag 15) judgments to lag 5 and lag 25 items were 18 (12-35) and 
22 (12-40). Appendix 2 tables API and AP2 show the behavioural data for this subset 
of 23 participants, while Appendix 2 (pages 312-317) Figures AP1-AP3 show the 
scalp distributions of the neural activity associated with correct lag judgments for the 
300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800-1100ms epochs at each lag. Table AP3 shows the 
outcomes of the ERP old/new contrasts for this subset. There is considerable overlap 
between the outcomes for this subset and those for the full set of 36 participants that 
are shown in Table 9 (p i69).
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Table 9. The outcomes of the global ANOVA Performed for the Mean Amplitude Measures (n=36) §
300-500ms
df F
500-800ms
df F
800-1100ms 
df F
cc 2.5,88.5 29.67*** 2.9,101.1 39.52*** 2.9,102.3 12.96***
ccxap 3.2,113.6 3.84* 3.4,119.2 9.62*** - -
ccxhm - - - - - -
ccxst 3.1,109.8 17.85*** 3.2,111.2 22.41*** 3.0,105.7 5.98***
cc x ap x hm - - - - 3.9,136.8 4.25**
cc x ap x st - - 7.6,264.9 5.02*** - -
cc x hm x st 3.3,116.4 .55* 3.8,134.2 5.01** 3.5,120.8 4.20**
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H5R5, H15R15, H25R25, CR. 
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0.001 (epsilon corrected)
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Global Old/new Analyses
The outcomes of the global analysis involving the categories CR, H5R5, H15R15 and 
H25R25 for the 300-500ms, 500-800ms and the 800-1100ms epochs are shown in 
Table 9 (pi69). The table shows that, in all cases, there were interactions involving 
condition and scalp locations, and in light of this, follow-up paired contrasts were 
conducted for all possible pairs for each epoch.
Paired Global Old/new Analyses
As in previous chapters, only the highest order interaction terms are reported in the 
text. In the 300-500ms time-window, a global ANOVA was conducted to assess 
whether there were differences between CR and H5R5 (see Table 10, pl72). For this 
analysis there was a CC, AP and ST interaction, which came about because the H5R5 
condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences over frontal scalp, 
with differences in amplitude diminishing with increasing distance from the midline, 
as Figure 14 (pi 65) shows. There was also an interaction involving the CC, AP and 
HM categories, which came about because the positive-going differences are 
moderately larger over the right hemisphere at frontal and central locations. In the 
same epoch, the comparison between CR and H15R15 revealed a CC, HM and ST 
interaction, which came about because the hit condition was more positive-going, 
with larger differences over the left hemisphere and a reduction in the size of the 
differences with increasing distance from the midline. This ANOVA also revealed a 
CC, AP and ST interaction, which came about because there were larger differences at 
the front of the head, in addition to the reasons mentioned for the previous interaction. 
Finally in this epoch, in the CR and H25R25 comparison, a CC, HM and ST 
interaction was revealed because the hit condition was more positive-going, with
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differences that were largest over left inferior and mid-lateral sites. A CC, AP and ST 
interaction was also found, because differences are larger over posterior sites.
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Table 10. The outcomes of the global paired analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP old/new effects for words attracting correct 
old/new and correct lag judgements for the 3 selected time-windows (n=36)§
Epoch 300-500ms 500-800ms 800-1100ms
Lag__________5_____________ 15____________ 25____________ 5_____________ 15____________ 25____________ 5_____________ 15____________ 25_
CC 64.80*** 77.98*** 20.89*** 83.93*** 71.14*** 38.33*** 29.91*** 20.54*** 23.58***
CCxAP 5.37* 4.26* - 15.87*** 15.80*** 18.30*** - - -
CCxHM 3.55* 3.15* - - - - - - -
CCxST 46.62*** 33.03*** 26.69*** 45.26*** 37.67*** 32.54 4.34* - -
CCxAPxHM 3.85* - 4.32* 5.09* - - 7.47** 6.56** 6.18**
CCxAPxST 4.19* 2.97* 2.90* 8.22*** 7.16*** 12.31*** - - 3.16*
CCxHMxST - 3.89* 4.88* - 5.43* 16.88*** - 5.79* 13.22***
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H5R5vsCR; H15R15vsCR; H25R25vsCR. 
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0 001 (epsilon corrected)
•trend
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In the 500-800ms time-window, the ANOVA for the H5R5 versus CR contrast also 
revealed a CC, AP and ST interaction, which came about because the H5R5 condition 
was more positive-going, with the largest differences over the back of the head at the 
midline (Figure 15, p i66). There was also a CC, AP and HM interaction, because 
additionally the differences were largest over the left hemisphere at posterior 
locations, whereas there was less marked lateralisation at the front of the head. In the 
contrast between H15R15 and CR, the ANOVA revealed a CC, HM and ST 
interaction. This came about because the H15R15 condition was more positive-going 
than CR, with the differences being largest over the right hemisphere at superior and 
mid-lateral sites. There was also a CC, AP and ST interaction, because differences 
were largest over the back of the head, with a reduction in size with increasing 
distance from the midline. Finally, the ANOVA comparing CR and H25R25 revealed 
a CC, HM and ST interaction as well as a CC, AP and ST interaction, which both 
came about for the same reasons as for the terms revealed in the CR vs. H15R15 
comparison.
In the 800-1100ms time-window (Figure 16, p i66), the H5R5 versus CR ANOVA 
revealed a CC, AP and HM interaction which came about for the same reasons as this 
comparison in the 500-800ms epoch. In this same time-window, an ANOVA 
comparing H15R15 and CR revealed that there was a CC, HM and ST interaction and 
this also came about for the same reasons as this interaction in the earlier epoch.
There was also a CC, AP and HM interaction which came about because the H15R15 
response category was more positive-going and the largest differences were over the 
right hemisphere at frontal locations. Finally, the ANOVA comparing CR and 
H25R25 in this epoch revealed a CC, HM and ST interaction, which came about
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because H25R25 was more positive-going, with the largest differences being over 
right superior and mid-lateral sites. There was also a CC, AP and ST interaction, 
because additionally, the largest differences were over posterior locations. 
Furthermore, there was a reliable CC, AP and HM term, which came about because 
the differences were largest over right frontal sites.
A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms time-window a focused analysis (F3,Fz,F4) was conducted with the 
CR, H5R5, H15R15 and H25R25 conditions, since this region is of interest in terms 
of the pre-experimental hypothesis. There was a CC and ST interaction (F(4.4,153.7) 
= 2.44;p<0.05), which came about because the CR condition was the most negative- 
going, with an increase in hit positivity as lag decreased and with the largest 
difference at Fz (H5R5). There was also a main effect of condition (F(2.6,89.5) = 
26.02;p<0.001). This was followed up with all possible paired contrasts (Figure 17). 
The CR and H5R5 comparison revealed a main effect of condition (F(l,35) =
88.53;p<0.001) and a CC by ST interaction (F(1.7,58.4) = 6.78;p<0.01), which came 
about because the hit condition was more positive-going, with the largest differences 
at Fz. The CR and H15R15 comparison revealed a main effect of condition (F(l,35) = 
51.15;p<0.001), which also came about because the hit condition was more positive- 
going than the CR condition. Finally, the CR and H25R25 ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of condition (F(l,35) = 11.68;p<0.01), which came about for the same reasons 
as the previous two main effects. There was also a trend for a CC and ST interaction 
(F(2.0,70.0) = 2.96;p=0.06).
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The second planned comparisons were carried out in the 500-800ms time-window at 
posterior locations (P3,Pz,P4). The ANOVA comparing CR, H5R5, H15R15 and 
H25R25 revealed a main effect of condition (F(2.6,91.3) = 41.30;p<0.001), which 
came about because the CR condition was the most negative-going, and because the 
hit conditions increased in positivity with decreasing lag. This was followed up with 
all possible paired contrasts involving the CR response category (Figure 17). All three 
ANOVAs revealed main effects of category (F(l,35) > 53.36;p<0.001, in each case), 
which came about because the hit conditions were more positive-going than the CR 
condition in every contrast. In the CR and H5R5 comparison there was a CC and ST 
interaction (F(2.0,69.8) = 3.42;p<0.05), which came about because the hit condition 
was more positive-going, with the largest differences over P3. In the CR and H15R15 
comparison, there was also a trend for a CC and ST interaction (F(1.7,58.3) = 
2.76;p<0.082), which came about for the same reason.
Global Hit Paired Contrasts
These comprised follow-up paired contrasts for the H5R5, H15R15 and H25R25 
conditions only for each epoch (thus CR is not included in this set of analyses). Only 
the highest order interactions are detailed in the text (see Table 11, p i77, for results in 
full). The ANOVA from 300-500ms comparing the H5R5 and H15R15 conditions 
revealed a trend for a CC, HM and ST interaction, which came about because the 
H5R5 condition was more positive-going, with differences that were largest over the 
left hemisphere at superior sites. In the contrast between H5R5 and H25R25 in this 
early epoch the same interaction was revealed by the ANOVA, with the shorter lag 
eliciting greater positivity and larger differences over left superior and mid-lateral 
sites. In the same epoch, the comparison involving H15R15 and H25R25 revealed a
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CC and AP interaction, which came about because the ERPs associated with the 
shorter lag were more positive-going, with the largest differences at the front of the 
head.
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Table 11. The outcomes of the global paired hit analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP activity for words attracting correct old 
and correct lag judgements for the 3 selected time-windows (n=36)§
Epoch 300-500ms 500-80Qim 800-1100tns
Lag___________5 vs 15________ 5 vs 25________ 15 vs 25_______ 5 vs 15________ 5 vs 25________ 15 vs 25_______ 5 vs 15________ 5 vs 25________ 15 vs 25
CC
CCxAP
CCxST
CCxHMxST 4.15* 
CCxHMxAPxST -
23.52***
6.68**
6 . 12*
3.43*
7.61**
5.10*
14.44**
6.92**
3.50*
5.87*
5.66* 3.72*
3.79*
2 .201-
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H5R5vsH15R15; H5R5vsH25R25; H15R15vsH25R25. 
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0.001 (epsilon corrected)
•trend
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In the 500-800ms epoch, the ANOVA revealed no differences between the H5R5 and 
H15R15 conditions. There was a CC, HM and ST interaction between H5R5 and 
H25R25, which came about because the shorter lag was associated with greater 
positivity, with the smallest differences over left inferior sites. In the H15R15 and 
H25R25 contrast, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, which came about 
because the H15R15 condition was more positive-going.
Finally, in the 800-1100ms time-window, there was a CC and AP interaction between 
H5R5 and H15R15, which came about because the H15R15 condition was more 
positive-going at frontal locations, but not at posterior locations. There was a CC, HM 
and ST interaction between the H5R5 and H25R25 conditions, because the H5R5 
condition was more positive-going, except over left inferior sites. Finally, there were 
no statistically reliable differences revealed between the H15R15 and the H25R25 
conditions in this epoch.
A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms time-window a focused analysis (F3,Fz,F4) was conducted with all 
possible paired contrasts between the ERPs associated with correct lag judgments and 
separated according to lag. In the ANOVA, a trend for a main effect of condition was 
revealed involving the H5R5 and H15R15 conditions (F(l,35) = 3.65;p<0.066), 
because the H5R5 condition was moderately more positive-going. There was also a 
trend for a CC and ST interaction with these conditions (F(1.6,56.5) = 2.53;p<0.1). In 
this epoch, there was a main effect of condition when comparing H5R5 and H25R25 
(F(l,35) = 27.70;p<0.001), because the H5R5 condition was associated with greater 
positivity. Finally in the 300-500ms epoch, when comparing H15R15 and H25R25,
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there was a main effect of condition (F(l,35) = 5.74;p<0.05), which came about 
because the ERPs associated with the shorter lag were more positive-going. There was 
also a trend for a CC and ST interaction with these categories (F(l .8,62.2) = 
2.61;p=0.089).In the planned 500-800ms follow-ups, there were no reliable 
differences between H5R5 and H15R15, or between H15R15 and H25R25. An 
ANOVA did reveal a main effect of condition in the H5R5 and H25R25 comparison 
(FI,35) = 7.23;p<0.05), which came about because the ERPs associated with the 
shorter lag were more positive-going.
Global Over-Estimate Comparison
Of primary interest for addressing the experiment hypothesis was whether any 
differences are present between the H5R5 condition and the H5R15 (over-estimate) 
condition (Figure 18, right hand side, p i81). The scalp maps showing the activity in 
all 3 epochs differentiating between H5R15 and CR are shown in Figure 19 (pi 82). 
The analysis strategy for this comparison followed that of the old/new effect analyses 
reported above (with the exception that the CR condition was not included here). All 
reliable effects involving condition in these analyses are reported in the text. For the 
analysis involving all electrode sites of interest (specified above) for the H5R5 and 
H5R15 (over-estimate) conditions between 300-500ms, an interaction was revealed 
between CC, AP and ST (F(2.8,60.5) = 2.95;p<0.05). This interaction came about 
because the H5R5 condition was more positive-going (except at posterior sites), with 
the largest differences at anterior electrode locations, and with amplitude differences 
falling from superior to inferior locations. There was also a CC and AP interaction 
(F(l .4,29.7) = 6.02;p<0.05). In the 500-800ms epoch, there was a trend for a main 
effect of condition (F(l,22) = 3.74;p=0.067), because the H5R5 condition was
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moderately more positive-going compared with the over-estimate condition. In the 
800-1100ms epoch, there were no reliable differences across these conditions.
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Figure 18. Grand Average ERPs associated with correct and incorrect JORs (n=23). The left panel constitutes waveforms associated with items 
presented at lag 5, the right panel items presented at lag 25. Waveforms associated with lag 15 JORs in both panels are incorrect. For each lag, 
the ERPs are shown for three frontal (F3,Fz, F4) and three parietal (P3,Pz,P6) electrodes.
300-500ms, 4.0,1.0 500-800ms, 5.0,1.0
H5R15-CR (Overestimates)
800-1100ms, 3.5,0.5
Figure 19. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity 
associated with incorrect lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800- 
1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by 
subtracting mean amplitudes within each time-window for correct rejections from 
amplitudes associated with incorrect lag 15 judgments for words presented at lag 5, 
respectively (n=23).
A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms time-window a focused analysis was again conducted for critical 
paired contrasts. In a departure from the approach in the previous experiments, these 
focused analyses comprised one-tailed t-tests on mean amplitudes across sites F3, Fz 
and F4. The tests were one-tailed because they were based on the prediction that 
larger (more positive-going) effects would accompany shorter lag judgments, with the 
findings in Experiments 1 & 2 providing tentative support for this prediction. The 
one-tailed t-test revealed reliably more positive-going activity for correct compared to 
incorrect JORs at this lag (t(22) = 2.04;p<0.05). In the 500-800ms time-window, the t- 
test analysis revealed no differences between the critical conditions on mean 
amplitudes across sites P3, Pz and P4.
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Global Under-Estimate Comparison
Also of primary interest for addressing the experiment hypothesis was whether any 
differences are present between the H25R25 condition and the H25R15 (under­
estimate) condition across the same 23 participants contributing sufficient trials to the 
categories of interest (Figure 18, right hand side, pi 81). The scalp maps showing the 
activity in all 3 epochs differentiating between H25R15 and CR are shown in Figure 
20 (pi 84). The analysis strategy for this comparison followed that for the over­
estimate analyses described above. Again, all reliable effects involving condition in 
these analyses are reported in the text. For the analysis involving all electrode sites of 
interest (specified above) for the H252R5 and H25R15 (under-estimate) conditions 
between 300-500ms, an interaction was revealed between CC, AP and ST (F(2.5,55.3) 
= 3.12;p<0.05). This came about because the under-estimated lag judgements were 
associated with more positive-going activity, with the largest differences over frontal 
superior sites. This interaction was also revealed by the ANOVA in the 500-800ms 
time-window (F(3.0,66.9) = 3.91;p<0.05), which came about for the same reasons. In 
the 800-1100ms epoch, there was a CC, AP and ST interaction (F(3.7,80.4) = 
3.50;p<0.05), because the under-estimate condition was more positive-going (except 
at posterior inferior sites), with the largest differences over central locations. Finally 
in the 800-1100ms epoch, there was a four-way interaction CC, AP, HM and ST 
(F(3.1,67.8) = 3.14;p<0.05), which came about for the same reasons as the three-way 
interaction, with the additional reason that there were larger differences over the right 
hemisphere.
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Figure 20. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity 
associated with incorrect lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800- 
1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by 
subtracting mean amplitudes within each time-window for correct rejections from 
amplitudes associated with incorrect lag 15 judgments for words presented at lag 25, 
respectively (n=23).
A Priori Planned Comparisons
In the 300-500ms time-window a more focused analysis (F3,Fz,F4) was again 
conducted with a one-tailed paired t-test -  this time comparing mean amplitudes 
associated with H25R15 and H25R25. There were no reliable effects. In the 500- 
800ms epoch, across the electrode sites (P3,Pz,P4), this was also the case.
In summary, the results o f the Global Paired Contrasts revealed patterns of reliable 
effects that indicated that positive -going effects with different distributions in the 
300-500 and 500-800ms epochs predicted shorter recency judgments. The follow-up 
(a priori) analyses revealed support for the view that aspects of the electrical record 
linked with familiarity responded in this way.
H25R15-CR (Underestimates)
 I-------1■ H 9 — — j-------------------------1____________ l
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Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the ways in which recollection and/or 
familiarity memory processes could support judgments for when events occurred. The 
behavioural data in this experiment showed that old/new discrimination declined with 
increasing lag, as did the accuracy of JORs, a pattern of performance consistent with 
that obtained in previous comparable studies (Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968; Hintzman, 
2004; 2005). In relation to Experiment 2 in this thesis, the JOR accuracy reported here 
is improved and this may be due to decreasing the complexity and length of the 
experiment. The fact that there was a greater overall likelihood of a lag 15 judgment 
in this experiment (see Table 8, p i64) might be interpreted as a tendency to default to 
this response option when uncertain, but attributing aspects of the pattern of 
behavioural data to response bias is complicated by the fact that for both lag 5 and lag 
25 items, a lag 15 judgment is temporally closer to the correct response than the other 
incorrect alternative.
ERP Old/new Effects
The sizes of the old/new effects decreased as lag increased (Figure 17, pi 67) -  this is 
largely consistent with the findings of Experiment 2. The scalp distributions of the 
ERP old/new effects corresponded broadly with the effects reported previously in 
ERP studies of episodic retrieval, comprising a more posterior and left-lateralised 
distribution in the 500-800ms than in the 300-500ms epoch (Azimian-Faridani & 
Wilding, 2006; Curran, 1999; 2000; Wilding, 1999). These findings are consistent 
with the view that at least two distinct memory processes were engaged in the first 
800ms following stimulus presentation.
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Figures 14-16 (pages 165-166) show the distributions of these ERP old/new effects, 
and how they change with lag. For the 300-500ms time-window, the progressively 
posterior maximum of the old/new effects with increasing lag is consistent with the 
view that the amplitude of the mid-frontal old/new effect -  the putative index of 
familiarity -  became smaller as lag increased. In the 500-800ms epoch, the old/new 
effects diminished but the shapes of the distributions remained the same. In keeping 
with the findings in Experiments 1 and 2, in the late time-window (800-1100ms), the 
scalp maps revealed emerging anterior activity that was right lateralised. In this late 
epoch, the old/new effects associated with the three lags did not vary in a way that 
was consistent with the earlier experiments. This pattern of findings will be discussed 
in more detail in the General Discussion (Chapter 7).
Single Lag Comparisons
As with the previous two experiments, the main ERP activity of interest in 
Experiment 3 is that which differentiates between correct and incorrect recency 
judgments. In this experiment it was possible to measure lag 15 JORs to lag 5 items 
(over-estimates), and to measure lag 15 JORs to lag 25 items (under-estimates). 
Critically, for these incorrect lag judgments, ERPs were formed only for those items 
attracting lag 15 judgments. The central findings in this set of analyses are shown in 
Figures 21-23 (pages 187-189), which illustrate the mean amplitudes of the 
waveforms across the 3 epochs (separated across the anterior, central and posterior 
electrodes), for hits associated with correct JORs (lag 5 and 25), along with hits 
associated with incorrect (lag 15) JORs.
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Figure 21. Mean amplitude of the 300-500ms electrical activity associated with correct JOR lag 5 and 25 hits (black bars); lag 5 hits attracting 
over-estimated lag judgements (red bars) and lag 25 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars). (n=23). There are separate graphs 
for each AP dimension: Central (C) electrodes (collapsed across T8,C6,C4,T7,C5,C3), Frontal (F)(F8,F6,F4,F7,F5,F3) and Posterior 
(P)(P8,P6,P4,P7,P5,P3).
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Figure 22. Mean amplitude of the 500-800ms electrical activity associated with correct JOR lag 5 and 25 hits (black bars); lag 5 hits attracting 
over-estimated lag judgements (red bars) and lag 25 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars). (n=23). There are separate graphs 
for each AP dimension: Central (C) electrodes (collapsed across T8,C6,C4,T7,C5,C3), Frontal (F)(F8,F6,F4,F7,F5,F3) and Posterior 
(P)(P8,P6,P4,P7,P5,P3).
188
Mean Amplitudes by Location
C F P
6.00
5.00
4.00
>a.
c
S  3.00
5
2.00
1.00
0.00
Figure 23. Mean amplitude of the 800-1100ms electrical activity associated with correct JOR lag 5 and 25 hits (black bars); lag 5 hits attracting 
over-estimated lag judgements (red bars) and lag 25 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars). (n=23). There are separate graphs 
for each AP dimension: Central (C) electrodes (collapsed across T8,C6,C4,T7,C5,C3), Frontal (F)(F8,F6,F4,F7,F5,F3) and Posterior 
(P)(P8,P6,P4,P7,P5,P3).
H5R5 H5R15 H25RI5 H25R25 H5R5 H5R1S H2SR15 H25R25 HSR5 H5R15 H25RI5 H25R25
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In the 300-500ms epoch, the bar graph (Figure 21, p i87) reveals that at frontal 
electrodes, correct JORs for lag 5 items elicit more positive-going activity than 
incorrect (over-estimated) lag judgements. This is also the case at the central 
electrodes, but less so at posterior ones. Under-estimated lag 25 hits were associated 
with more positive going activity than correct lag 25 judgements in this epoch, 
especially over anterior locations. In the 500-800ms epoch, the bar graph (Figure 22, 
pi 88) reveals that the correct JOR lag 5 hits were associated with more positive-going 
waveforms than the over-estimated JORs for lag 5. This was the case at the anterior, 
central and posterior electrode locations, but only moderate support for differences 
was revealed by the statistical analyses. Under-estimated lag 25 hits were associated 
with more positive going activity than correct lag 25 judgements, consistent with a 
strength-based account of JORs. There was an indication that the largest differences 
between these conditions were over anterior electrode sites, suggesting an extension 
of the activity from the early epoch into the 500-800ms time-window.
Finally, Figure 23 (pi 89) reveals that at frontal locations in the 800-1100ms epoch, 
hits attracting over-estimated lag judgements were actually associated with marginally 
increased positivity, in comparison with accurate lag 5 judgements. This is not the 
case at posterior electrode sites, where once again correct lag 5 judgements were the 
most positive. However there was no support for differences across conditions in the 
statistical analyses. The under-estimated lag 25 condition was associated with more 
positive going waveforms than the correct 25 lag condition, which was held up by the 
statistical analysis.
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In the 300-500ms epoch, the magnitude of frontally distributed ERP old/new effects 
varied inversely with the lag judgment that was made to test items. In previous 
studies, greater relative positivity for old than for new items attracting correct 
judgments in recognition memory tasks has been interpreted as an index of familiarity 
(e.g. Azimian-Faridani & Wilding, 2006; Curran, 2000). By this account, the greater 
positivity for old in comparison to new items signals the increase in familiarity for this 
stimulus class that is engendered by exposure in a study phase. The sensitivity of this 
effect to a range of manipulations thought to change the familiarity of items is 
consistent with this account, and of particular importance here are findings that ERP 
old/new effects in this time-window at anterior locations vary according to perceived 
memory strength (Azimian-Faridani & Wilding, 2006; Woodruff et al., 2006). 
Alongside other data points (Curran, 2004; Curran et al., 2006), the findings of 
Azimian-Faridani et al. (2006) as well as Woodruff and colleagues (2006) support the 
view that ERPs at anterior scalp sites in the 300-500ms time-window index familiarity 
in a graded manner.
Hintzman has suggested that one of the processes that support recency judgments is 
the same strength-based process -  familiarity -  that also supports old/new recognition 
memory judgments (Hintzman, 2003). Familiarity is assumed to provide a basis for 
recency judgments in so far as the familiarity strength signal is employed 
heuristically, with high levels of familiarity signalling more recent events than low 
levels of familiarity. If the magnitude of the mid-frontal ERP old/new effect does in 
fact index familiarity in a graded manner, then the findings in this experiment -  an 
inverse relationship between the magnitude of this old/new effect and the associated 
recency judgment -  are consistent with Hintzman’s account, and at the same time
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provide data consistent with the familiarity account of the mid-frontal ERP old/new 
effect. Previous research demonstrating that familiarity declines more rapidly than 
recollection (Yonelinas & Levy, 2002) makes familiarity an especially strong 
contender for providing distance information over the short-term.
In line with the early time-window, there was some tentative support for the notion 
that larger ERP old/new effects in the 500-800ms epoch predicted shorter lag 
judgments than did smaller old/new effects. Positive-going ERP old/new effects, often 
with a left-parietal maximum, have been associated with the process of recollection 
(see Chapter 2, Wilding, 2000; Wilding & Rugg, 1996; Wilding & Sharpe, 2003). 
Evidence for this account comes from findings that the magnitude of the left-parietal 
ERP old/new effect varies according to the either the quality or quantity of task­
relevant information that is retrieved (Vilberg et al., 2006; Wilding, 2000). This 
suggests that recollection may also be employed in a strength-based manner to 
support JORs. However, stronger support for this would have been to demonstrate 
statistically that activity in posterior regions varied with JORs in this epoch.
The results of this experiment also suggest that recollection could be employed as a 
source of distance information, which is inconsistent with the suggestion by Curran 
and Friedman (2003; 2004) that recollection is associated solely with location-based 
processes. If recollection had been the basis of location information in this task, larger 
parietal old/new effects would be expected to uniformly accompany correct, rather 
than incorrect, lag judgments (a finding that has been obtained in some experiments 
where the focus has been on recovery of forms of contextual information other than 
time: e.g. Wilding, 1999; Wilding & Rugg, 1996). The data reported here are more
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consistent with the possibility that, if recency judgements are supported by 
recollection, then this is in a strength-based manner, which would correspond to the 
use of distance information according to Friedman’s (1993) framework. This is 
because activity in the time-window associated with this effect varied in magnitude 
across JORs, and since the magnitude of the left parietal old/new effect varied across 
time.
In one important study relevant to these views, Hintzman (2001) explored judgements 
of recency using a continuous recognition memory task where low frequency words 
were repeated after lags of 10,20, 30,40, 50, 60, 70 and 80 intervening items. 
Participants were required to make old/new recognition judgements in response to 
word stimuli in the continuous list. For items judged to be old (i.e. those recognised as 
being repeated in the experiment by participants), numerical JORs were also required. 
Before making the JORs, participants were also required to make an R/K judgement 
in order to report whether their old judgement had been based on recollection or 
familiarity (as in the R/K procedures identified in Chapter 1, p62).
In Hintzman’s study (2001), mean JOR decreased as a function of increasing lag, as 
did the proportion of accurate ‘olcT judgements. JORs for items judged familiar (as 
indexed by ‘know’, or ‘K’ responses) were longer on average than those judged to be 
recollected (‘remembered’, or ‘R’). Hintzman argued that this data suggests that uni­
dimensional strength does not account for recency judgements. However, the fact that 
participants were asked to make R/K judgements prior to making their JORs could 
have led to this result, in that participants adapted their numerical JORs in accordance 
with their R/K judgements (Hintzman, 2001). The current ERP experiment has the
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advantage of negating any requirement for participants to indicate whether they are 
recollecting or experiencing familiarity and so avoids the criticism that this prior 
judgement could influence subsequent JORs. The data reported in the current 
experiment provides additional support for the notion that both familiarity and 
recollection may underpin JORs in a continuous recency task.
Again a confidence or error related processing account for these ERP findings is 
thought to be unlikely in that a confidence effect that varies in a graded way, 
according to whether shorter or longer lag judgements (relative to a correct judgment) 
are made would suggest that confidence (or indeed error checking) would decrease 
with increasing lag. There is no reason to expect that greater errors or less confidence 
would be associated with items thought to be recently experienced. Further discussion 
of these issues is presented in the General Discussion (Chapter 7).
In summary, the data presented in this experiment has provided further evidence that 
ERP old/new effects in the early and middle epochs diminish with increasing lag, and 
that in all time-windows, the activity associated with shorter JORs was largely more 
positive-going, compared to activity associated with longer JORs. These findings will 
be discussed further in the General Discussion (Chapter 7). The following chapter 
contains a report of the outcomes of a series of behavioural experiments that were 
conducted to uncover further information regarding these issues. Experiment 3 
revealed that familiarity and recollection are likely to be utilised by participants for 
their JORs, but a limitation of this experiment is that ERPs were formed for an under­
estimation of a lag (25) or an over-estimation of a lag (5), and not both for the same 
lag. Another limitation is that only tentative support for the fact recollection varied
194
inversely with increasing JORs was obtained in Experiment 3 -  possibly because 
ERPs are not sensitive enough to capture the very small differences in this kind of 
strength that may exist between memories formed very close together in time. 
Attempts to form ERP waveforms for correct, under- and over-estimates for a single 
lag in Experiments 1 and 2 did not lead to findings that were easily interpreted (for 
possible explanations, see Chapters 3 and 4). For these reasons, it was decided that a 
fruitful approach would be to conduct several behavioural experiments, in order to 
provide more evidence for the ways in which different memory processes and types 
are used by participants when making recency judgments.
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CHAPTER 6 -  BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES
Famous Experiments Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, when making judgements about the recency of an item in 
memory, it could be that participants utilise what Friedman (1993) referred to as 
distance information. This kind of information is obtained via processes that occur 
following memory encoding, the most prominent of which is the fact that memory 
traces decay. As a result, the strength of a memory might be employed as a basis for 
recency judgments (Hinrichs, 1970). Hintzman (2001; 2003; 2005) has conducted a 
series of studies on recency judgements, which all involved a continuous memory task 
adapted from that of Yntema and Trask (1963). In these tasks, participants are usually 
presented with a long list of items one at a time. Items are represented in the list after 
different numbers of intervening items. After each item is presented, participants 
make a recognition judgement (i.e. new or old item), followed by a judgement of 
recency for items they had classified as being repeated.
Typical continuous recency tasks are thought to be free of contextual landmarks 
(Hintzman, 2001), unlike tasks that involve study listl/list2 divisions, which would 
provide information relating to source that people could use to make judgements 
about time under different circumstances. In a task where there are two study phases, 
followed by a test phase, participants could make recency judgements based on 
location information (contextual retrieval), e.g. they might know that ‘SPATULA’ 
occurred before ‘SPIDER’ simply because they knew study list 1 occurred before 
study list 2. In a long continuous list of words like that of the continuous recency task
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employed by Hintzman, it is less likely that people would make broad contextual 
associations such as these for JORs.
Furthermore, since continuous memory tasks comprise a single long list of words 
(typically between 400-800 items) with lags of up to 80 items, it is also unlikely that 
participants are using relative information to chronologically reorganize the items 
studied (for a full discussion of this topic, see Chapter 1). For example, when 
presented with the word ‘SPATULA’, in making a recency judgement it is unlikely 
participants recall each item between first and second presentation. Hintzman’s (2004) 
research supports the idea that any form of re-ordering or reference to a large number 
of intervening items is unlikely. In this study participants performed the continuous 
memory task under ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ conditions, where the time duration between 
trials was varied between 500ms and 2500ms. Time passage, rather than the number 
of intervening items, was the basis of recency decisions in this task (since the number 
of intervening items was constant across blocks, but JORs varied between them). This 
suggests that carrying out chronological re-organization is unlikely to be the basis of 
recency judgements in continuous memory tasks of this type, because performance 
did not depend upon the number of items to be ordered but on the time between 
presentation and re-presentation.
It is probable that, in this type of continuous memory task, distance information (in 
the form of a strength assessment of memory traces) is available to participants and 
that this is the form of information utilised when making JORs. This notion is 
supported by previous work conducted by Hintzman. In 2003, employing the 
continuous memory task with lags of 5,10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 intervening items,
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Hintzman showed that low frequency words attracted shorter JORs than high 
frequency words. Hintzman also demonstrated that pictures attracted shorter lag 
judgements than words (2005). Both types o f stimuli attracting the shorter lag 
judgments in these studies were also the categories associated with more accurate 
recognition performance and were therefore thought to have greater memory strength. 
Figure 24 shows how patterns of JOR might differ across strong and weak items. The 
key idea is that ‘stronger’ memories attract shorter lag judgements, and in this 
example this is evident at each lag -  although this may not always be the case.
WEAK
STRONG
Lag
Figure 24. JOR as a function of lag, based on memory strength (adapted from 
Hintzman, 2005).
Previous research (Chapter 5) implementing the continuous recency task and using 
ERPs to investigate the nature of JORs over lags of 5, 15 and 25, supports the idea
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that the strength of a memory trace is linked to the JOR it will attract. When items at 
lag 5 were over-estimated (attracting a JOR of 15), they were accompanied by less 
positive-going waveforms in comparison with accurate lag 5 judgements.
Furthermore, when lag 25 items were under-estimated, the waveforms were more 
positive-going than when the lag 25 items attracted a correct response. These results 
were found in both the 300-500ms (anterior locations) and the 500-800ms (anterior 
and posterior locations) time-windows. Neural activity in these time-windows and at 
these scalp locations has been associated with familiarity and recollection memory 
processes respectively. The results of this study suggested that both recollection and 
familiarity could be utilised when making JORs, and if so, they are both likely to be 
employed in a strength-based manner. The greater level of familiarity experienced, 
and/or the more information recollected, the shorter the JOR.
Reported in this behavioural section are experiments involving continuous recognition 
tasks with stimuli not before employed in published continuous recency memory 
tasks, namely famous and non-famous first and last (full) names. The stimuli chosen 
for this behavioural series were expected to have highly different levels of pre- 
experimental strength. This means that participants will experience relatively greater 
levels of memory strength upon seeing famous names for the first time in the 
experiment (since they will have been experienced in many pre-experimental 
settings), in comparison with non-famous names which will be associated with low 
memory strength (since these combinations of first & last name pairs are unlikely to 
have been experienced in any pre-experimental context).
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An advantage of using famous and non-famous names in this behavioural series is that 
they can ultimately be used to give a direct assessment of how pre-experimental levels 
of memory strength can predict lag judgements (this will be discussed in depth in 
Experiment 8, pages 234-246).
The first purely behavioural experiment (Experiment 4) was conducted to determine 
whether famous names do attract shorter JORs than non-famous names. Next in the 
behavioural series, manipulations thought to influence primarily familiarity or 
recollection were employed. Finally, an experiment was designed to assess whether 
pre-experimental levels of familiarity and recollection were related to JORs. Since 
famous names are expected to have a high level of pre-experimental memory strength, 
it was possible to use this feature in order to explore the nature of recency judgements 
further. In the final behavioural experiment, the level of memory strength for each 
famous name was measured before and after the continuous recognition and recency 
task. These measures of memory strength were then used to assess whether 
recollection and/or familiarity related to the JORs given by participants during the 
recency task.
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EXPERIMENT 4
Introduction
A long list of famous and non-famous names was rated in a prior experiment so that 
the most famous names (e.g. Bill Clinton, Julia Roberts) were included along with 
non-famous names (e.g. Jonny Butterfield, Lurline Newton) in a later continuous 
memory task. Famous names were expected to have a high level of memory strength 
and would perhaps be better recognised and attract shorter judgements of recency in 
comparison with non-famous names.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants aged between 18 and 22 years (mean age 19.1 years) took 
part in the experiment. Six participants were excluded on the basis of poor 
behavioural performance (hit rate below 50% for non-famous names). All participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision. Of those included, 2 were male and all were 
undergraduates at Cardiff University, each taking part in return for course credit. The 
participants reported speaking English as their native language. All participants gave 
informed consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was approved by the ethics 
committee of the School of Psychology, Cardiff University.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 292 first and last name pairs, half of which were famous (rated in a prior 
experiment -  see Appendix 3, p318). Non-famous names were taken from the 1990 
U.S. census. Famous names were taken from various celebrity database websites. The
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stimulus set was checked to ensure that close variants and highly similar names were 
excluded. Male names had an average of 11.4 letters and 3.6 syllables and female 
names an average of 12.0 letters and 4.1 syllables (matched across famous and non- 
famous names). There was one block per experiment which included 556 trials.
Within the experiment block there were 264 names, of which an equal number (44) 
were repeated after 5,10,15,20,25 and 30 intervening items. An equal number (22) 
of famous and non-famous names were repeated at each lag, half of which were male. 
A further 28 names, half of which were famous - and half were female - were 
included in the experiment to act as filler items. Six fillers were placed at the 
beginning of each list and the rest were placed towards the end of each experiment 
list, with the order of filler presentation in the list randomized according to condition. 
These items were not included in the experiment analysis. A total of 6 lists were 
created, so that across lists each name was presented at each lag (with 3 participants 
completing each list). Test lists were constructed by randomly assigning names as one 
of 6 lag item types. Items were then organised pseudo-randomly for each block. 
Stimuli were presented on a computer monitor. All stimuli were presented in 
uppercase size 40 Times New Roman font in white, set against a black background.
Procedure
Participants sat at a desk to perform this task. The participants read through an 
instruction sheet and the instructions were then relayed verbally. Each experiment 
block began with a ‘Ready’ signal, lasting 6000ms. Each trial began with a fixation 
mark (*) which lasted 500ms, followed by a blank screen (100ms). Names were then 
presented for 500ms, followed by a blank screen during which participants decided 
whether the name was old or new via key press (old/new was on the ‘0’ or ‘Del’
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button on the number section of the keyboard, counterbalanced across participants). 
Once this judgement had been made, a blank period of 1000ms passed before 
participants were presented with the words ‘How Far Back?’. If the participant had 
indicated the name was new, they were instructed to press the same key again at this 
point to carry on to the next trial. If they had indicated that the name was old, they 
were instructed to judge whether the name had initially been presented 5,10,15,20, 
25 or 30 intervening names previously. The six judgment of recency (JOR) options 
were made via six key buttons, with the buttons used for responses balanced across 
participants (so that buttons ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6 ’ on the number section of the 
keyboard represented either 5,10,15,20,25, 30 -  or -  30,25,20,15,10, 5 
respectively). The JOR was followed by a 500ms blank screen before the next trial. 
Participants were able to remind themselves of which keys to press throughout the 
experiment by looking at the keyboard on which the buttons were labelled. 
Participants were instructed to balance speed and accuracy equally. Participants were 
informed that there were an equal number of items at each lag. The experiment took 
40-50 minutes to complete.
Results
Behavioural Results Strategy
Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) corrections were used in the following analyses when it 
was necessary to correct for violations of sphericity. No reaction times were 
recorded, since this is not of critical interest for answering the main research 
questions. This mirrors the approach taken in relevant previous research (e.g. 
Hintzman, 2003).
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Recognition Memory
Discrimination is shown in Figure 25. The mean probability of a false alarm was .07 
for famous names (SD .09) and was .07 for non-famous names (SD .07). There were 
no reliable differences among these paired categories when using t-tests. Mean 
discrimination rates (hits minus false alarms) for famous and non-famous names were 
.85 (SD .10) and .62 (SD .15) respectively. Old/new discrimination of famous and 
non-famous names (p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably greater than chance (t( 17) 
>3.40;p<.01 in each case), with discrimination being greater for famous names (t( 17) 
= 7.27;p<0.001).
Fame
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Figure 25. Mean Discrimination (n=18).
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A 2x6 within subjects ANOVA on discrimination rates with factors of lag (5,10,15, 
20, 25 and 30) and fame (famous and non-famous) revealed a main effect of fame 
(F(l.0,17.0) = 43.37;p<0.001), and a main effect of lag (F(3.4,57.7) = 13.47;p<0.001). 
There was also a statistically reliable interaction between lag and fame (F(3.0,51.4) = 
4.49;p<0.01) which came about because discrimination is superior at all lags for 
famous names and decreases markedly with increasing lag for non-famous names 
only. Follow up paired t-tests revealed statistically reliable discrimination differences 
at each lag between famous and non-famous names (t(17) >3.73;p<0.01, in each 
case).
JOR
An illustration of the mean JORs for famous and non-famous names at each lag is 
provided in Figure 26 (p206). A within subjects ANOVA with the categories of fame 
and lag revealed a main effect of lag (F(3.4,57.1) = 172.76;p<0.001), and a main 
effect of fame (F(l.0,17.0) = 5.19;p< 0.05). There was also an interaction between lag 
and fame (F(3.7,62.8) = 3.09;p<0.05), which came about because at lags 5,10 and 20, 
famous names attracted shorter mean JORs. Follow up paired t-tests at each lag 
confirmed this; there was a difference between famous and non-famous names at lag 5 
(t(17) = -1.91;p<0.05), and reliable differences at lags 10 and 20 were also found 
(t( 17) >-2 .66;p<0.05 in each case), with famous names receiving the shorter mean 
JOR. There were no reliable differences according to fame at the remaining 3 lags.
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Figure 26. Mean Judgement of Recency (n=18).
Familywise Error Rate
An issue that has not been mentioned so far in the results is the one of familywise 
error rate. Due to the fact that multiple comparisons have been carried out above on 
the same dataset, this may appear to have caused an increase in the number of Type I 
errors (false positives). In order to control for this, it is often argued that a post-hoc 
test, such as a Bonferroni correction, should be carried out to adjust the significance 
levels o f multiple comparisons so that there is no overall increase in Type I errors 
across the family o f comparisons. In these experiments, however, it is not necessary to 
control for an increase in familywise error rate, or indeed any experiment carried out 
in the current research where t-tests are used to compare JORs at the same lags for 
significant differences (e.g. 5 vs.5, 15 vs. 15, etc). This is because an increase in Type 
I errors only occurs when multiple comparisons are made from the same family of
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data, or data where the independent variable and dependent variable are common (i.e. 
where the same data point is used in multiple comparisons). In the current work, 
because a within-subjects design is used, and the individual comparisons are across 
condition for the same lag, at no time are the same data points (or families of data) 
being used for multiple comparisons, and therefore there will be no increase in Type I 
error rates (Nakagawa, 2004, Cabin & Mitchell, 2000, Moran, 2003, Pemeger, 1998). 
These issues are also discussed in the General Discussion (Chapter 7, p286).
Discussion
This experiment was conducted to extend the generalizability of Hintzman’s finding 
that items which generate strong memories will attract shorter JORs than items which 
generate weak memories (e.g. Hintzman, 2003; 2005). This experiment was 
essentially a replication of Hintzman’s recency experiment with the exception that 
famous and non-famous names formed the strong and weak categories. It was 
expected that famous names would generate the equivalent of Hintzman’s ‘strong’ 
memory condition (e.g. similar to long study duration, concrete and low frequency 
items), and that non-famous names would be equivalent to ‘weak’ memory items (e.g. 
comparable to short study duration, abstract and high frequency items). The notion 
that famous names will lead to stronger memories is consistent with MEG research 
showing that famous names and faces lead to greater activation in the superior 
temporal gyrus (amongst other areas of the brain) in comparison with non-famous 
names and faces even before any memory processing can be carried out (Ryan et al., 
2008).
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The findings of this experiment were somewhat in line with these expectations. First, 
the level of discrimination for famous names was much higher than the level of 
recognition for non-famous names at every lag, consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Stenberg, Heilman, Johansson and Rosen, 2008; Traversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Differences in discrimination were greater than that demonstrated in the Hintzman 
work (2003; 2005), although recognition performance largely followed the same 
pattern, with recognition decreasing with increasing repetition interval, mainly for the 
weak category. The false alarms for non-famous names were in line with previous 
research using first non-famous female names, where in that study the non-famous 
names had false alarms of .8 compared to .4 for nouns (Hintzman, 2004). This 
finding, combined with those presented in this experiment, suggest that non-famous 
names are a relatively more difficult category than nouns or pictures in a memory 
task.
The main purpose of carrying out this experiment was to replicate Hintzman findings 
(2001; 2003) that items of high memory strength are associated with comparatively 
shorter lag judgements than low memory strength items. The old/new discrimination 
levels indicate that famous names are a stim u lu s category of relatively high memory 
strength, and that the non-famous name stimulus category is associated with relatively 
low memory strength. In terms of lag judgements, famous names attracted shorter 
judgements of recency than non-famous names. This experiment also provides further 
support for Hintzman’s (2005) view that weaker memories promote relatively longer 
lag judgements, consistent with the view that distance information (in the form of an 
assessment of memory strength) can be used for JORs at least under some 
circumstances.
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However, only the JORs at lags 5,10 and 20 were reliably different and this is where 
the current findings diverge from Hintzman’s (2005) where differences in JOR were 
found at every lag. Instead the data reported here is more in line with Hintzman’s 
earlier (2003) experiment, where judgements of recency did not differ with some 
manipulations at the longest lags. Further research is necessary to assess whether a 
lack of difference in JORs at lag 15 is a robust finding, since this was not expected. If 
found to be a consistent finding however, it could be some form of bias responding 
based on the lag being more towards the centre in the range of possible lags. It is also 
challenging that the lags at which there is the largest difference in old/new 
discrimination (25 and 30) are those at which there is no difference in mean JOR. One 
potential explanation is the following. If one assumes a common criterion for old/new 
recognition memory for famous and non-famous names, then the higher level of 
discrimination for famous names reflects the higher proportion that fall to the right of 
the criterion. If strength falls off with lag however, then it may be the case that at the 
longer lags the above criterion responses for famous as well as non-famous names are 
based on strength signals that are on average more similar than is the case at shorter 
lags. If this is correct, and if the same strength signal is employed in service of 
recency judgements, then this might explain the smaller divergences between recency 
judgements for famous and for non-famous names at the longer lags.
One point that may be worth mentioning here is how it can be reconciled that famous 
names are conceptualised as 'high strength’ in line with other stimuli such as low 
frequency words (Hintzman, 2001), whereas non-famous names are ‘low strength’ in 
line with words of high frequency (Hintzman, 2001). It is proposed in the current
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work that common words are low strength because they are everyday and are 
nondescript, whereas uncommon words are classified as high strength because they 
stand out as being more unusual. However while non-famous names are uncommon 
(in their current first and last name pairing), they are also considered to be low 
strength because compared to famous names, non-famous names are also nondescript. 
Although famous names (e.g. Hugh Hefner, Susan Sarandon) are high frequency, due 
to our pre-existing knowledge of them, they are distinctive compared to the less 
common (in these pair combinations), but lower strength non-famous names (e.g. 
Nathan Smith, Mary Lewis). Whether an item can be classed as low strength or high 
strength will depend on the type of stimuli used in the task, and not simply the 
uncommonness of the stimuli per se. For example, if pictures of famous faces were to 
be introduced into the recency task used in this experiment, it is highly possible that 
famous names would become ‘middle strength’, alongside the pictures (high strength) 
and the non-famous names (low strength). The classification of the stimuli in terms of 
strength is relative within task and they are not directly comparable across different 
tasks.
Item salience has long been implicated in the memorability of items, since salient 
items (for example, any item that has more significance to an individual for whatever 
reason, e.g. a name that is similar to their own name, or the stimulus evokes personal 
feelings or memories, etc) are more likely to capture greater attention and more 
processing (Hunt, 2006) that will be likely to enhance memory strength. Recent 
findings that controlled for the distinctiveness of emotional pictures led to their being 
as equally memorable as neutral pictures, negating their prior advantage (Talmi, Luk, 
McGarry & Moscovitch, 2006). Brandt, Gardiner and Macrae also found that name
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distinctiveness (as rated by participants) led to superior memory, even when the 
number of distinctive and typical names was equivalent (2006). Recent evidence also 
suggests that the distinctiveness effect in low vs. high frequency items is carried by 
familiarity, since the putative ERP correlate of familiarity was greater for uncommon 
rather than common names -  with the former category being more memorable (e.g. 
Stenberg et al., 2008). These studies suggest that distinctive or salient items are of 
high memory strength.
The key point is that these results suggest that the use of famous and non-famous 
names could be fruitful for identifying the potential contributions of recollection and 
familiarity to JORs as described in the introduction of this chapter. The next research 
question of interest following from this experiment is whether familiarity is 
responsible for the shorter JORs in the famous name condition. It is possible that since 
famous names have a higher pre-experimental level of familiarity, this causes them to 
attract shorter JORs than non-famous names on some occasions. If this is correct, then 
the divergences between the JORs should be attenuated if the pre-experiment 
familiarity of the non-famous names is manipulated.
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EXPERIMENT 5
Introduction
In Experiment 5, participants were presented with two study phases before taking part 
in an identical continuous memory task as has been used in Experiment 4. During the 
study phases, rote repetition (a shallow encoding task) was used for the non-famous 
names only. Famous names were not presented before the continuous memory task. 
This experiment was designed in order to increase the pre-experimental familiarity 
levels of the non-famous names.
Previous research has shown that repeated presentation of stimuli in a shallow 
encoding task leads to changes in the levels of familiarity but has less of an effect on 
recollection (Dobbins, Kroll, & Yonelinas, 2004). Therefore this manipulation was 
expected to elevate recognition memory accuracy for the non-famous names, due to 
increased levels of familiarity. In terms of JORs, this manipulation should lead to a 
reduction in the size of the difference between JORs for famous and for non-famous 
names in comparison to the differences observed in Experiment 4. This will be the 
case if pre-experimental familiarity is the strength-based process supporting JORs and 
the process responsible for the fact that famous names in Experiment 4 attracted 
shorter JORs than non-famous names at some lags.
212
Method
The method for Experiment 5 was identical to that for Experiment 4 with the 
exception of the following:
Participants
Twenty-five participants aged between 18 and 21 years (mean age 19.2 years) took 
part in the experiment. Three participants were excluded because they did not 
understand instructions and a further three participants were excluded because of poor 
behavioural performance (hit rate less than 50% of non-famous names). Two were 
excluded as extreme outliers using SPSS box plot (more than 3 box lengths from 75th 
and 25th percentile). Of those included, 3 were male.
Procedure
The participants took part in 3 phases, the final phase being the continuous 
recognition memory task detailed in Experiment 4. In the first phase, participants 
were presented with the non-famous names in a random order. Each non-famous 
name was viewed for two seconds on the computer monitor with names presented 
sequentially. For each name presented, participants were asked to type the initials of 
the name during a 1.5 second interval. Once they had finished this phase, participants 
were given a two minute break. Phase 2 was identical to phase 1, with the exception 
that the non-famous names were presented in a different random order. Before phase 
3, participants were given a second break of 2 minutes. Before beginning the final 
phase, participants were reminded to only press the ‘old* key if seeing an item for the 
second time in phase 3 only. The entire experiment took 60-70 minutes to complete.
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Results
Recognition Memory
Recognition memory performance is shown in Figure 27 (p215). The mean 
probability of a false alarm was .03 for famous names (SD .02) and was .10 for non- 
famous names (SD .08). The level of false alarms was higher for the non-famous 
condition (t(17) = -4.19;p<0.01). Mean discrimination rates (p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) 
for famous and non-famous names were .89 (SD .05) and .62 (SD .10) respectively 
and were reliably greater than chance (t( 17) >25.72;p<.001 in each case). A paired t- 
test revealed a reliable difference between these categories (t(17) = 11.64;p<.001) 
with discrimination being greater for famous names. A 2x6 within participants 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of fame (F(l.0,17.0) = 134.99;p<0.001) as expected. 
There was also a main effect of lag (F(3.78,64.33) = 10.619;p<0.001) which came 
about because the level of recognition decreased as a function of increasing lag (to a 
greater extent in the non-famous name condition). Finally, there was a statistically 
reliable interaction between lag and fame (F(4.2,70.93) = 5.76;p<0.001), which came 
about because discrimination decreases markedly with increasing lag for non-famous 
names only. Follow up paired t-tests revealed statistically reliable differences at each 
lag between famous and non-famous names (t(17) >6.33;p<0.001, in each case).
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Figure 27. Mean Discrimination (n=18).
JOR
An illustration of the mean JORs for items presented at each lag is provided in Figure 
28 (p216). A 2x6 within subjects ANOVA with the categories of fame and lag 
revealed a main effect o f lag (F(3.0,50.5) = 133.48;p<0.001) which came about 
because the JORs increased with lag, and a main effect of fame (F(1.0,17.0) = 5.71 ;p< 
0.05), which came about because famous names tended to receive shorter lag 
judgements. There was also an interaction between lag and fame (F(4.0,67.3) = 
3.65;p<0.05) which came about because only at lags 5, 10 and 20 did famous names 
attract shorter mean JORs. Follow up paired t-tests confirmed this as there were 
differences between famous and non-famous names at lag 5 (t( 17) = -2.08;p<0.05),
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and at lags 10 and 20 (t( 17) >-3.17;p<0.01 in each case), with famous names 
receiving the shorter mean JOR.
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Figure 28. Mean Judgement o f Recency (n=18).
Discussion
Experiment 5 was conducted in an attempt to uncover the reasons for the shorter lag 
judgements in Experiment 4, where famous names were found to attract shorter lag 
judgements than non-famous names. This experiment was fundamentally a replication 
of Experiment 4 using famous and non-famous names in a continuous memory task, 
with the exception that there was an initial study phase with non-famous names only 
and a shallow encoding task.
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As was described in Chapter 1 (p57), familiarity is an acontextual strength-based 
signal that may lead to judgements of recognition (e.g. Yonelinas, 2002). A strength- 
based assessment of familiarity, if utilised for recency judgements, would fall under 
the bracket of distance information according to the Friedman (1993) framework of 
memory for time. It was reasoned that non-famous names would have an increase in 
their level of pre-test familiarity because of the encoding manipulation in this 
experiment. It was argued that familiarity rather than recollection would be increased, 
because rote repetition in combination with shallow encoding tasks has been shown to 
influence familiarity to a greater degree than recollection (Dobbins et al., 2004; Rugg, 
et al., 1998). If familiarity is the basis for memory strength (categorised as a potential 
source of distance information), then it could be expected that differences between 
JORs across fame conditions would be reduced in this experiment in comparison to 
the findings in the previous experiment.
Recognition memory accuracy in Experiment 5 was highly similar to that of 
Experiment 4, with recognition of famous names being much higher than the level of 
recognition for non-famous names at every lag. Differences in recognition levels were 
again greater than that demonstrated in the Hintzman work (2003; 2005), though 
recognition performance largely followed the same pattern, decreasing with 
increasing repetition interval largely for the weak category only. In contrast with the 
predictions, discrimination was not improved for the non-famous names compared to 
the previous experiment. Thus if pre-experimental levels of familiarity were increased 
by the manipulation for this category, it was not reflected in discrimination. The 
findings in this experiment showed that famous names attract shorter lag judgements 
than non-famous names at a range of lags. The outcomes reported here showed that
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again lags 5,10 and 20 were reliably different, in line with Hintzman’s (2003) 
experiment, where judgements of recency did not differ at the longest lags.
The outcomes of this experiment indicate that the strength manipulation did not have 
any effect on either the level of discrimination, or more importantly, on the JORs. Still 
there were reliable differences between the JORs for famous and non-famous names, 
with famous names attracting shorter recency judgements across a range of lags. This 
is the same pattern of judgements found in the previous study. The findings in respect 
to the recognition and JOR data suggest that either the level of familiarity was not 
raised to a great enough extent to influence subsequent judgements in the recency 
task, or that familiarity is not employed as a form of distance information when 
making JORs of this nature.
The finding that lags 25 and 30 were not reliably different in the two experiments 
reported here is consistent with the finding of Hintzman (2005) that mean JORs for 
different stimulus classes vary minimally at the longest lags. It could be that a strength 
form of distance information is not sufficient for JORs at longer lags, accounting for 
the lack of JOR differentiation here. Alternatively, it could be the case that no 
difference between lag judgements at the two longest lags was caused by lack of 
statistical power -  where discrimination levels meant fewer trial numbers were 
included in these contrasts. That there was a lack of a difference at lag 15 in both 
behavioural experiments reported here is surprising. This appears to be due to an 
increase in the JOR given to famous names at this lag which is not in line with the 
overall trend for famous names. It is possible that this reflects a bias response for
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participants in terms of JOR. Since this is a ‘middle’ lag, it is possible that participants 
default to either a 15 or 25 response to lag 15 items.
The next research question of interest following from this experiment is whether 
recollection is responsible for the shorter JORs in the famous name condition in 
Experiments 4 and 5. It is possible that since famous names have a higher pre- 
experimental level of contextual information associated with them, this causes them to 
attract shorter JORs than non-famous names on some occasions. In this way the 
memory process of recollection would be used in a strength-based manner for recency 
judgements. This possibility was tested in Experiment 6 , as detailed below.
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EXPERIMENT 6
Introduction
Though an increase in the familiarity of the non-famous items was expected in 
Experiment 5, the participants’ JORs followed the same patterns as in Experiment 4. 
It is possible, therefore, that an increase in pre-experimental contextual information 
may be the key factor leading to shorter JORs for famous names, rather than prior 
levels of familiarity. This account is in line with some previous research, where 
contextual information rather than rote repetition influences the accuracy of recency 
judgements (Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998). Experiment 6 was conducted to explore 
the possibility that increasing the available pre-experimental contextual information 
for an item leads to a shorter JOR for that item, in line with a distance account of 
recency judgements (Friedman, 1993, 2001).
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiments 4 and 5, with the following exceptions: 
Participants
Twenty-four participants aged between 18 and 24 years (mean age 20.1 years) took 
part in the experiment. Two participants did not understand the task and four 
participants performed too poorly (hit rate below 50% for non-famous names); 
therefore these participants were excluded. Of those included, 2 were male and each 
participant took part in return for £5.
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Procedure
The participants took part in 3 experiment phases, with the final phase being the 
continuous memory task described in Experiment 4. In the first phase, participants 
were presented with the non-famous names in a random order. Each non-famous 
name was viewed for two seconds on the computer monitor with names presented 
sequentially. For each name presented, participants were asked to type press the ‘z’ 
key if the name sounded like it might belong to a circus performer; or to press the *?’ 
key if the name sounded like it might belong to a librarian (keys counterbalanced 
across participants). Participants had 1.5 seconds between names to complete this 
study task. Once they had finished this phase, participants were given a two minute 
break. Phase 2 was identical to phase 1, with the exception that the non-famous names 
were presented in a different random order. Before phase 3, participants were given 
another break of 2 minutes. Before beginning the final phase, participants were 
reminded to press the ‘old* key only if seeing an item for the second time in phase 3. 
The entire experiment took 60-70 minutes to complete.
Results
Recognition Memory
Discrimination performance is shown in Figure 29 (p222). The mean probability of a 
false alarm was .04 for famous names (SD .04) and was .11 for non-famous names 
(SD .07). There were reliable differences across fame in the level of false alarms 
(t( 17) = -4.23;p<0.01). Mean discrimination rates for famous and non-famous names 
were .82 (SD .15) and .61 (SD .10) respectively. Old/new discrimination for famous 
and non-famous names (p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably greater than chance 
(t( 17) >13.09;p<.001 at each lag).
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Figure 29. Mean Discrimination (n=18).
A 2x6 within subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of fame (F(1.0,17.0) = 
99.92;p<0.001) and there was also a main effect of lag (F(3.8,65.3) = 10.3 l;p<0.001), 
which came about because the overall level of recognition decreased as a function of 
increasing lag. There was also a statistically reliable interaction between lag and fame 
(F(3.9,65.5) = 3.95;p<0.01) which came about because recognition memory accuracy 
decreased with increasing lag at a greater rate for non-famous than for famous names.
JOR
An illustration of the JORs is provided in Figure 30 (p223). A 2x6 within subjects 
ANOVA with the categories of fame and lag revealed a main effect of lag (F(2.7,45.2) 
= 117.51;p<0.001), which came about because JOR increased as a function of 
increasing lag. There was no main effect o f fame in this experiment. There was an
2 2 2
interaction between lag and fame (F(3.5,59.7) = 5.75;p<0.001), which came about 
because famous names attracted shorter lag judgements at 2 lags only. Follow up 
paired t-tests revealed reliable differences across fame at lag 10 (t( 17) = -2.92;p<0.05) 
and at lag 20 (t( 17) = -2.19;p<0.05) with famous names receiving the shorter mean 
JOR in both cases.
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Figure 30. Mean Judgements of Recency (n=18).
Discussion
Experiment 6 was conducted in an attempt to uncover the reasons for the shorter lag 
judgements in the previous two experiments, where famous names were found to 
attract shorter lag judgements than non-famous names. This experiment was very
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similar to Experiment 4 with famous and non-famous names presented in a 
continuous memory task, with the exception that there was an initial study phase with 
non-famous names only. The study phase was designed to encourage deep encoding 
of the non-famous names. Asking whether a name sounds more like a circus 
performer or a librarian was intended to encourage conceptual processing to a greater 
degree than the manipulation that was employed in Experiment 5. It was anticipated 
that this deep encoding manipulation would enhance the level of contextual 
information available for these names at retrieval, in line with other deep encoding 
manipulations (e.g. Rugg et al., 1998).
As was described in Chapter 1 (p57), recollection is thought to be a memory process 
that indexes recovery of contextual information (Yonelinas, 2002). In this way, the 
volume (or strength) of that contextual retrieval might be used for JORs. If evidence 
was found to support this notion, then recollection would also fall under the bracket of 
distance information according to the Friedman (1993) categorization. It was reasoned 
that non-famous names would be more likely to elicit recollection at retrieval in this 
experiment, because of this ‘deep’ encoding manipulation, than they would in either 
Experiments 4 or 5. The prediction that follows from this is similar to that for 
Experiment 5. If the degree to which recollection is available forms the basis of JORs 
in a strength-based manner, then it would be expected that differences between JORs 
across fame conditions would be smaller in this experiment than in Experiment 4.
The recognition performance in this experiment was highly similar to that of 
Experiment 5, with recognition of famous names being much higher than the level of 
recognition for non-famous names at every lag. JORs across fame differed at only two
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lags. As for Experiment 5, therefore, these findings add little information about the 
processes supporting JORs, because while the pattern of reliable effects is not 
identical, it is broadly similar, again suggesting that either the experiment 
manipulation was not sufficiently strong, or that the processes influenced by the 
manipulation had little effect on the JORs.
Other research involving continuous recognition tasks have also failed to increase the 
availability of recollection through deep encoding (Jones & Atchley, 2007). In that 
research, participants were presented with a long list of items and an old/new 
recognition judgement was to be made in response to each word presented. The lags 
were 1, 5 and 20 intervening items in that experiment, and repeated items were either 
identical (e.g. Mother ► Mother) or were lure words (e.g. Blackbird ► Jailbird). 
Across experiments, participants continued to make more errors (i.e. accepting lure 
words as being old) at shorter lags despite attempts to enhance the use of recollection 
(which should decrease error rates). Manipulations included providing more time for 
encoding of the words and providing participants with feedback. Familiarity was 
thought to cause the pattern of error rates in this instance, since the error rates follow 
forgetting rates for familiarity (Jones & Atchley, 2007). Thus in the current 
experiment, the attempt to increase the availability or use of recollection appears to 
have failed.
Since in this experiment the pattern of JORs was very similar, it was possible that 
either the experiment manipulation was not sufficiently strong, or that the processes 
influenced by the manipulation had little effect on the JORs. The former possibility is 
thought to be reasonable in that the effects of the manipulations may be obscured
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because the contrast is between famous and non-famous names, rather than between 
the same class of stimuli that differ only according to whether they were encountered 
in a prior study phase. In this way it is possible that famous names are so strong due to 
years (in some cases) of prior exposure that non-famous names cannot be brought in 
line with this strength under these circumstances. Experiment 7 was designed to 
investigate this possibility.
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EXPERIMENT 7
Introduction
To shed light on the findings in the previous behavioural experiments, the following 
experiment was devised. Though an increase in the familiarity of the non-famous 
items was expected in Experiment 5, the participants’ JORs followed the same 
patterns as Experiment 4. It is possible that the manipulations in the two previous 
experiments failed to have any effect on memory strength. Experiment 7 was 
conducted to explore this possibility by comparing recency judgements of previously 
studied (prior to being presented in the continuous recency memory task) non-famous 
names, to non-famous names which had not been studied.
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiment 5, with the following exceptions: 
Participants
Twenty-one participants aged between 18 and 24 years (mean age 20.1 years) took 
part in the experiment. One participant was excluded because they failed to 
understand the task, another two were excluded as outliers in the statistical analysis in 
the same way as Experiment 6 . Of those included, 1 was male, each taking part in 
return for £5.
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Stimuli
132 male non-famous names and 132 female non-famous names were used in this 
experiment (rated in a previous experiment -  see Appendix 3, p318). An equal 
number (11) of female and male names were allocated to one of the 6 lags. 50% of the 
names were allocated as being ‘Prior Study’ items, 50% were allocated as being ‘No 
Prior Study’ items -  an equal number at each lag.
Procedure
The participants took part in 3 experimental phases, with the final phase being the 
continuous memory task described in Experiment 4 (except that only non-famous 
names were included, 50% of which were studied prior to the recency task). In the 
first phase, participants were presented with half of the non-famous names in a 
random order (an equal number of male and female and an equal number to be 
presented subsequently at each lag). Each of these ‘prior study’ non-famous names 
was viewed for two seconds on the computer monitor with names presented 
sequentially. For each name presented, participants were asked to type the initials of 
the name during the blank interval. They had 1.5 seconds between names to complete 
this study task. Once finished this phase, participants were given a two minute break. 
Phase 2 was identical to phase 1, with the exception that the ‘prior study’ non-famous 
names were presented in a different random order. Before phase 3, participants were 
given another break of 2 minutes. Before beginning the final phase, participants were 
reminded to only press the old key if seeing an item for the second time in phase 3 
only. The entire experiment took 60-70 minutes to complete.
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Results
Recognition Memory
Recognition performance is shown in Figure 31. The mean probability of a false 
alarm was .06 for names with no prior study (SD .04) and was .18 names that had 
been studied in advance of the recency task (SD .10). There were also reliable 
differences across condition in the level of false alarms (t( 17) = -6.62;p<0.001). Mean 
hit rates (minus false alarms) for studied and non-studied names were .65 (SD .17) 
and .63 (SD .16) respectively. Old/new discrimination of studied and non-studied 
names (p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably greater than chance (t( 17) >12.90;p<.001 
at each lag).
Study Status 
Prior Study 
No Rior Study0.9-
ffl °-7-
0 .6 -
0.5-
20 25 305 10 15
Lag
Figure 31. Mean Discrimination (n=18).
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A 2x6 within subjects ANOVA revealed no main effect of study condition. There 
was a main effect of lag (F(3.8,64.6) = 8.75;p<0.001), which came about because the 
level of recognition largely decreased as a function of increasing lag in both 
conditions.
JOR
An illustration of the JORs is provided in Figure 32. A 2x6 within subjects ANOVA 
with the categories of study condition and lag revealed a main effect of lag 
(F(3.6,61.1) = 142.23;p<0.001), which came about because JOR increased as a 
function of increasing lag. There was no main effect o f study condition in this 
experiment.
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Figure 32. Mean Judgements o f Recency (n=18).
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Discussion
Experiment 7 was conducted in order to try to uncover the reasons for the lack of 
pattern change in the lag judgements found the previous two experiments. This 
experiment was adapted from the task used in Experiment 5, with the exception that 
only non-famous names were used in the continuous recency memory task. In the 
study phase, it was expected that half of the non-famous names from the recency task 
would be shallowly encoded. It was reasoned that studied non-famous names would 
become ‘strong’ in terms of familiarity. If studied non-famous names became ‘strong’ 
in this experiment, and if this form of strength is the basis of JORs, then it would be 
expected that differences between JORs across study conditions would be found in 
line with a distance account of recency (Friedman, 1993; 2001).
The recognition memory performance in this experiment demonstrated that as lag 
increased, discrimination diminished for both types of non-famous name. This finding 
is in line with the previous reported experiments, with the trend lines highly similar to 
those for the non-famous names in previous experiments. The markedly higher rate of 
false alarms for the studied category of non-famous names indicated that familiarity 
levels had been raised by the study manipulation (Wolk et al., 2006). In terms of JOR 
however, names studied in advance of the continuous memory task did not attract 
shorter lag judgements than non-famous names which had not been studied. When 
follow up t-tests were conducted (in light of the findings in the previous two 
experiments which justified this analysis), JORs did not differ at any lag.
There are at least two possible reasons for this pattern of findings. It is possible that 
memory strength (in the form of familiarity) is used for making recognition and
231
recency judgements, but that the manipulation in this experiment was not sufficient to 
demonstrate this influence here. Evidence to suggest that this is a reasonable 
consideration can be established by looking at the false alarm data. Participants did 
make more false alarms for prior study items, compared to no prior study items. This 
suggests that familiarity was increased at least to some extent (Yonelinas, 2002), 
leaving open the possibility that this increase was just not sufficient to influence the 
levels of discrimination or the lag judgements. It is also possible however, (and 
entirely consistent with the findings in Experiment 5) that familiarity is not the basis 
for JORs in this task, or for these kinds of stimuli. In order to investigate these issues 
further, Experiment 8 was devised.
The next step in this series of experiments was to assess in a different way whether 
memory strength in terms of recollection is related to judgements of recency. After 
the results of Experiment 4 were obtained, the aim in Experiments 5 and 6 was to 
employ manipulations of recollection and familiarity that might bring the judgements 
of recency for the non-famous names in line with those of the famous names, and if 
successful, this could have shed light on the processes supporting JORs. A related 
approach is to focus on the strength levels of the famous names.
As was outlined in the introduction of this chapter, one benefit of using famous and 
non-famous names is that the level of strength varies across participants according to 
the name. For example, one is likely to recognise both Julia Roberts and Michael 
Owen -  both examples from the high strength famous name category of stimuli. 
However, it is still possible to have a variation in the level of memory strength (in 
terms of familiarity or recollection) within the high strength category. These
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properties of names can be employed to provide insights into how memory strength 
influences JORs in continuous recency memory tasks in line with a distance account 
of recency memory (for a review, Friedman 1993; 2001).
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EXPERIMENT 8
Introduction
An experiment conducted by Brown et al. (1985) provided evidence to suggest that 
memory strength predicts recency judgements. In this study participants were 
presented with a series of public events and were asked to demonstrate their level of 
knowledge about each event. A second set of participants were then asked to provide 
a rating of how long ago these events had occurred. The results of this study 
suggested that the level of knowledge was more related to recency judgements than 
was the actual date of the event (Brown et al., 1985).
The aim of Experiment 8 was to investigate the reasons for Experiment 4, where 
famous names attracted shorter lag judgements than non-famous names in a 
continuous recency memory task. Rather than attempting to artificially manipulate the 
strength levels of the non-famous names (as had been done across Experiments 5-7), 
the aim here was to assess the pre-experimental levels of memory strength for the 
famous names. Though the famous names used in this series of behavioural 
experiments had been previously rated as being highly recognisable in comparison 
with non-famous names, the level of knowledge participants have for each name may 
vary. For example, one might recognise the name ‘Frank Sinatra’ and know that this 
man is highly famous, but in actual fact, one might know much more about the name 
‘Julia Roberts’. This could be the basis of a continuum of memory strength. A famous 
name could be highly familiar, could elicit the recovery of many semantic facts, and 
could elicit the recovery of more contextual episodic information during recollection.
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These separately or in combination could be the basis of judgements of recency, or at 
least be contributing factors.
Using famous and non-famous names, it was therefore possible to assess the level of 
strength for famous names prior to the continuous recency memory task. Participants 
were asked to provide an indication of their memory strength for each famous name in 
terms of facts on the day before the continuous recency memory task, along with a 
famous name fame rating (immediately after the continuous recency memory task). It 
was expected that memory strength assessed in these ways would be related to the 
recency judgements of the famous names.
Method
The method for Experiment 8 was identical to that for Experiment 4, with the 
exception of the following:
Participants
Twenty-three participants aged between 19 and 30 years (mean age 21.2 years) took 
part in the experiment. Three participants were excluded because they did not perform 
well enough (hit rate below 50% for non-famous names), and a further two were 
excluded because they failed to complete the study task. Of those included, 9 were 
male. Participants were paid £15 for taking part in this experiment.
Stimuli
In the first phase of the experiment, there was what can be regarded as a deep 
encoding task with famous names. These were presented in a random order for each
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participant on an Excel spreadsheet. In the top row of the spreadsheet were the famous 
names (one in each column). Beneath the top row were ten rows of blank cells. 
Beneath these rows on the spreadsheet, there was a duplication of that described, 
except that the stimuli were place names (e.g. France, Rwanda, etc).
Procedure
The participants took part in 3 phases, the second phase being the continuous 
recognition and recency task detailed in Experiment 4. In the first phase, participants 
were presented with the famous names in a random order. Participants were asked to 
type bullet point facts which they could recall about each person name on the list. 
Participants were asked to type a maximum of 10 facts (one in each cell beneath the 
name) and were asked to spend no more than 60 seconds on each name. Participants 
were asked to fill out the cells corresponding to the place name only in the event that 
they did not recognise the person name (this was done to prevent participants skipping 
names to finish the task more quickly). Once finished this phase, participants were 
asked to return the following day, and not attempt to recover any further information 
about the famous names on the list before their return.
Phase 2 was identical to Experiment 4 and was completed 24 hours after the start of 
phase 1. Following phase 2, participants were asked to complete phase 3. Here 
participants were presented with the list of famous names in random order on an 
Excel spreadsheet and were asked to give a rating for each name on a scale of 1-6, the 
scale denoting how strongly they recognised the name. The scale went from 1 (highly 
recognise) to 6 (I do not recognise). Participants were asked to base these ratings on
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their personal semantic knowledge. The entire session took 50-60 minutes to complete 
on day 2 and 110-130 minutes on day 1.
Results
Recognition Memory
Discrimination is shown in Figure 33. The mean probability of a false alarm was .04 
for famous names (SD .04) and was .07 for non-famous names (SD .06). There were 
reliable differences across fame in the level of false alarms (t( 17) = -2.25;p<0.05), 
with this being marginally greater in the non-famous condition. Mean discrimination 
(hits minus false alarms) for famous and non-famous names was .86 (SD .11) and .61 
(SD .13) respectively. Old/new discrimination for famous and non-famous names 
(p[hit] -  p[false alarm]) was reliably greater than chance (t( 17) >10.10;p<.001 at each 
lag).
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Figure 33. Mean Discrimination (n=18).
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A 2x6 within subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of fame (F(1.0,17.0) = 
64.09;p<0.001), which came about because famous names were recognised to a 
greater degree. There was also a main effect of lag (F(4.0,67.8) = 10.33;p<0.001), 
which came about because the level of recognition largely decreased as a function of 
increasing lag in both conditions. There was also a statistically reliable interaction 
between lag and fame (F(3.4,58.1) = 5.86;p<0.01) which came about because 
recognition decreased with increasing lag to a greater extent in the non-famous 
condition. Follow up paired t-tests revealed statistically reliable differences at each 
lag between famous and non-famous names (t( 17) > 5.22;p<0.001, in each case).
JOR
An illustration of the JORs is provided in Figure 34 (p239). A 2x6 within subjects 
ANOVA with the categories of fame and lag revealed a main effect of fame 
(F(l.0,17.0) = 5.37;p<0.05), which came about because famous names attracted 
relatively shorter lag judgements than the non-famous names. There was also a main 
effect of lag (F(3.0,51.6) = 192.15;p<0.001), which came about because JOR 
increased with increasing lag. There was also an interaction between lag and fame 
(F(3.6,60.6) = 3.33;p<0.05). Follow up paired t-tests revealed reliable differences 
across fame condition at lag 5 (t( 17) = -2.49;p<0.05); and at lag 10 (t( 17) = - 
3.84;p<0.001) and at lag 20 (t( 17) = -1.87;p<0.05) with famous names receiving the 
shorter mean JOR in all cases.
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Figure 34. Mean Judgements o f Recency (n=18).
Fact Recall and Fame Rating
The mean number of facts recalled across participants was 4.03 (range 1-10; SD = 
2.40) and the mean fame rating given was 2.42 (range 1-6; SD = 1.44). To assess 
whether the level of fact recall and the fame ratings given by participants were 
meaningful, a correlation analysis was conducted to assess whether these dependent 
v ariables were related. There was a negative correlation between the number of facts 
recalled for a name and the fame rating given for that name (r = -.39, n=18, p<0.001). 
This shows that as the rating given for a famous name decreased, the number of facts 
recalled for that famous name increased. This suggests that participants were 
consistent when asked to demonstrate their level of knowledge for each famous name
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(since a rating of 1 meant the name was recognised to the greatest degree, and a high 
level of fact recall indicated high levels of name recognition).
Since there was evidence to suggest that fact recall and fame rating were treated 
meaningfully by the participants, it was important for the experimental question to 
identify whether either of these variables predicted JORs. This was tested via multiple 
regression, where actual lag and fact recall were simultaneously entered as 
independent variables. JOR was the dependent variable. The overall regression was 
significant (ANOVA result: F(2,2133)= 428.76,p<0.001. Adjusted R square = .286). 
The effect of actual lag and fact recall on JOR is shown in the results below:
Predictor Variable Unstandardised Beta p
Actual Lag .444 p<0.001
Fact Recall -.192 p<0.001
(Fame rating was not a significant predictor.)
This data shows that with each unit increase in actual lag, the JOR rating increased on 
average by .444, and with each unit increase in fact recall, the JOR decreased by .192. 
Both of these results were significant at p<.001 and were as predicted. While it is 
clear that more variance in the DV was predicted by actual lag than fact recall, this 
would be expected, and critically this method ensured that the effect of actual lag on 
JOR was controlled for when examining the effect of fact recall on JOR.
As a follow up to this result, the same regression was carried at each individual lag. 
These analyses revealed a significant result was obtained at lags 10 and 30 (F(l,361)
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>3.94,p<0.05 in each case). Furthermore, there was a trend for a reliable result at lag 
15 (F(l,352) = 2.80;p=0.96).
Discussion
Experiment 8 was conducted in an attempt to uncover the reasons for the patterns of 
lag judgements in the Experiments 4-6, where famous names were found to attract 
shorter lag judgements than non-famous names across a range of lags. This 
experiment was effectively a replication of Experiment 4, with the exception that 
there was an initial study phase with famous names 24 hours before the continuous 
recency task, and that there was a fame rating task after the continuous recency task.
In the study phase, the level of pre-experimental information was measured for each 
name, to give some indication of the memory strength level for each famous name.
In line with the earlier experiments, it was reasoned that famous names would be 
‘strong’ in terms of memory and that this would lead to them attracting shorter mean 
lag judgments than the ‘weak’ non-famous names, in line with distance theory of 
memory for recency (Friedman, 1993; 2001). It was also predicted that fame ratings 
provided by participants for each name (after the recency task) would provide a 
subjective measure of memory strength for each famous name, and that this too would 
predict JORs in the famous name condition.
Old/new discrimination in this experiment was highly similar to that in Experiments 
4 , 5 and 6 , with discrimination of famous names being much higher than the level of 
discrimination for non-famous names at every lag. Differences in discrimination 
levels were again greater than that demonstrated in the Hintzman work (2003; 2005),
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though performance largely followed the same pattern, with discrimination decreasing 
with increasing repetition interval -  though once again less steeply for the ‘high 
strength’ condition compared to the ‘low strength’ condition.
In this experiment, famous names attracted shorter lag judgements than non-famous 
names. When follow up t-tests were conducted, JORs across fame differed at the same 
three lags as in Experiments 4 and 5, and were similar to the findings in Experiment 6 . 
This study provided further support for Hintzman’s (2005) view that strength 
underlies recency memory at least in part, in continuous memory tasks of this kind. 
When memory strength is high, events experienced for the second time appear more 
recent than when memory strength is low.
A novel finding in this experiment is that the level of distance information available 
(in the form of memory strength) predicted JORs. This is consistent with the 
behavioural findings of Brown et al. (1985), who assessed levels of knowledge for 
public events and recency memory and found them to be related. The previous 
research showed that actual recency was less related to recency judgements than was 
level of factual knowledge about the public events (Brown et al., 1985). This pattern 
is inconsistent with the current findings, where actual lag was a better predictor than 
pre-experimental strength levels for the famous names. It is likely that this 
discrepancy is due to differences in the type of recency task employed. In Experiment 
8, a within-subjects memory task was used to explore recency, where the time 
between the first and second presentation of the items was relatively brief. This is 
unlike Brown et al.’s (1985) between-subjects task, where the second presentation 
was between one day and months later. The current experiment appears to be the first
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demonstration that pre-experimental memory strength is a predictor of memory for 
recency in a subsequent continuous memory task where only distance information is 
likely to be available to participants.
What is the basis for memory strength? Assessing the levels of familiarity, 
recollection and or semantic information could all constitute distance information and 
may have predicted JORs in this experiment. It has been suggested earlier in this 
thesis that familiarity could be utilised in strength-based recency judgements, and 
some support for this was predicted by the findings in Experiment 3. Despite this 
evidence, the study task used in this experiment (where participants were asked to 
demonstrate their levels of pre-experimental knowledge for famous names) means 
that episodic familiarity may be unlikely to underlie memory strength levels here 
because the study task was contextual in nature, and the levels of contextual or 
semantic information predicted famous name lag judgements. The task used in 
Experiment 8, along with the finding of Chalmers and Humphreys (1998) that 
increases in pre-experimental contextual levels for words were associated with later 
recency accuracy for those words, suggests that contextual recovery is a more likely 
basis for the divergences in JORs than familiarity under these circumstances. Though 
familiarity was likely to vary according to lag judgements in the experiments reported 
in this thesis, the findings of the current experiment would suggest that this was not 
the basis of recency judgements in the kind of task employed here. The role of 
familiarity in JORs will be discussed further in the General Discussion (Chapter 7).
Finally, there was no evidence that levels of familiarity for famous names had been 
raised in this current experiment by the study task, since false alarms for the non-
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famous names were higher in the continuous memory task than famous names, despite 
the prior deep encoding task. This could suggest that for famous names, the level of 
strength experienced is so strong that presenting them just once before the experiment 
does not noticeably increase their strength levels. Experiments 5 and 7 show that the 
level of strength, in the form of familiarity, can be somewhat increased for non- 
famous names however (as indicated by the heightened levels of false alarms for this 
category), since the strength levels are low for these names pre-experimentally and 
therefore any increase in familiarity will be relatively larger for this category.
The finding that fact recall was related to the fame rating given to each famous name 
suggests that the participants approached these tasks with consistency. If these 
variables had not been related it might have suggested that participants were not 
motivated to provide meaningful demonstrations of their knowledge of the famous 
names. Despite this relationship, there was little evidence to suggest that fame rating 
predicted JORs in this experiment. One possible reason for this outcome is that there 
was not enough variance in this measure. It could be that the participants found it 
more difficult to demonstrate their level of memory strength across names in this 
manner, in comparison with the fact recall task.
A recurring finding across Experiments 4-6 and 8 is that judgements of recency did 
not vary across conditions at lags 15,25 and 30, which is inconsistent with some 
previous research where differences across low and high strength items were found at 
every repetition interval (Hintzman, 2005). It has been noted that the longer lag 
judgements tended to converge in Hintzman’s (2003) continuous memory experiment 
and that this could be explained by the fact that participants were less accurate at the
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longest lags, in line with the reduction in their recognition levels. This is consistent 
with the idea that discrimination at the two longest lags would be hardest since the 
distance between these lags would be proportionally smaller in comparison to the 
other lags (i.e. lag 10 is double lag 5 in terms of ‘distance’, whereas lag 25 is only 
20% more recent than lag 30).
The lack of difference between high and low strength items at lag 15 could stem from 
the greater recognition level for non-famous names at this lag. It might be the case 
that when non-famous names are recognised to a greater degree than other non- 
famous names, the JORs become more accurate for the better recognised lag. Thus, 
when participants’ recognition for non-famous lag 15 items increases (for whatever 
reason) then their lag judgements also improve. However, doubt about this suggestion 
comes from the lag 5 data where participants have superior recognition performance, 
but less accurate JORs in comparison with lag 15 data.
Another potential reason that lag 15 JORs do not differ across fame is that the lag 15 
category is treated as a favoured response option by participants. Across experiments, 
lag 15 is the last point at which participants’ mean lag judgement is an over­
estimation. Figures 26, 28 and 30 show that at lag 20 (another ‘middle’ lag) 
participants begin to give under-estimated lag judgements. This finding, coupled with 
the fact that in this series of behavioural experiments participants made lag 15 
judgements more than any other lag, suggests that a lag 15 response may be a default 
response option when uncertain. If and how this might be related to the lack of 
difference across fame at this repetition interval is something which requires future
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investigation. Conducting experiments with lags of (for example) 15-60 could be one 
way to shed light on this issue.
In summary the final experiment in the behavioural series has provided evidence in 
support of the notion that strength-based memory processes support recency 
judgements in a task that is considered to be devoid of location or relative 
information. The findings reported in Experiment 8 are in line with the ERP data, 
suggesting that distance information is a valid category in the Friedman (1993) 
framework of memory for recency.
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CHAPTER 7 -  GENERAL DISCUSSION
The reason for conducting the experiments reported in this thesis was to investigate 
the nature and number of memory processes that might support relatively short 
recency judgements. As outlined in Chapter 1, there are broadly three classes of 
information that could be used to form judgements of recency: relative, location and 
distance information (Friedman, 1993). In making judgements of recency, one could 
use these information types either individually, or in combination (Janssen et al., 
2006). The principal goal in the experiments described here was to investigate 
memory for recency when relative and location information are either unavailable or 
are of limited use, and to understand what cognitive processes might underpin the 
strength subcomponent of distance information. Few studies have explored questions 
about how many memory processes might support recency judgements in 
circumstances where distance information is likely to be utilised, and so the 
experiments reported in this thesis are likely to contribute towards an understanding 
of these issues.
It is important to understand the mechanics of recency memory because this is an 
important cognitive ability and it is one that may deteriorate more rapidly than some 
other kinds of memory abilities as age increases (e.g. Bastin, Van der Linden, Michel 
& Friedman, 2004; Fradera & Ward, 2006). The experiments in this thesis involved 
either a combination of behavioural and electrophysiological (ERP) findings, or 
behavioural findings alone. In keeping with the order of the work described above, in 
the proceeding sections the ERP findings are described first, followed by the 
behavioural studies in which famous and non-famous names were employed as 
stimuli.
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ERP Findings
Three ERP experiments have been reported in this thesis. They were designed with 
the aim of investigating i) how many memory processes contribute to judgements of 
recency where the strength subcomponent of distance information is available to 
participants, and ii) the nature of any such processes. Using tasks similar to those used 
in the Hintzman (2003; 2005) series of behavioural experiments, it was assumed that 
access to relative and location categories of recency-based information would be 
highly limited. Since the tasks were continuous, it was unlikely that participants could 
use relative ordering information for their JORs. With a long list of at least 398 trials 
and 5-35 intervening items between repetition lags across experiments, it is difficult to 
envisage how participants might be continually comparing the relative list positions of 
items. The use of location information is also unlikely in the experiments reported in 
this thesis, since the continuous recognition and recency tasks were devised to be 
largely free of contextual landmarks, as was outlined in Chapter 1. The stimuli used 
contained no recency information directly in that they were words and not times or 
dates. Thus, it is likely that one can rule out the use of location information.
One reason for acquiring ERPs in these memory tasks was because it provided a 
means of addressing questions about recency processing that had not been explored 
previously. This involved recording ERP activity during continuous recency tasks so 
that it was possible to analyse the neural responses associated with correct recency 
judgments, as well as two kinds of incorrect responses, comprising under- and over­
estimates of lag, respectively. This is a useful contrast, because a strength-based ERP 
signature should behave differently for these two kinds of incorrect responses. If the 
size of an ERP memory effect indexes memory strength, and if an assessment of
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memory strength is used as a basis for recency judgments, then larger ERP memory 
effects should accompany shorter recency judgments.
A second reason for employing ERPs was because of a body of previous research that 
has demonstrated that ERPs are sensitive to the processes of recollection and 
familiarity (e.g. Curran, 2000; Wilding & Rugg, 1996). In so far as these claims are 
correct, then analysing the ERP data acquired in recency tasks offers a means of 
assessing how these two classes of memory process might support recency judgments 
under different circumstances. These possibilities were explored by analysing the 
specific parts of the electrical record that have been linked to familiarity and 
recollection. For the former, this comprised analyses at anterior scalp locations in the 
300-500ms time-window. For recollection, this comprised analyses at posterior 
locations in the 500-800ms period.
ERP Experiment 1
The first ERP experiment reported in this thesis provided evidence that ERP old/new 
effects could be obtained in a continuous recognition and recency memory task, in 
line with previous findings (e.g. Friedman, 1990). The ERP old/new effects that were 
obtained for correct recency judgments varied across epochs in a manner similar to 
that observed in previous ERP studies where recognition memory and source memory 
judgments have been required (e.g. Wilding et al., 1995; Wilding & Rugg, 1996). In 
this first experiment, there was one repetition lag only (15); however participants were 
not aware of this and could choose to give lag 10, 15 or 20 responses when making 
their lag judgements. ERPs did not vary reliably according to JOR in this experiment. 
Figures 35 and 36 (p250) show that there were small differences in the predicted
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direction between the ERPs associated with shorter and longer lag judgements over 
the electrode locations and time-windows associated with familiarity and with 
recollection.
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Figure 35. Mean amplitude of the 300-500ms frontal (collapsed across F3,Fz,F4) 
electrical activity associated with lag 15 hits attracting over-estimated lag judgements 
(red bars) and lag 15 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars) 
(n=18).
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Figure 36. Mean amplitude o f the 500-800ms posterior (collapsed across P3,Pz,P4) 
electrical activity associated with lag 15 hits attracting over-estimated lag judgements 
(red bars) and lag 15 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars) 
(n=18).
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As was discussed in Chapter 3 among other possibilities, one explanation for the fact 
that only trends were evident is that, since all stimuli were repeated after only one lag, 
and since there was only a narrow range of response options, the absence of 
differences arose because there was limited scope for ERPs associated with correct 
lag judgments, under-estimates and over-estimates to diverge greatly. Therefore, the 
decision was taken to conduct another ERP experiment including a wider range of 
response options. These options reflected the actual lags included in the continuous 
recency task (5,15,25, 35), although the proportions of repetitions were higher for 
lag 15 and 25 items in order to ensure that there were sufficient trials in the correct, 
over- and under-estimated lag judgement conditions to form reliable ERPs for items 
from these two lags.
ERP Experiment 2
The second ERP experiment reported in this thesis provided evidence that ERP 
old/new recognition memory effects changed over the three recording epochs, in line 
with the findings in the previous experiment. The distributions of the activity in the 
300-500ms, 500-800ms and 800-1100ms epochs contained elements that resembled 
those associated with the processes of familiarity, recollection (e.g. Mecklinger, 2000; 
Rugg et al., 1998) and with executive processing in previous studies (e.g. Hayama et 
al., 2008). Importantly, in Experiment 2 there was evidence in all three time-windows 
that these ERP effects diminished in magnitude with increasing repetition lag. It was 
not possible to obtain this evidence in Experiment 1, because only one lag (15) was 
employed. The reason that this finding is important, is because any aspects of the 
electrical record that are candidates for indices of processes that might be employed in
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a strength-based fashion in recency judgements should be found to change as lag 
increases.
Identification of such effects is a necessary but not however, a sufficient condition to 
support the claim that the effects of interest actually support JORs. It may be the case 
that the effects signal recency, but do not index processes that can be employed in 
order to make recency judgments. In order to fulfil this second criterion, the ERP 
effects of interest should vary according to the recency judgments with which they 
were associated. In this experiment there was only limited evidence to suggest that 
this was the case.
The key contrasts in Experiment 2 involved ERPs associated with correct and 
incorrect JORs for lag 15 and lag 25 items. Few reliable differences were observed for 
lag 15 items, except that over-estimated lag judgements were associated with less 
positivity over posterior locations in the 500-800ms epoch compared to those 
attracting a correct lag judgement. This planned comparison provides some evidence 
that the strength subcomponent of Friedman’s (1993) distance information is utilised 
for making JORs in the time-window and location associated with recollection (e.g. 
Wilding, 2000).
For lag 25 items, there was some evidence that correct judgements were associated 
with greater positivity than over-estimated lag judgements in the early (300-500ms) 
time-window at frontal sites. However, there was no further statistical evidence in 
support of this in the directed follow up analyses at sites F3, Fz and F4. Figure 37 
(p253) shows that there are only minimal differences at these locations. In the middle
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(500-800ms) epoch, there was some evidence to suggest that under-estimated lag 25 
items elicited more positive-going activity over posterior electrode locations than 
over-estimated items. In so far as greater positivity indexes greater memory strength, 
and greater strength attracts shorter recency judgments, then this finding is consistent 
with the view that this aspect of the electrical record indexes a strength-based memory 
process that can be used for JORs in line with Friedman’s (1993) distance 
information. The time course and distribution o f the effect also encourages the claim 
that the process providing distance information here is recollection: effects with 
similar time courses and topographies have been linked to this process in numerous 
previous studies (e.g. Rugg et al., 1996; Wilding et al., 1995). Again however, 
stronger support for this claim would have been to provide evidence of this in the 
outcomes of subsequent focal analyses (see Figure 38, p254).
Figure 37. Mean amplitude of the 300-500ms frontal (collapsed across F3,Fz,F4) 
electrical activity associated with lag 25 hits attracting over-estimated lag judgements 
(red bars) and lag 25 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars) 
(n=17).
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Figure 38. Mean amplitude of the 500-800ms posterior (collapsed across P3,Pz,P4) 
electrical activity associated with lag 25 hits attracting over-estimated lag judgements 
(red bars) and lag 25 hits attracting under-estimated lag judgements (grey bars)
(n=17).
One interesting point worthy of note here is how the findings in Experiment 2 relate to 
a long-term vs. short-term memory distinction. Atkinson and Shriffin proposed that 
human memory is fractionated into short- and long-term memory (1968). The short­
term store (STS) was thought to be of limited capacity, being able to hold around 6-8 
items (Cave & Squire, 1992). This was first demonstrated in a classic behavioural 
experiment by Miller (1956) who showed that people can store around seven 
consecutive items in their immediate memory. It was also proposed that items held in 
the STS could be transferred to the long-term store (LTS) under the right conditions 
and that the LTS has potentially limitless capacity. The fact that some amnesic 
patients present with impaired long-term memories, but with normal short-term 
memory capacities (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970), lends support to this division. 
Some, however, do not accept the multiple systems account. For example, Ranganath 
and Blumenfeld (2005) reviewed the evidence for the short- and long-term memory 
distinction, and have argued on the basis of neuropsychological and brain imaging 
data, that these are part of the same memory system. The researchers point out that
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short- and long-term memory may be supported by the same brain regions, and also 
note that the neuropsychological case studies used to provide evidence for the 
separate stores, may not actually demonstrate selective short- or long-term deficits.
The data derived from Experiment 2 cannot contribute to the debate over whether the 
distinction between short and long-term memory is valid, however Table 3 (pi33) 
shows that there is no drop off with performance across lags 5 to 15, despite the fact 
that the longer lag presumably depends on long-term memory whilst arguably the 
short lag might also receive a contribution from short-term memory (e.g. Cave & 
Squire, 1992). If items were to be transferred into a long-term memory store, 
participants would require time to rehearse the items in the continuous recency 
memory task. The structure of the task implemented in the experiments throughout 
this thesis is such that participants would have little if any time to rehearse the 
presented items, therefore a drop in recognition of items would be expected after lag 5 
according to this dual process view. In terms of the neural data, there is no reason to 
expect that a change in the cognitive systems supporting recency memory would 
occur across the very short-term lag (5) and later lags (15-35) if familiarity and 
recollection support JORs, since both the mid-frontal ERP effect and left parietal 
old/new effects are present for at least 24 hours after an item in memory has been 
presented (Curran & Friedman, 2003; 2004).
In terms of recency, the patterns in the data obtained in Experiment 2 were 
encouraging, and for this reason, a third experiment was designed, in which an 
additional attempt to maximally separate ERPs associated with correct and incorrect 
lag judgements was incorporated. The change in Experiment 3 was motivated by the
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concern that some of the null results in the second experiment came about because 
there was not an even distribution of items at each of the four lags. In Experiment 2, 
there were markedly fewer items for the two extreme (high and low) lags, but 
participants were not informed of this disparity. As a result, participants may have 
been responding on occasions according to what they believed was likely (in terms of 
an even spread of items repeated across the 4 lags), rather than simply on the basis of 
relevant mnemonic information that they had to hand (for a discussion, Postma,
1999). The final ERP experiment was devised to address these concerns.
ERP Experiment 3
ERP Experiment 3 involved a shorter experiment than the previous two, along with 
just three repetition lags (5,15 and 25). There were equal numbers of items repeated 
at each of the lags. In this experiment, the pattern of response accuracy meant that 
robust ERPs could not be formed for both under- and over-estimates for a single lag. 
Instead, correct and over-estimated lag judgements for lag 5 items were compared, 
along with correct and under-estimated lag judgements for lag 25 items. In terms of 
the old/new effects, there was strong evidence that the ERP old/new effects 
diminished with increasing actual lag in all three time-windows. This finding was 
consistent with that in Experiment 2, although not with all previously reported results.
Rugg & Nagy (1989) analysed old/new effects in a continuous recognition memory 
task where words were repeated after either 6 or 19 intervening words. There were no 
reliable differences between the magnitudes of the old/new effects for words re­
presented at either lag, despite superior old/new discrimination at the shorter lag. It 
may be the case that the use of data from only 12 participants in that study, alongside
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the acquisition of data from only 5 electrodes (3 midline and two inferior temporal 
locations) reduced the opportunity to observe changes in effect sizes with lag. An 
interpretation of the null result in this way also gains some support from work 
showing that familiarity does decline over these kinds of lag separations (Yonelinas & 
Levy, 2002).
These methodological considerations cannot be applied to the data reported by Curran 
& Friedman (2004), who did not observe differences between the magnitudes of 
old/new effects for items repeated after either 34 mins, 39 mins, or 24 hrs. A similar 
null result has also been reported by Wolk et al. (2006), who contrasted old/new 
effects for words where the gap between presentation and re-presentation was either 
39 mins or 24 hrs. In this case, old/new discrimination was lower for words re­
presented one day later. Wolk et al. confounded lag with encoding task, however as an 
equal number of words re-presented at short or long lags were presented either once 
or three times at study (2006). All of the data presented was collapsed across number 
of study presentations, thereby making it difficult to assess how this element of the 
design influenced the behavioural and ERP data that was obtained.
In summary, of these previous studies, the one which is most comparable to the 
studies in this thesis (because of the contrast across similar lag intervals) is Rugg & 
Nagy (1989). It may be the case that the absence of changes in old/new effects with 
lag in their study came about because of a combination of reduced power and limited 
coverage of the scalp. Rugg & Nagy however, required only an old/new judgment of 
participants, whereas in the studies conducted for this thesis, recency judgments were 
also required. It is not possible to rule out this task-demand difference as a contributor
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to the disparate findings. The key point for the thesis however, is that changes in the 
magnitudes of effects with lag are a necessary pre-cursor to analyses that determine 
whether these electrophysiological modulations also change with the accuracy of lag 
judgments.
In this regard, the central and most critical finding in this experiment, and in this 
series of ERP studies, was that incorrect (longer) JORs to lag 5 items were associated 
with relatively reduced levels of positive-going ERP activity compared to correct lag 
5 JORs, whereas incorrect (shorter) JORs to lag 25 items were associated with 
relatively more positive-going ERPs than correct JORs to lag 25 items. This was the 
case in both the early time-window (largest over the front of the head), and in the 
middle epoch (see Figures 39-41, p259-261). In addition, in the late time-window, 
under-estimated judgements to lag 25 items were associated with more positivity 
relative to correct lag 25 JORs. This was inconsistent with the findings in Experiment 
2, where over-estimated lag judgements were associated with the greatest level of 
positivity (Figure 13, p i57).
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Figure 39. Mean amplitude of the 300-500ms frontal (collapsed across F3,Fz,F4) electrical activity associated with lag 5 hits attracting over­
estimated lag judgements (red bars) and lag 5 hits attracting correct JORs (black bars) (n=23).
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Figure 40. Mean amplitude of the 500-800ms posterior (collapsed across P3,Pz,P4) electrical activity associated with lag 5 hits attracting over­
estimated lag judgements (red bars) and lag 5 hits attracting correct JORs (black bars) (n=23).
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Figure 41. Mean amplitude of the 300-500ms frontal (collapsed across F3,Fz,F4) electrical activity associated with lag 25 hits attracting under­
estimated lag judgements (grey bars) and lag 25 hits attracting correct JORs (black bars) (n=23).
The inconsistencies in late frontal activity across this and the earlier studies mirror 
other inconsistencies in the published literature (see Chapter 2). Previous recognition 
memory experiments have reported that this effect has behaved in contradictory ways, 
for example Trott et al. (1999) reported that this effect accompanied old judgements 
associated with source inaccuracy, whereas Wilding & Rugg (1997) reported that the 
late right frontal activity was greater for correctly identified old items associated with 
accurate source judgements. Since there are multiple examples of conflicting results 
connected to reports of ERP activity in this late time-window, it was unfeasible to 
make any strong predictions about how this effect might behave in the continuous 
recency memory tasks described within this thesis. These issues will be addressed 
later in this chapter (see pages 267-269).
Interpretations o f ERP Findings
The ERP findings provide good evidence that distance information is likely to be used 
by participants when making judgements of recency in a continuous memory task. 
Although Experiment 2 provided some evidence that old/new effects diminished in 
magnitude with increasing repetition lag, this was not sufficient to demonstrate that 
ERP activity was associated with JORs: positive going activity may diminish over 
time, but this is not an indication that participants used the processes that activity 
indexed for their lag judgements. Experiment 3 provided that crucial evidence. ERP 
activity was less positive going for over-estimates than correct lag judgements (lag 5), 
and larger for under-estimates than for correct lag judgments (lag 25). This final ERP 
experiment provides support for the claim that distance information was available to 
participants and that it also formed a basis for their recency judgments. This appears 
to be a novel and important memory finding about memory for recency.
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One other possibility is that some of the ERP differences that have been described 
reflect the fact that incorrect lag judgements (be they under- or over-estimates) may 
be decisions associated with lower confidence than correct JORs. If this is the case, 
then how might this be manifest in the electrical record? Presumably, any such index 
of decision confidence would be either larger or smaller for correct than for incorrect 
JORs. Critically however, it is difficult to conceive of a confidence effect that will 
vary according to whether an under- or an over-estimate (relative to a correct 
judgment) is made in a graded fashion. Thus the findings at anterior sites in the 300- 
500ms epoch in Experiment 3, and at posterior sites in the same experiment from 500- 
800ms, are difficult to interpret in terms of confidence. The same can also be said of 
the findings in Experiment 2 where there was some evidence to suggest activity in 
these time-windows was also of a graded nature across JORs.
Another way that effects related to confidence may be manifest in the electrical record 
is with respect to any potential indices of monitoring/evaluation processes.
Presumably these processes will be engaged to a greater degree for incorrect than for 
correct JORs. The right-frontal ERP old/new effect (see Chapter 2, pages 85-91) has 
been linked to monitoring/evaluation, but across the experiments in this thesis the 
effect has not uniformly been larger for incorrect than for correct JORs. This effect is 
of course very unlikely to be an exhaustive index of monitoring/evaluation processes, 
but the ERP data provide no direct basis for claims that there are differences in 
confidence associated with correct and incorrect JORs. The key point that remains 
however, is that effects that show a graded response across under-estimates, correct
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responses and over-estimates are difficult to reduce to an explanation that is framed 
solely in terms of response confidence.
This series of ERP experiments has also contributed to an understanding of how 
familiarity and recollection might support JORs. As outlined in Chapter 5, in the early 
epoch, the magnitude of frontally distributed ERP old/new effects predicted JORs. In 
previous recognition memory studies, greater relative positivity for items judged 
correctly to be old - compared to correct judgements to new items, has been associated 
with familiarity (see Chapter 2). The findings of Azimian-Faridani et al. (2006) and 
Woodruff and colleagues (2006) support the view that ERPs at anterior scalp sites in 
the 300-500ms time-window index familiarity in a graded manner. The data reported 
here are consistent with this view since there was some evidence that the mid-frontal 
old/new effect varied according to JORs in a graded manner. This is in line with the 
view that familiarity is one memory process that can be utilised as a form of distance 
information. In addition, more positive ERP activity in the middle time-window 
predicted shorter lag judgments. Positive-going ERP old/new effects, often with a left- 
parietal maximum., have been associated with the process of recollection (see Chapter 
2). The data overall suggest therefore, that recollection can also support JORs. The 
pattern of statistically reliable effects in the directed analyses makes one a little more 
cautious in this claim than for the associated claims about the process of familiarity. 
Across the three experiments however, there is some basis for claiming that 
recollection is also employed in a strength-based manner when JORs are required.
The claim that the mid-frontal old/new effect in the early time-window indexes 
familiarity has not gone unchallenged however, as was reviewed in Chapter 2. Some
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suggest that the effect indexes conceptual priming (Paller et al., 2007; Voss & Paller, 
2006; 2007; Yovel & Paller, 2004). By this account, the fact that the mid-frontal ERP 
old/new effect varies according to response confidence comes about because the same 
processes that contribute to variations in the confidence with which responses are 
made are also those that introduce variations in the degree of conceptual priming. It 
could be the case that these arguments can be reconciled if conceptual priming 
supports familiarity (Paller et al., 2007; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002).
It is not necessary to adopt this position however, merely noting that there is a degree 
of correspondence between the factors that induce changes in the two processes is 
sufficient. From this perspective therefore, the data points in the recency judgment 
task reported here only add to the list of manipulations for which the factors 
influencing familiarity and conceptual priming overlap. As was stated in Chapter 2, 
the weight of evidence to date supports a familiarity account of the mid-frontal ERP 
old/new effect (Rugg & Curran, 2007). The current data therefore is consistent with 
the view that familiarity supports recency judgments, and it does so in a quantitative 
manner, in line with a strength-based theory of memory for recency. In this way, 
reliance on familiarity for recency judgements would fall under the category of 
distance information in Friedman’s (1993) framework (see Figure 2, p56).
It is worth considering here the correspondence between the way in which the mid- 
frontal ERP old/new effect predicts JORs and the properties of cells identified in 
single-unit recording studies in the primate (Xiang & Brown, 1998,2004). Cells that 
respond differently according to whether an item is being presented for the first or 
second time have been identified in the temporal lobe and in the pre-frontal cortex
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(PFC). Cells in the PFC respond within 250-350ms of a target stimulus, which 
provides support for the claim that neural activity in this region underlies the mid- 
frontal old/new effect (Rugg & Curran, 2007). Sub-populations of these cells in the 
PFC also signal relative recency in that their response to repeated items declines as 
the interval between first and second presentation increases. Thus these cells can be 
regarded as a strength-based signal that might be employed to make judgments about 
when events occurred.
Xiang & Brown (1998,2004; and see Bogacz, Brown & Giraud-Carrier, 2001) also 
identified what they termed novelty sensitive neurons, and well as familiarity 
sensitive neurons. The former respond only to the first presentation of a novel 
stimulus, and the second respond more strongly to novel than to familiar stimuli, but 
do so equally for first and second presentations of those stimulus types. Thus only the 
first class of neurons described here might support JORs, and only the first class are 
candidates for a neural substrate underlying the mid-frontal ERP old/new effect.
It appears that the only other ERP study of memory and distance information was 
conducted by Curran and Friedman (2003; 2004). As was outlined earlier in this 
thesis, although old/new effects typically associated with familiarity and recollection 
were elicited in this study, neither effect was found to differ reliably or meaningfully 
across the various repetition intervals. In this thesis, the second ERP experiment 
provided evidence of a difference in the size of the old/new effects across repetition 
interval in the time-windows and locations typically associated with familiarity and 
recollection, and some support for the notion that these effects vary with JORs. In 
addition, Experiment 3 also provided evidence that anterior ERP old/new effects vary
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according to JOR in a strength-based manner. If these ERP effects are assumed to 
reflect familiarity memory processes, then shorter lag judgements are predicted by 
greater levels of familiarity.
Curran and Friedman (2004) suggested that location memory processing may be 
analogous to recollection, and that distance processing may be equivalent to 
familiarity. The final ERP experiment reported in this thesis shows that this 
distinction is unlikely to be entirely accurate, since both putative ERP indices of 
recollection and familiarity varied with time, and since there was evidence that these 
processes also varied according to recency judgements, in a task where only distance 
information was likely to be available to participants.
A subsidiary aim in conducting the ERP experiments reported in this thesis involved 
assessing whether late frontal ERP effects varied according to judgements of recency, 
and whether they did so in a way that contributed to an understanding of the 
functional significance of late frontal memory-related ERP effects, and by extension 
the roles that the PFC plays in different kinds of recency judgments. Curran and 
Friedman (2003) reported that late right frontal ERP old/new effects in the 800- 
1800ms epoch varied depending on whether participants had been asked to make a 
recency judgement across days or minutes. These were larger when participants had to 
make day 1 versus day 2 judgements, compared to list 1 versus list 2 (both day 2) 
judgements. Curran and Friedman interpreted this evidence as suggesting that 
participants were more likely to use memory reconstruction, supporting the use of 
location information (2003), since these ERP effects have been associated with 
processing linked to reconstruction (e.g. Wilding & Rugg, 1996).
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The experiments in this thesis have provided additional information in regard to 
memory for recency and late frontal ERP activity. In Experiment 2, old/new effects 
decreased with decreasing JOR in the late epoch (800-1100ms), with this diminution 
being largest over the front of the head. This stands in contrast with the results of 
Experiments 1 and 3, where late frontal old/new effects were larger for shorter than 
for longer JORs. In Experiment 3, there was also evidence that these frontal effects 
were right lateralised. The effects reported in Experiment 2 were not larger over the 
right hemisphere, and may not have correspondences with the late right frontal 
old/new effects described in Chapter 2, but why distinct processes might be engaged 
across the three experiments described on this thesis is not straightforward to explain.
In general the frontally distributed activity revealed in the current ERP experiments 
provides additional support for the idea that the frontal lobes are involved in recency 
memory processing, most likely in an executive manner, but does not contribute to 
questions about the identity of these executive operations (e.g. Curran & Friedman, 
2003; Eyler-Zorrilla et al., 1996). It should also be noted that the 800-1100ms time- 
window is one in which frontally distributed ERP old/new effects can be 
contaminated by the anterior projection of activity generated in more posterior brain 
regions -  for example that responsible for the parietal ERP old/new effect. For this 
reason, a later time-window (e.g. 1100-1400ms) is one that is often employed in 
studies where the intention is to explore the functional significance of late frontal ERP 
old/new effects. The use of a 1280ms post-stimulus recording epoch in these 
experiments precluded examination of activity in this later time period.
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Another possibility is that some of the effects seen in the late recording epochs are a 
reflection of anticipation/preparation for the upcoming trial. From this perspective, a 
key question is how this possibility would predict differences between the ERPs that 
are time-locked to stimulus onset on a given trial and separated according to lag as 
well as to the accuracy of test judgments. One way in which this could occur would be 
if the times taken to make task judgments varied systematically with the conditions 
under which frontal old/new effects changed in magnitude.
In concrete terms, one might anticipate larger indices of a process related to 
preparation for a subsequent trial when the time taken to reach a decision was 
shortest. Unfortunately, the designs of the three ERP experiments in this thesis do not 
permit an accurate assessment of this account. This is because an old/new judgment 
preceded the lag decision in all three test phases, and RTs were recorded for the first 
decision only. An adequate assessment of consistent correspondences between 
reaction times and the conditions under which frontal ERP old/new effects change 
would require information about the time at which the last trial judgment (in this case 
the lag judgment) was made, and how that varied with lag as well as response 
accuracy. This could be assessed in a design in which the old/new and lag judgments 
were made at the same time. That said, in studies where ERPs have been acquired in 
tasks where source judgments have been made at the same time as old/new judgments, 
frontal old/new effects have not varied in a way that would support an anticipatory 
account of the frontally distributed activity. For example, Senkfor and van Petten 
(1998) required participants to make a three-way new/old male/old female task 
judgment. Late frontal old/new effects were statistically equivalent for correct and 
incorrect voice judgments, despite markedly shorter RTs for correct responses.
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It should be emphasised that, while the ERP data presented support a strength-based 
account of JORs in continuous recency memory tasks, they do so on the basis of a 
contrast that is somewhat different to that employed in prior behavioural studies. In 
previous research, the focus has typically been on differences in mean JORs 
associated with two different classes of stimuli that are assumed to vary in memory 
strength. For example, across a range of lags, JORs for pictures are shorter than those 
for words (see Chapter 1, as well as Hintzman, 2005). These data points support a 
strength-based contribution to JORs in that memories for pictures are on average 
stronger than those for words. Importantly, the ERP data reported here support this 
conclusion, as well as conclusions about the number of processes that contribute, on 
the basis of a different experiment manipulation. This stems from the ability to 
contrast, for items from the same stimulus class, changes in the neural activity 
differentiating correctly identified old items that attracted either correct or incorrect 
JORs.
ERP Summary
In summary, the ERP studies have given rise to novel and interesting findings relating 
to memory for recency. In particular, the findings support the claim that two distinct 
processes -  recollection and familiarity -  have the properties to support JORs in a 
strength-based fashion and evidence that these processes varied in these experiments 
according to JOR, with stronger evidence supporting the use of familiarity. In the 
remaining experiments in the thesis, a different approach to assessing the processes 
supporting memory for recency was taken. In these studies, similar tasks were used, 
but the stimuli comprised famous and non-famous names. These stimuli were
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employed because, for famous names, the availability of different kinds of 
information associated with them offered additional means of assessing what 
processes contribute to JORs, as outlined in Chapter 2. In addition, the experiments 
were designed with manipulations that have been shown to influence either familiarity 
or recollection to greater or lesser degrees, in order to determine how these two 
processes, either singly or in combination, support JORs. These kinds of inferences 
cannot be made on the basis of the ERP data described above, because the possibility 
remains that while two distinct ERP effects predicted JORs, the ERP data signals only 
the availability of the processes indexed by these effects, rather than their use in 
support of recency judgments.
Behavioural Findings
In the series of behavioural experiments, the aim was to explore recency memory 
further. Once again the continuous recency task adapted from Hintzman (2003) was 
used, along with a behavioural manipulation that involved presenting categories of 
stimuli that were expected to have different levels of pre-experimental strength. These 
comprised famous and non-famous names. These were selected because famous 
names should be associated with recovery of more forms of information than non- 
famous names such as semantic information, feelings of familiarity and other 
contextual information, thereby comprising an overall difference in memory strength 
compared to non-famous names. In addition, famous names were selected because 
they provided the opportunity to acquire JORs alongside an assessment, on an item- 
by-item basis, of the quality and/or quantity of information that was available about 
the individual denoted by each name.
271
First Behavioural Experiment
Experiment 4 was conducted in order to establish whether the patterns of behavioural 
data found in the Hintzman (2003) experiment would also be found with famous and 
non-famous names. Evidence suggests that for classes of stimuli that might 
reasonably be associated with different levels of memory strength, the mean JOR 
across most repetition lags is shorter for items judged to be higher strength (Hintzman 
2003; 2005). Therefore, if famous names were high strength, they would be expected 
to attract shorter mean lag judgments across repetition intervals, in line with a 
distance account of recency memory (Friedman, 1993; 2001). Such a finding would 
justify the further use of famous and non-famous names in other tasks used to explore 
memory for recency as described above, and would also support and expand upon 
Hintzman’s results (2003).
The results of Experiment 4 did indeed appear to support these predictions, with the 
famous names being judged as significantly more recent by participants across a range 
of lags. These differences are proposed to be due to the differing levels of strength 
between famous and non-famous stimuli, as supported by the fact that the old/new 
judgements made by participants were significantly more accurate for famous names. 
These findings are entirely consistent with the notion that an assessment of memory 
strength influences JORs, consistent with a distance account of recency memory 
under these circumstances. However in order to further confirm that the resulting 
differences in lag judgements were due to the famous and non-famous names forming 
high and low strength categories, future research could ask participants to rate the 
familiarity of the stimuli on a Likert-type scale after the experiment, to ascertain 
whether the familiarity ratings corresponded to the lag judgements. Since there was
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evidence in Experiment 4 that famous names were likely to be of greater overall 
memory strength than non-famous names, and since there was some evidence that an 
assessment of memory strength influenced the type of JOR an item attracted, there 
was sufficient reason to continue to utilise these categories of items in order to ask 
further questions about recency memory.
Second Behavioural Experiment
Experiment 5 was conducted in order to determine whether familiarity forms one 
basis for the strength differences that support JORs, which would complement the 
findings in the earlier ERP experiments. Participants were presented with the non- 
famous names twice before the continuous memory task, in order to raise their levels 
of pre-experimental familiarity (e.g. Dobbins et al., 2003; Rugg et al., 1998). It was 
expected that if familiarity does contribute to the formation of recency judgements, 
then exposing the participants to these names before the task should increase their pre­
experiment familiarity and as a result reduce any differences in mean JORs between 
the famous and non-famous names (if familiarity can be used as a source of distance 
information). In contrast to this prediction, increasing the level or strength of 
familiarity did not have an effect on JORs. This was the case despite the fact that the 
increased false alarm rate for the initial recognition memory judgment for the non- 
famous names suggested that the pre-exposure manipulation did have some impact on 
behaviour. This suggested that familiarity was either not a basis for JORs, or that the 
level of familiarity of the non-famous names was not increased sufficiently to alter the 
pattern of JORs for this category relative to the pattern for famous names.
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One possible reason for this null result is that exposing non-famous (and rather 
nondescript) names prior to the recency experiment might cause participants to attend 
less to these items later on -  since more typical items may be less interesting and thus 
more poorly encoded than atypical items (Stenberg, Heilman & Johansson, 2007). If 
this line of reasoning is followed, it would suggest that non-famous names became 
relatively less strong after pre-experiment exposure in this experiment, in comparison 
to Experiment 4 where there was no pre-exposure phase. This account of the data is 
unlikely however; since there was no drop in the level of discrimination in the 
continuous memory task across the two experiments, which would be expected if the 
participants were paying less attention to the non-famous items.
It is also possible that participants were able to identify the strength gained for non- 
famous items in the pre-experiment study phase, and that they discounted this increase 
for their later recency judgements. Chalmers & Humphreys (1998) suggested that this 
was the case in their study where exposing their participants to items before the 
recency task did not lead to shorter JORs. In terms of the data reported in this thesis, 
given that the rate of false alarms was higher in Experiment 5 than in Experiment 4, it 
is unlikely that participants had been able to perform this cognitively complex task, 
since familiarity is likely to be one basis of such a strength increase and is a cause for 
heightened false alarm rates (Wolk et al., 2006). Instead the findings in respect to the 
recognition and JOR data suggest that either the level of familiarity was not raised to a 
great enough extent to influence future judgements in the recency task, or that 
familiarity is not employed as a form of distance information when making JORs of 
this nature. In response to this latter possibility arising from Experiment 5, it was
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decided to explore whether an increase in the availability of contextual information 
does influence later JORs in this type of continuous recency memory task.
Third Behavioural Experiment
Experiment 6 was almost identical to Experiment 5, with the exception that in the 
study phases prior to the continuous recency task, pre-experimental levels of 
recollection for the non-famous names were manipulated. An attempt was made to 
increase the levels of contextual information available to participants for the non- 
famous stimuli by asking them to think about each name in a conceptual way (rather 
than in a perceptual way, as in Experiment 5). It was reasoned that a deep encoding 
task was more likely to influence recollection than was a shallow encoding task such 
as that employed in Experiment 5 (e.g. Rugg et al., 1998). The results of Experiment 6 
were highly similar to Experiment 5, both in terms of recognition memory accuracy 
and mean JORs. This was an unexpected result, since deep and contextually-rich prior 
study of items in other research was positively associated with recency judgements 
(Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998). One possible reason for this discrepancy is that in 
the earlier research, much more extensive and perhaps more meaningful pre­
experiment tasks were used than that implemented here. Further, more general 
explanations such as that participants were not motivated to engage in deep encoding 
and that they preferred to rely on less effortful familiarity for their recency 
judgements, could equally have provided the basis for these results.
Another explanation for these null results is that the changes in strength induced by 
the pre-experiment manipulations (either in terms of recollection and/or familiarity) 
were small relative to the levels of pre-experiment familiarity associated with the
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famous names. In order to further explore the reasons behind the results that were 
obtained in Experiments 5 and 6, therefore, the decision was taken to include only 
non-famous names in Experiment 7. If non-famous names studied in advance of the 
continuous recency task using the manipulation employed in Experiment 5 attracted 
equivalent lag judgements in comparison with the other (non-studied) non-famous 
names, it would suggest that the strength manipulation was not sufficient to influence 
JORs. On the contrary, if studied non-famous names did attract relatively shorter 
JORs, it would be evidence to suggest that, in earlier experiments, the strength 
manipulation for non-famous names was ineffective relative to the levels of pre­
experiment familiarity associated with the famous names. Importantly, this finding 
would suggest that familiarity does contribute to JOR formation in line with a distance 
account of memory for recency.
Fourth Behavioural Experiment
The results of Experiment 7 revealed that pre-experimental exposure to non-famous 
names did not influence the recency judgements they went on to attract, despite 
increasing the level of false alarms (indicating that familiarity levels had been raised). 
Judgements of recency associated with studied non-famous names were not found to 
differ from non-famous names that had not been previously studied. What could be 
the reason for this null effect? One likely suggestion is that the pre-experiment 
strength manipulation to increase the level of familiarity in 50% of the non-famous 
names did not lead to a sufficient incremental increase to influence later 
discrimination or recency judgements.
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Though it is likely that the increasing level of false alarms shows that familiarity was 
raised by the pre-experiment manipulation (Wolk et al., 2006), it is probable that only 
what some would call ‘general familiarity’ was increased (Stenberg et al., 2007). 
General familiarity is not accompanied by an increase hit rates, and it is likely that 
this allowed pre-studied non-famous names to lead to memory confusion in the later 
recency task. This might be because is because the strength of familiarity that is 
increased is not specific to the episode, and may thereby make items less salient. 
Generalised strength is thought to make items ‘more ordinary’ (Stenberg et al., 2007). 
If this is the case, less attention may have been paid to the non-famous names after 
study, influencing the accuracy of discrimination levels. This would signal a failure to 
enhance familiarity in a way that might enhance the distinctiveness of the pre- 
experiment studied items.
Since the results of Experiment 7 failed to demonstrate that pre-experimental strength 
manipulations have an impact on subsequent JORs associated with the non-famous 
names, it was decided that an important related approach could be taken whereby the 
strength of the famous names could be measured directly. An investigation would be 
conducted in order to assess whether the level of pre-experimental strength of famous 
names influenced subsequent JORs. This was thought to be an important and novel 
way of exploring how judgements of recency might be influenced by the availability 
of distance information.
Fifth Behavioural Experiment
In Experiment 8, the question of how recovery of task-relevant information associated 
with recollection might relate to JORs was explored, exploiting directly item-by-item
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differences in the amount of knowledge participants had about different famous 
names. The primary aim was to assess the levels of pre-experimental strength for each 
of the famous names, and then to explore whether these were related to subsequent 
JORs for this category in a way that would support a distance account of recency 
memory.
Once again, famous and non-famous names were included in the continuous recency 
memory task. The method used for measuring the strength levels of the famous names 
was analogous to a deep encoding manipulation, in that participants were asked to 
recover multiple forms of information about the individual denoted by each famous 
name. Despite the nature of the deep encoding task, the patterns of recognition and 
recency judgements were strikingly similar to the sixth experiment in this thesis. This 
pattern of findings provides support for the notion that attempts to ‘artificially’ 
manipulate distance information levels is extremely difficult. The attempts reported 
here are not the only endeavours to have failed (Friedman & Kemp, 1998).
Most important in regard to the aims delineated at the start of this section of 
behavioural studies, Experiment 8 revealed evidence in support of the idea that 
recollection, or retrieval of contextual information, is associated with JORs in a 
manner consistent with a distance account of recency memory (Friedman, 1993; 
2001). The number of facts participants recalled for famous names was related to the 
subsequent lag judgements for those names. Crucially for a distance theory of recency 
memory judgements, the more facts recalled for a name (high strength) -  the shorter 
the lag judgement that name attracted.
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It is difficult to reconcile these findings with a location or relative ordering account of 
recency judgements. Though these types of information are likely to be available in 
other tasks, such as those described in Chapter 1, their use is limited to a great degree 
in a continuous recency memory task. Instead, participants must largely make use of 
distance information in order to make JORs. Since the task was very long, participants 
are unlikely to be able to use relative ordering information. In addition, the fact they 
had poor recognition memory for many of the intervening items also rules out relative 
ordering information (since you must remember the items before being able to 
compare recency relatively).
Location information is also unlikely to have contributed to JORs to the same extent 
as distance information in this task type, since there were no apparent temporal 
landmarks or any temporal information inherent within the stimuli (see Hintzman, 
2001). For example, if you recovered a memory of your birthday, this provides you 
with location information -  since you can relate this contextual retrieval to time 
conventions. It is difficult to see how participants could derive any location 
information in this task. The recency judgements in the continuous recency memory 
task were also often inaccurate, suggesting that distance information was being used, 
if not exclusively, then to a greater extent than location information, which is thought 
to be superior for recency accuracy (Janssen et al., 2006).
Interpretation o f Behavioural Findings
In the behavioural studies there was evidence that an assessment of strength does 
contribute to JORs in that famous names were associated with shorter JORs across a 
range of lags. The results of Experiments 4 to 7 suggest that pre-experiment
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manipulations do not influence JORs, though they had some influence over 
recognition performance. This is in line with Hintzman’s data that showed recognition 
and JORs are not based on entirely the same memory processes, since lag influenced 
JORs more than recognition (2003). In Experiment 8, the overall difference between 
JORs for famous and non-famous names did not vary much from the way it did in the 
earlier behavioural experiments. This is consistent with the view that immediate pre­
test manipulations do not influence later recency performance to a marked degree.
The results of Experiments 4-6 and 8 are in line with an activation hypothesis of 
memory for recency, whereby strength of a memory trace declines over time and this 
information can be used to place events in time (Hintzman, 2005). The results do not 
provide support for an accuracy hypothesis of recency, which posits that stronger 
memories will be more accurately judged in terms of time than comparatively weaker 
memories (Hintzman, 2005). Famous names (strong) attract relatively shorter lag 
judgements than non-famous names (weak) at lags 5,10 and 20; however Figures 28, 
30 and 34 illustrate that the strong category does not attract more accurate JORs than 
the weak stimuli for all lags. Thus, the behavioural experiments in this thesis provide 
support for the activation hypothesis of memory for recency.
The final experiment involved the equivalent of a deep study task for famous names. 
Levels of processing experiments (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) have revealed that deep 
encoding leads to elevated recognition based on recollection and (to a somewhat 
lesser extent) familiarity, whereas shallow encoding leads to elevated recognition 
based primarily on familiarity only (see Toth 1996; for a review, Yonelinas, 2002). In 
addition, Greve, van Rossum and Donaldson (2007) have argued that semantic
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processing leads to superior levels of familiarity-based recognition. The final 
experiment in this thesis did not correspond to these previous findings, in that 
discrimination levels remained largely similar to those obtained in Experiment 4. This 
inconsistency is likely to result from task differences; including the fact that semantic 
processing occurred the day before the test in the current research.
The final behavioural experiment in Chapter 6 showed that semantic or contextual 
information might be employed in a strength-based manner to support JORs, 
consistent with a distance theory of memory for recency. The findings in Experiment 
8 are consistent with previous research where increasing the level of contextual 
information available during a prior study task leads to more accurate temporal source 
judgements (Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998). In their between subjects task, 
participants were presented with a list of low frequency words and were told either to 
learn the words, or were told to learn the words along with their presented definition. 
After a week, participants returned for a second study phase with half of the words 
from phase one being presented: 50% of the words were repeated once and 50% were 
repeated three times. During second study, the definition group were asked to rate 
how well they knew the meaning and the no definition group were asked to rate their 
level of recognition (sure recognise, unsure, or sure don’t recognise). The final study 
phase occurred the following day with participants being presented with the second 
half of the words from study session 1, in the same manner as study session 2 
(Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998).
Chalmers & Humphreys reported that, at test, participants were asked to make either a 
recency (‘today’/’yesterday’) or a frequency judgement (‘one time’/’three times’).
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Only for the participants in the definition group was there an increase in recency 
accuracy for ‘today’ responses for items studied three times in comparison with items 
studied once. The no definition group had lower levels of recency accuracy for items 
studied three times ‘today’. This study suggests that in a task where contextual 
information is likely to be utilised, an increase in the level of contextual information 
available to participants about the word prior to test increases the accuracy of 
temporal judgements (Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998; for similar results with 
melodies see also McAuley, Stevens, & Humphreys, 2004). An increase in the level 
of familiarity would be expected for the no definition group (see Dobbins et al., 2003) 
because they had been exposed to the items several times and high strength in the 
form of familiarity should make items appear more recent. Since the level of 
familiarity being increased in this task did not lead to greater ‘today’ responses, 
familiarity does not appear to lead to recency accuracy in this kind of task. Chalmers 
and Humphreys (1998) suggested that ‘generalised strength’ is discounted by 
participants when making their recency judgements.
High levels of contextual information recovered for an item during the pre-experiment 
session led to shorter lag judgements in Experiment 8, compared to when only low 
levels of information were recovered for an item. It may be that this data provides 
evidence for the role of semantic memory in certain kinds of recency judgments. 
According to Tulving (1983), episodic memory is always formed and accessed in 
reference to the self. Semantic memory, on the other hand, includes fact or 
conceptually based information that will be changed little by retrieval of its contents. 
Semantic memory is accessed in reference to the world (Tulving, 1986; 2002) and is 
assumed to build up over a long period of time - not typically linked to any one
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particular episode in memory. Though there has been some debate over the validity of 
the notion that there are multiple explicit memory categories (e.g. Hintzman, 1984; 
Roediger, 1984), the combination o f developmental, pharmacological and 
neuropsychological evidence suggests that the distinction between episodic and 
semantic memory is well-founded (e.g. Baddeley et al., 2001; Mitchell, 1989; Roy- 
Byme et al., 1987; Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, & Mishkin, 2001; Warrington & 
Weiskrantz, 1974; Wood, Taylor, Penny & Stump, 1980). Thus one possibility is that 
the outputs from semantic memory can be considered as a form of memory strength 
signal that, in addition to familiarity and recollection, can support JORs (Figure 42).
3 types of Distance 
Information „
1 Chronological Organization
Relative Information \  Location Information
3 Strength Measurement
2 Contextual Overlap
Friedman’s 1993 Fram ework of Memory 
a  for Recency
Semantic Information
Recollection
Familiarity
Figure 42. Interpretation of Friedman’s framework, illustrating the different forms of 
memory which could underlie the strength subcomponent o f distance information.
As an example of semantic strength differences, one might know that Paris is the 
capital city of France and that Santo Domingo is the capital city of the Dominican 
Republic. Semantic memory for the former however, is likely to be stronger for those 
living in the UK (since this information is more likely to have been extensively
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repeated). If this account is correct, the final experiment in this thesis reveals that in 
addition to recollection and familiarity signals, semantic memory strength can also 
contribute to recency judgements.
One other possibility is that semantic memories are supported by recollection and 
familiarity memory processes. Mayes et al. (2004) have suggested that a form of 
semantic recollection may exist which depends upon equivalent memory processes to 
‘traditional’ recollection. In a similar fashion, ERP evidence has revealed that 
executive memory processes are engaged during both episodic and semantic tasks 
(Hayama et al., 2008). Thus, although previous studies have largely linked familiarity 
and recollection processes to episodic memory, they may be tied to semantic memory 
also.
In fact, Tulving suggested that familiarity (noetic awareness) is supported by semantic 
memory (1985). In consideration of amnesic patients with impaired episodic memory, 
despite retention of semantic memory capacity, Tulving suggested that noetic 
awareness could be relied upon for knowledge about previous episodes. This he called 
‘Knowing’ -  a concept later tied with familiarity. Thus, semantic memory is linked to 
familiarity memory processes in that familiarity can be elicited when retrieving 
factual memory rather than only in cases of episodic retrieval (Gardiner & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).
Neuropsychological research has provided some support for these notions. Vargha- 
Khadem et al. (1997) showed that patients with damage to the hippocampus during 
childhood had impaired ability to recall, but that their semantic memory and
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recognition performance abilities were preserved. Where contextual retrieval was 
required, these patients failed to perform (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). The patients 
in the Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) study had an intact perirhinal cortex, providing 
some support for the theory that semantic memory and familiarity are closely linked 
and may even rely on the same processes.
A relevant ERP study by Nessler, Mecklinger & Penney (2005) also provided 
evidence for the link between familiarity and semantic memory, showing that frontal 
ERP effects emerged 300-450ms post-stimulus that were highly similar after both first 
and second presentations of famous faces. The first presentation effect they regarded 
as an index of semantic familiarity -  activity that was not associated with non-famous 
faces. The second presentation old/new activity present for both types of repeated 
faces was regarded as an index of recognition-based familiarity (Nessler et al., 2005). 
The similarity of these observed effects suggests that they could be related, sharing at 
least some of the same memory processes (Nessler et al., 2005).
More recent neuro-imaging evidence has also provided support for this potential link 
between semantic memory and familiarity, in that the mid-frontal old/new effect was 
larger for unitized word pairs that were semantically related than for unrelated pairs 
(Greve et al., 2007). If this line of reasoning is followed, the data in this thesis are 
consistent with the idea that semantic memory supports JORs under some 
circumstances. Experiment 8 illustrated that the greater the level of semantic 
information (and therefore presumably the greater the level of familiarity in this 
instance) elicited for a famous name, the more recently the name will appear to have
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been experienced. This supports the notion that the strength subcomponent of distance 
information (Figure 42, p283) can be relied upon in judgements of recency.
Familywise Error Rate and the Bonferroni Correction
As stated in the discussion in Experiment 4, a criticism that could be made of the 
methods used in this thesis is related to the problem of the multiple comparison error 
rate (or familywise error rate). Familywise error rate is the likelihood of finding false 
positives, or Type I Errors in the results, and this is said to increase if multiple 
comparisons are made from the same “family” of data (where the dependent variable 
and at least one of the independent variables is the same). However, it has previously 
been argued in Experiment 4, that the nature of the comparisons used in the current 
work are not from the same family of data, due to the lack of multiple use of the same 
data points across different lag comparisons, and therefore are not subject to increases 
in Type I error rate. Furthermore, the Bonferroni method itself has been strongly 
criticised in recent years for being too conservative and causing significantly 
increased Type II error rates (Nakagawa, 2004, Cabin & Mitchell, 2000, Moran, 2003, 
Pemeger, 1998). Indeed in a typical analysis with a large number of family 
comparisons, the number of Type II errors that occur due to the application of a 
Bonferroni correction, is likely to be greater than the number of Type I errors 
prevented by the procedure. Therefore, while it is concluded that post-hoc corrections 
for increased Type I error rates can be useful in certain circumstances, due to the 
methods used in the current work, and the criticisms described, they are not 
considered suitable for use here.
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Future Research Directions
Although the ERP experiments described above provided novel findings in regard to 
memory for recency, some limitations are worth mentioning here, in addition to those 
already outlined previously in the discussion and individual experiment discussions. 
The consequence of averaging single trial ERPs associated with the same response 
category for each participant prior to analysis is that it is not possible to make 
inferences about the relative contributions of familiarity and recollection processes to 
recency judgments on individual trials.
It was described in Chapter 1 that it is likely more than one category of recency 
information is available for recency judgements under some circumstances (Janssen et 
al., 2006). An important line of enquiry for possible ERP and behavioural studies in 
the future will be concerned with the conditions under which people may prioritise 
one or other form of information in order to make recency judgments -  for example, 
when the outcomes of two processes provide conflicting information. It is generally 
assumed that, when multiple sources of mnemonic information are available, people 
will rely on those sources that are the most reliable means of making memory 
judgments (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).
An obvious extension to this work would be to acquire ERPs in tasks where the JOR 
is a listl/list 2 judgment. It may be the case that under these circumstances the relative 
contributions of familiarity and recollection differ, and indeed it may be the case that 
recollection under these conditions is employed in a location-based format, with list- 
specific information providing the basis for the recency judgments. The ERP index of 
recollection (the left-parietal ERP old/new effect) would be expected to behave
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differently when indexing the use of information in either a distance- or a location- 
based manner. If supporting JORs based on distance, the left parietal effect would be 
graded in nature, unlike when supporting location-based JORs. The fact that the 
availability of familiarity declines more quickly over time that does the availability of 
recollection (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002) leads to the prediction that this process 
should be less influential for JORs as the gap between exposure and re-exposure 
increases, and the ERP data offer a means of testing this assumption.
Finally, a particularly interesting avenue to pursue could involve manipulations of the 
emotional content associated with stimuli that require recency judgments. Valence 
manipulations are known to influence responses on recognition memory tasks (e.g. 
Greder & Malmberg, 2008; Ochsner, 2000), and social cognitive investigations 
(Gebauer et al., 2008) have led to the proposal that positively valenced events are 
judged to have occurred more recently than negatively valenced events. Variants on 
the continuous recognition memory task employed here appear to be well-suited to 
investigate related issues in a task where valence can be manipulated across stimulus 
categories.
Conclusions
The experiments in this thesis were designed to explore the basis of recency 
judgements in tasks where location information and relative ordering information 
were of limited use. Few studies have addressed the use of distance information in 
recency memory processing and no imaging experiments have been designed in order 
to investigate what memory processes could underlie the strength subcomponent of 
distance information. The ERP data support the claim that familiarity contributes to 
judgements of recency in continuous memory tasks devoid of location cues, and
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where there is limited scope for making use of relative ordering information. The 
findings also provide some evidence that recollection can be utilised in judgements of 
this kind. The behavioural studies in this thesis revealed that the availability of 
semantic information about famous names predicted recency judgments, thereby 
linking this kind of memory content to JORs as well. The findings reported here thus 
indicate that multiple forms of information can be employed in a strength-based 
fashion to make JORs and these therefore fall under the bracket of distance 
information in Friedman’s (1993) framework of memory for recency. They provide a 
platform for initiating future studies where what is explored are the links between 
distance information and other kinds of processes that might support JORs in a wider 
range of circumstances than those that were investigated here.
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APPENDIX 1
Table API. The outcomes of the global analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP old/new effects for words attracting correct 
old/new and correct lag judgements for the 3 selected time-windows. Experiment 1 (n=17)§.
300-500ms 500-800ms 800-1100ms
CC 20.19*** 42.52*** 14.60***
CCxAP - 10.84*** -
CCxHM - - 3.50*
CCxST 14.58*** 26.82*** -
CCxAPxST 2.29* 7.16*** 2.93*
CCxHMxST - - -
CCxAPxHMxST - - -
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H15R15, H25R25, CR. 
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0.001 (epsilon corrected)
•trend
Table AP2. The outcomes of the global paired analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP old/new effects for words attracting 
correct old/new and correct lag judgements for the 3 selected time-windows. Experiment 1 (n=17)§.
Epoch 300-500ms 500-800ms 800-1100ms
Lag_________________ 15___________________ 25___________________ 15___________________ 25___________________ 15___________________ 25
CC
CCxAP
CCxHM
CCxST
CCxAPxST
CCxAPxHMxST
51.92***
42.21***
2.95*
24.15***
4.10*
3.41*
11.42**
2.98*
2.34*
66.94***
28.20***
38.31***
9.33***
37.28***
12.17**
21.50***
9.95***
13.39**
3.83*
24.99***
4.25*
5.36**
§ The factors were Condition (cc), Hemisphere (hm), Anterior-Posterior Dimension (ap) and Site (st). Conditions = H15R15vsCR; H25R25vsCR.
*p<0.05 ***p<0.001 (epsilon corrected)
**p<0.01 .trend
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Figure API. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 
500-800ms and 800-1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 15 and 25 judgements, respectively (n=23).
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Figure AP2. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs for lag 15 words and for lag 25 words at selected anterior electrodes (n=17).
P3 P4PZ
0 500ms 0 500ms 0 500ms
1(W   CR   H15R15    H25R25
Figure AP3. Grand average ERPs associated with correct JORs for lag 15 words and for lag 25 words at selected posterior electrodes (n=17).
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APPENDIX 2
300-500ms, 4.5,1.0 500-800ms, 6.0,2.0 800-1100ms, 3.5,0.5 
H5R5-CR
Figure API. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 
500-800ms and 800-1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 5 (n=23).
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300-500ms, 3.0,1.0 
H15R15-CR
Figure AP2. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 
500-800ms and 800-1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 15 (n=23).
500-800ms, 4.5,1.5 800-1100ms, 3.0,-0.5
313
300-500ms, 2.0,0.5 500-800ms, 4.0,0.5 800-1100ms, 2.5,-0.5
H25R25-CR
■ I
Figure AP3. Topographic maps showing the scalp distributions of the neural activity associated with correct lag judgments for the 300-500ms, 
500-800ms and 800-1100ms time-windows. The maps were calculated on differences scores obtained by subtracting mean amplitudes within 
each time-window for correct rejections from amplitudes associated with correct lag 5 (n=23).
314
Table API. Probabilities of correct old and new judgments and associated reaction times (RT), separated according to lag (n=23) §
New Lag 5 Lag 15 Lag25
p(correct) 0.96 (0.04) 0.90 (0.08) 0.89 (0.09) 0.88 (0.10)
RT 835(144) 975(242) 907(184) 871 (145)
§ Standard deviations are in brackets
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Table AP2. Probabilities of each lag judgment (lag 5,15,25), conditional on a correct old judgment and separated according to lag (n=23) §
Lag5
Actual Lag 
Lagl5 Lag25
Judgment
Lag5 0.55 (.11) 0.11 (.05) 0.05 (.04)
Lag 15 0.38 (.09) 0.63 (.10) 0.47 (.10)
Lag25 0.07 (.04) 0.26 (.10) 0.48 (.11)
§ Correct lag judgments are in bold, standard deviations are in brackets
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Table AP3. The outcomes of the analyses (F-values and significance levels) of the ERP old/new effects (n = 23) for words attracting correct 
old/new and correct lag judgments for the 300-500 and 500-800ms epochs §
Lag5
300-500ms
Lagl5 Lag25 Lag5
500-800ms
Lagl5 Lag25
CC 115.21*** 61.59*** 15.67** 63.73*** 47.83*** 25.30***
CCxAP 5.31* 3.07* - 7.35* 5.72* 10.25**
CCxST 13.63 ***(o.59) 2.53* (0.60) 2.72*(o,50) 2 .69*(o ,64) - -
CC x AP x ST 4.26* *(073) 2.28*(o,65) 4.81 *(0.44) 3 .9 5 *(o ,44)
‘
§ All other nomenclature as for Table 9
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APPENDIX 3
Participants
Six participants aged between 20 and 28 years (mean age 23 years) took part in the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision. Of those included, 4 were female and all were undergraduates at Cardiff University, each being paid £2. The participants reported 
speaking English as their native language. All participants gave informed consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was approved by the 
ethics committee of the School of Psychology, Cardiff University.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 400 male first and last name pairs and 400 female first and last name pairs, half of which were famous names. Famous names were 
taken from celebrity database websites (www.who2.com, www.famousfolk.com) and from various magazine websites (www.heatworld.com, 
www.glamourmagazine.co.uk,www.dailymail.co.uk). Non-famous names were taken from the 1990 U.S. census. Male names had an average of 
11.4 letters and 3.6 syllables. Female names had an average of 12.0 letters and 4.1 syllables. Letters and syllables were equated across fame type.
Procedure
Names were randomly organised in an excel spreadsheet and participants were asked to put a value in the box to the left of each name. A value 
of ‘0’ was to be given if the name was not recognised. A value of ‘ 1’ was to be given if the value might perhaps be recognised. A value of ‘2’ 
was to be given if the name was recognised. This rating scale was in line with that of previous research (Schweinberger, Pickering, Burton, & 
Kaufinann, 2002). The entire task took a maximum of 20 minutes to complete.
